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This work presents a probabilistic symbolic formal method, based on queuing networks, for
checking the robustness of security protocols. The method has been developed to verify the
security promises of availability and synchronisation of state between devices, instead of those
that are traditional analysed such as confidentiality/secrecy, integrity, authentication, (CIA)
and non-repudiation. This research uses a network of M/M/c/K queues to model packets
travelling through the state machine of a device, or between networked devices. This method-
ology allows for the modelling of distributed systems, which are been computationally hard for
other methods in this domain. The method relaxes the level of proof required for a symbolic
formal method to calculating the likelihood that a promise is violated. The reduction in proof
and complexity translates to modelling either the most likely state of the system. However,
unlike other formal methods, the granularity of queuing network doesn’t encapsulate message
content.
This method builds upon on the work of Osorio & Bierlaire[144] by presenting an implementa-
tion with additional state space configurations and probability distributions, along with proofs
of completeness and correctness for the implementation. The additional state space configu-
rations provide a view of the total number of packets in each queue; the ordering of different
types of packets in a queue; and the number of packets in each stage of the queue.
The second part of this thesis present a series of security vulnerabilities discovered within
the IEC61850 substation automation standard (SAS), and its supplementary security standard
IEC62351, using the queuing network methodology. These smart grid (SG) standards were cho-
sen as a testbed for finding robustness attacks within a protocol because their primary concern
is with the safe and efficient operation of the SG, which means that the focus is on quality of
service (QoS) promises, that enforce hard real time limits on the data communication across
the network, over security. However, some of the decisions made to ensure the QoS are met
such as the omission of acknowledgement messages and requests for retransmission, may also
undermine the robustness promises. The SG sector has historically been dependent on the
relative obscurity of the standards to limit the attack surface of these communication networks,
but the introduction of TCP/IP technologies and the increase in complexity of the standards,
to allow for two-way communication between devices, has greatly undermined this approach.
This increase in attack surface has been demonstrated in recent years with the stuxnet[87] and
crash overide[172, 82] attacks.
Using the queuing network method against these standards allowed the author to develop
domain specific attacks, instead of searching for attacks usually deployed against traditional
internet technologies. The philosophical approach used in this research was to develop models
of how the devices reach undesirable states, before describing what level of access and abilities
the adversary required to implement the attack. This approach is agnostic to the adversary’s
methods of entry and techniques used execute the abilities.
During the course of this research project the queuing network was used to show that a re-
stricted adversary can cause a desynchronisation of state between devices during the issuance
of IEC61850 control commands and the desynchronisation of a device from a timing source with
the correct accuracy. The method was also used to show probability of success of a maliciously
injected Generic Object Oriented Substation Events (GOOSE) message to cause a denial of
service attack. A context-free grammar was used to demonstrate how a race condition in the
IEC61850’s association model can be used in a credential intercept attack. These attacks were
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This chapter lays out the author’s motivation for developing the queuing network based formal
method, and why SG communication standards were selected as a testbed. The chapter goes
on to present the author’s contribution, with citations to publications, before finally presenting
the layout for the rest of the thesis.
1.1 Motivation
Formal methods in the security domain have traditionally focused on demonstrating the re-
silience of a protocol to compromise by an adversary trying to exfiltrate data from the channel.
In this section the author lays out why this narrow focus of protocol verification leaves systems
vulnerable to other forms adversarial interactions, and lays out the case why verification of
protocol robustness should be on a equal footing with resilience. The author then explains why
SG standards were selected for exploring the verification of robustness security promises.
1.1.1 Formal Methods Development
Needham & Schroeder stated that “security protocols are prone to extremely subtle errors that
are unlikely to be detected in normal operation”[141], with this in mind a large body of research
has developed various models for verifying a security protocol’s resilience against an adversaries
attempts to extract or alter the information that is being guarded.Several formal methods have
been developed to confirm resilience promises, as well as providing precise and specific set of
statements correct of operation that must be met for the protocol to withstand the classes
of enacted by an extractive adversary. Using the various formal methods models have been
developed to show that an adversary can’t deduce the contents of encrypted messages (con-
fidentiality/secrecy); that the adversary can’t alter a messages content without the channel’s
agents knowing (integrity); that honest agents can believe that they know who they are talking
to (availability); and that no agent can deny having received a message (non-repudiation). The
protocols are verified using either the symbolic model, where a protocol session is arithmetised
and proves that it is resilient to an adversary that controls the communications channel be-
tween the honest agents, or the computational model, where the adversary queries multiple
sessions of the protocol to gather intelligence to deduce the content of the encrypted message.
The evolution of the various formal methods, and the security promises of resilience, stem from
the analysis of cryptographic protocols where the singular adversarial objective is to learn the
contents of messages being passed between honest agents. In reality adversaries can engage in
malicious interactions for alternative reasons than trying to extract information. The focus of
this research is test protocols against adversaries that seek to disrupt the passing of information
between honest agents[5]. The lack of modelling how protocols react to adversarial disruption
means that there are no clear statements correct of operation against this class of attack, which
leaves those operating protocols without an understanding as to how the protocol will react.
This lack of set of statements of operation ultimately means that there is no guarantees secure
message will be delivered through an adversarial channel, when the adversary aims to prevent
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this.
The aim of the author’s research was to develop a formal method that allowed for the modelling
of how protocols cope with disruption attacks, which would lead to the defining of the limits of
a protocols robustness. The author introduced traditional concepts from the fault identification
methods of critical-systems research to the security domain so orthogonal classes of attack could
be modelled to those that are traditional found. The objective of verification in the critical
systems field is to demonstrate that protocols can’t reach an specific undesirable state, or that
it has redundant states to deal with it[28], which aren’t goals that are traditionally encapsu-
lated in security modelling. In security formal methods the adversary is only trying to gleam
information from the honest agent’s state machine. This meant that a new formal method had
to be built to verify against this new class of attacks, along with the selection of a new set of se-
curity promises test against. For the purposes of this research the author selected the promises
of availability and synchronisation of state between honest agents in the face of adversarial
disruption. To be able to verify that a state machine can handle/avoid certain states, with
the aim of confirming the new promises, an abstraction was developed using queuing networks,
which allowed for the encapsulation and manipulation of a communication channel’s properties
which could then be used to show the affects honest agents’ state machines.
It could be argued that existing formal method can be used to model disruption attacks, but
using these methods would not provide the users of security protocols with any useful limits
of correct operation when the adversary is trying to disrupt the robustness of the protocol.
Traditional extractive adversaries are given complete control of the communications network
between honest agents, by folding the communication channel’s properties into the adversary
model, which allows them to drop all the packets should they choose to. A verification done
using these adversaries would provide insufficient granularity of correct operating conditions
for the protocol against disruption attacks. Traditionally the focus of the research community
is in increasing the abilities of the Dolev-Yao (DY) adversary[52], as well as their knowledge of
the protocol, as a way of demonstrating how much effort an adversary has to go to to extract
the critical information from the secured channel. However, the philosophy for modelling of
adversaries attacking robustness is the opposite of those demonstrating just how hard it is to
extract the information from the session is. A protocol needs to ensure its robustness against
the weakest possible adversary to be able to find out what the protocol’s true sensitivity to
disruption is. In the queueing network methodology the weaker adversaries are created through
a more granular manipulation of the properties of the communications channel. With this
granular manipulation different avaliability attacks can be modelled within the formal method
such as packet flooding or workflow amplification.
Being able to find the sensitivities of correct operation is especially important in distributed
protocols security as they are built on the presumption of being able to pass messages between
various nodes to complete their session. However, it is the inclusion of multiple honest agents
which makes it difficult to verify the limits of the protocol using formal methods as the inclusion
drastically increases the state space that needs to be searched to find potential compromises.
Another challenge is the encapsulation of the time dependency that the functionalities of these
protocols have within a formal method. This inability to verify the security of distributed sys-
tems leaves a large amount of contemporary computing infrastructure operating on untested
assumptions that may collapse when adversaries interact with them[41]. The author presents
their queuing network based formal method as step in the direction of solving these problems.
1.1.2 Security of Smart Grid systems
An example of a technological domain that relies heavily on distributed communications and
has stringent timing requirements for its messages are the protocols that are used to control
power systems. These requirements need to be met to ensure that an operation or event isn’t
missed that leads to physical equipment being damaged that could either begin a cascade of
events across the network or injure someone near the equipment. Traditionally the monitoring
of and control of power systems communications was done using a hierarchical SCADA set up,
which meant that the communications could be air gapped from the rest of the internet. This
air gap also relied upon the relative obscurity of how protocols operated. However, a greater
level of communication and autonomy of devices are being introduced into power systems due
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to the challenges of incorporating greener power generation technologies into power networks.
This has come in the form of the creation of the SG design paradigm which uses various internet
technologies to increase the level of connectivity between devices. This new paradigm, and its
associated technologies, have degraded the traditional air gap security principle that the power
systems has relied upon for the past few decades as they communications network is now reliant
on more commonly know protocols as well as being more enmeshed with the internet. One of
the principle design goals of any power system communication network is to ensure the safe
operation of the physical equipment. Due to the sectors faith in the air gap relatively little
effort has been put into the security of the communication protocols, despite the fact that the
second order consequence of the security being compromised could be the disruption of the safe
operation of the physical equipment. Efforts have occurred in both academia and industry to
secure SG systems against the traditional attack vectors of web service, the research into do-
main specific attacks has been limited. The safe of the physical equipment on the transmission
network manifests within the SG communications protocols as strict QoS requirements that
mandate how devices should behave and how quickly messages will be delivered. However,
these QoS restricts the deployment of traditional security solutions on the communication in-
frastructure due to the pursuit of the hard real time requirements leaves little room within the
IP technologies for the communications network incorporate the security technologies and pro-
cesses. This choice between safety and security wouldn’t exist if purpose built communications
solutions were developed.
With the standard’s focus pointed squarely at safety bespoke attacks against SG networks have
already begun to emerge in the wild. Attacks against industrial control systems (ICS) had
been incredibly rare[155] until the Stuxnet virus[87] which disabled and damaged Iranian Ura-
nium enrichment programme. Since then attacks against ICS have grown more sophisticated.
Two notable examples in the electrical grid domain are the attacks against Ukraine’s electrical
distribution network. In 2015 a foreign adversaries infiltrated their IT infrastructure. From
this foothold they were able to gain purchase in the SCADA human interface servers which
allowed them to switch on circuit breakers and install malicous firmware that hindered the
recovery effort[205]. In December 2016 the Ukrainian power grid was affected by the malware
’CRASHOVERRIDE’[82], which was designed to spread across the communication networks
that had implemented the IEC60870 & IEC61850 standards. It traveresed the network and
purposefully threw circuit breakers and damaged equipment. The delivered payloads to shut
off several transmission substations across Ukraine. The interest in this domain of attack sur-
faces hasn’t gone away since these attacks[161]
The IEC61850 protocol was selected for this research because it declared a specific set of QoS
parameters and promises that devices communicating using this standard must obey to ensure
the interoperability regardless of vendor. This is in contrast to other standards used the SG
domain, such as IEC60870 and DNP3, who lack these declarations as they are deployed in
other kinds of cyber-physical systems. The QoS promises of the standard are synchronisation
of state, access control, and availability of devices, which are the promises that the author
wanted to explore using their methodology. It also sets out various hard limits for the arrival
times of the different types of messages. These promises and parameters are declared to ensure
the safety of the physical devices connected to the communication network. In spite of this, all
the communications models within the standard have been designed with the presumption that
protocol sessions will always run as intended, despite including synchronisation of state promise
to ensure sessions can quickly be resumed. Whether the incorrect operation occurs due to an
error or malicious intent the fact that none of the communication models have any means of
handling exceptions will lead to unsafe states occurring which could lead to damage or injury.
If a malicious adversary were intent on destroying transmission equipment, they could achieve
this by attacking an intelligent electronic devices (IED) by either making it lose the state of its
session or denying its ability to communicate with other devices. The would lead to a violation
to the QoS limits which lead to physical devices being destroyed from overcurrents. Another
concern of author was that if IEC61850 didn’t have declared ways of handling undesired that
there would be no consensus amongst device vendors on how to handle them. This would lead
to violations of interoperability of devices being undermined occurring. The standards com-
munication models hadn’t been tested for robustness against error and adversarial interactions
which meant the communication network could cause dangerous situations to arise. With these
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problems in the standard the author felt that they would be able to find omissions in the stan-
dard’s QoS using the queuing network methodology they were developing for the reasons given
in section 1.1.1.
The author also used their methodology to assess IEC62351 ancillary security standard which
offers authentication, integrity protection and confidentiality, as well as mechanisms for replay
detection to devices using IEC61850.
1.2 Research Questions
In summary the research questions that this project sought to answer were:
1. Is there way of creating models within a formal method to define the limits of security pro-
tocol’s robustness against adversaries seeking to disrupt a session between honest agents?
This could be from an adversary with the objective to either ensure that protocol ses-
sion isn’t completed (availability), or that a session has to reset if the connection is lost
(synchronisation of state between agents).
2. To be able to precisely define the limits of correct operation of security protocol in the
face of robustness attacks, how can the DY adversary be made weaker?
3. The IEC61850 SAS declares that its QoS promises are synchronisation of state (session
resumption) and availability, to ensure that devices from different can interoperate and
upkeep the power transmission infrastructure’s safety. Using the methodology developed
to answer questions 1 & 2 are their omission in the standard’s descriptions of the different
sessions where an adversary or error can undermine these promises?
1.3 Contributions
Questions 1 & 2 are concerned with the creation of models to see if a security protocol is
vulnerable to promises that aren’t traditionally tested for with formal methods. For the reasons
given in section in section 1.1.1 the author decided to create a new formal to answer these
questions. The author’s method is based on symbolic model (which is described in section 2.1.1)
methods, but provides a lower standard of proof than those in this family of methodologies.
Instead of providing a rigorous proof that a security violation is within the standard, the method
gives the probability that a violation of availability or synchronisation of state will occur given
a set of operating parameters. The author’s probabilistic formal method was developed using a
network of M/M/c/K queues, that use the block at service congestion discipline. The is based
on the work of Osorio & Bierlaire[144] but was expanded upon by the author by introducing:
• Other state space configurations, that provide the ability to analyse a queuing network
in different ways.
• Alternative probability distributions of packet acceptance/processing to M/M , that allow
for different traffic models through the network.
• The inclusion of being able to model several packet types at once.
The queuing network is set up to to either represent the state machine of a device running
the protocol or a network of devices communicating with a specific protocol. The adversary
interacts with the network by either introducing new kinds of packets in the network or altering
the arrival or processing rates of packets into a queue. These rates can be used to represent
features of the scenario being modelled, such as the size of the packet. The effects of these
interactions can be seen through the different queuing network state space configurations. The
configurations available in the authors method are:
• The number of packets (agnostic of packet type) in every queue in the network.
• The number of packets of each type that are currently being processed, blocked from
transmitting, or waiting to be processed, either in an individual queue, as developed by
Osorio & Bierlaire[144], or every queue in the network.
16
• The order of the packets of each type in either an individual queue or every queue in the
network.
The results of these state space calculations can be further developed with the use of traditional
queuing theory performance metrics. The use of conditional probability allows for the mod-
elling of weaker adversaries that can only infer information about the state of an honest agent
or whether packets may have passed along a path in the network. The author’s implementation
of the formal method is presented with a set off proofs of completeness and correctness for the
data structures and algorithms they have used in the design of method.
All these features greatly expand upon the current research into using queuing theory to model
attacks against a systems availability.
Using the queuing network formal method the author was able to find several omissions in the
IEC61850 communications models that were developed into attacks that compromised the stan-
dards QoS/security promises of availability and synchronisation of state. The attacks discovered
by the author were:
• A race condition was demonstrated in the standard’s association model which allowed for
an adversary to be able to intercept legitimate credentials intercept attack. This attack
undermined the standard’s promise of access control. This attack was presented using
context free grammars[209].
• The standard’s multicast messaging services was demonstrated to be utilisable by an
adversary to create the conditions for a workflow amplification attack. This attack com-
promised the standard’s promise of availability[209].
• It was shown that an adversary can de-synchronise a server issuing control commands to
a node during a session, which would force the session to reset. This attack compromised
the standard’s promise of synchronisation of state[210].
• The likelihood of successful packet injection attack utilising a malicious GOOSE multicast
message was calculated. This was shown that it had the potential of creating a DoS attack
due to IEC62351’s anti replay attack algorithm[211].
• Showed that a IEC61850 node can easily be de-synchronized from the layer of time-
synchronisation network that has the correct accuracy for its functionality, due to the
state machine having no states for handling exceptions [207].
• A queuing network model for general packet injections was presented.
In the appendix of this work the author presents a qualitative analysis of the omissions in
IEC62351’s threat modelling.
1.4 Thesis structure
The rest of this thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 goes over the current state of the art
in security protocol analysis and smart grid security. The first half of the chapter presents the
various formal methods that are used to analyse the limits of the correct operation of security
protocols. How each method works will be presented, along with what aspects of the protocol
they encapsulate, and the level of human intervention that the method requires. This section
will go over the deficiencies of the symbolic model approach, as the author’s formal method is
primarily based from this approach. It also presents how the research community have increased
capabilities of the DY adversary through additions to their abilities and knowledge capacity. It
also goes over the computational model used to prove the correctness of cryptographic protocols.
A section is dedicated to the security research that has been done using queuing theory and
context free grammars.
The second part of the chapter goes over state of research into the security of SG technology,
along with the unanswered problems. It first lays out what security considerations are made by
the IEC61850 and IEC62351 standards. There are sections that discuss the privacy issues and
the attempts to apply the encryption protocols to SG standards. An entire section is dedicated
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to the SG specific attack vector of injecting false data into the state estimation of the grid. It also
looks at the security problems of the network time protocol (NTP) and precision time protocol
(PTP) protocols (these are the standards referenced in IEC61850) as time synchronisation is a
critical aspect of substation automation.
Chapter 3 presents the author’s probabilistic formal method to find the limits of a security
protocol in the face of disruption attacks. The first section goes over the standard results of
queuing theory so the mathematics of the M/M/c/K queuing network can be described. It then
presents how the author’s implementation of the formal method perform its calculation. The
next section goes over the proofs correctness and completeness of the author’s implementation
of the formal method. Before finally providing a comparison of the queuing network formal
method with the other methods presented in chapter 2.
Chapter 4 presents the attacks against IEC61850 that the author discovered during this research
project. The attacks in this chapter are those listed in section 1.3
The final chapter provides a summary of the work presented in the thesis, along with future
work that could be added to the formal method and possible research question that could be
perused using the method.
The first appendix presents a paper that gives a qualitative description of the limitations of
IEC62351-3 public key management[208]. The second appendix is an unpublished manuscript




This chapter explores the current state of the art in security protocol verification and research
into the security of SG systems. In the first section it is shown that the overarching focus of the
security protocol verification community has been to show that security protocols are resilient
against adversaries seeking to extracting a secret message, with very little attention being paid
to other classes of attack. The review explores the two different schools of thought for verifying
the promises of security protocols, the symbolic model and the computational model, as well
as reviewing the various projects working on automating the process. The various approaches
of each school are presented, a long with the general limitations of the schools of though. This
review is demonstrates that there is a niche in the protocol verification community for methods
that test for other attack vectors, which the author’s formal method begins to fill, and lays the
groundwork for the comparison of methods presented in section 3.3.
The review goes onto to looking at how queuing theory has been used to model DoS attacks in
security research. In this section it is laid out why queuing theory was selected as the formalism
for the author’s formal method. It also presents a brief look of how finite state machines have
been used in security research.
Section 2.2 reviews the research that has been done on the security of SG protocols and systems.
It presents the security considerations that are inherent within the different SG protocols,
and then looks at what security promises have been used to analyse the strength of these
mechanisms. The section goes on to look at possible solutions that have been researched, such
as intrusion detection systems, before looking at the specific security risk that arises due to the
cyber physical nature of the SG, attacks against the grid’s state estimation mathematics.
2.1 Security Protocol Modelling
This section gives an overview of the two philosophical approaches that are used to test the
validity of security promises of protocols, before going over the research into automating these
processes. The frameworks of protocol analysis are the symbolic model, where the protocol is
arithmetized to see if the adversary can extract the secret message from flaws in the protocol’s
narration, and the computational model, where the adversary tries to compute the secrete
message by inferring from quires made to multiple sessions of the protocol.
2.1.1 Symbolic Model for Analysing Security Protocols
The symbolic model is primarily used to analyse the semantic steps of security protocols run
to see if there are flaws in the logic that an adversary can exploit. All symbolic methodologies
encapsulate aspects of the functional operations required for the completion of protocol run,
such as the messages, keys, nonces, and so on, as variables without, whilst excluding other
message qualities such as size or content, which then are used to demonstrate how an adversary’s
interactions with the protocol will create a counterexample to the promises. In these approaches
it is usually presumed that the adversary has no crypto-analytical capabilities so they can’t infer
a messages content. They can only learn the message if they learn its encryption key. This
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section starts with the a general critique of symbolic model, and the present the different
adversary that have been developed by the research community. The first symbolic model,
and the basis for all symbolic adversaries, was done by DY who demonstrated that cascade
protocols using public key cryptography weren’t secure against an active adversary[52]. They
did this by developing a simple operator notation of public key cryptography. This methodology
encapsulated only what the agents knew from the values of the session that they posed. After
exploring the research into symbolic adversaries an overview of the different symbolic model
based formal methods is presented.
Undecidability & Complexity
All of the symbolic methods discussed in this section are bounded approximations to reduce
the size of the potential state space of variations of protocol that need to be searched for
counterexamples. If the methods didn’t enforce some form of bounding, finding counterexamples
of promises would become an undecidable problem. The initial research into this domain was
done whilst trying to define the complexity of proving confidentiality. The first result in this
field was completed by Even & Goldreich, who demonstrated that verifying the confidentiality of
a ping-pong protocol was NP-Hard problem[59]. Tiplea et al. provided an overview of proofs on
the decidability of confidentiality problems. In their work they reduced the post correspondence
problem to a confidentiality model which they used to show that if either the nonce and/or
the message length in a security protocol model is unbounded then proving confidentiality is
undecidable. They also provided an upper bound on the complexity of proving confidentiality
promises within different boundary conditions. If the model has an unbounded number of
sessions then it can be proved in DEXPTIME, and if it is bounded it is NP-HARD[190].
The author did not find any results regarding the decidability and complexity of other security
promises.
Symbolic Adversary Strength
The standard adversary used in by the symbolic model research community is the DY model[52].
The model states that the adversary controls the network between the communicating parties,
and so can intercept, edit, delay, or drop any message that is passed between parties, but cannot
decipher a message unless the discern the key to the message.
There appears to have been little research into altering the strength of the adversary in the
academic literature. The cases the authors have found are, Cohn-Gordon et al.[43] who model
what security promises can still be maintained in authenticated key exchange protocol when
the adversary has compromised the communications channel’s keys. They define two types of
compromise, weak, where the adversary has the use of the keys but doesn’t discerns them,
and total, where the adversary discerns the key. They prove that a secure session can still be
possible in both situations so long as conditions are met. For weak the adversary needs their
access revoked before the secure session begins, and for total there needs to have been at least
one uncompromised message exchange before the secure session.
Cremers et al.[47] build on this work by exploring other forms of compromise. They add the
adversary capabilities of having learned the pre-shared keys or Diffie-Hellman values of session.
With these new forms of adversary strength they use the Tamarin modelling checking software
to prove that draft 21 of the TLS 1.3 is secure against these forms of compromise, as well as
protection against downgrade attacks. However, they did find a potential de-synchronisation
of state attack vector that could undermine the clients belief of authentication in the draft.
McEvoy & Wolthusen[125] used π-calculus to model an adversary with various agent devices
deployed across a limited part of the network between communicating agents to limit the ad-
versaries strength. They also encapsulate the latency between the adversary’s agents, as well as
modelling that information might be lost between them. They use their model to demonstrate
that if the adversary is restrained enough that they will reveal themselves to the communication
network before they perform their malicious actions.
20
CTL* logics
The CTL* logic is the superset consisting of computational tree logics (CTL) and linear tem-
poral logics (LTL) which are used to formally verify the safety promises of protocols. They
are a deductivive verification method that uses Kripke structures to test the rules concurrent
finite state systems session against a specified set of promises. Examples of promises that can
be checked for are deadlocks, no progress in the run is possible, safety, the set of undesirable
states is never reached, fairness, and a state does not have to wait infinitely long before being
called upon. The methodology views the state machine of a protocol’s communication model
as a tree of infinitely long paths. Each branch on the tree is a potential trace that a session
could go down. The logics encapsulate rules of the state transitions during a protocol session,
and then are used to model a potential trace through the state machine. This approach means
that a explicit notion of time is not incorporated into the modelling of a system. The logical
formulae are used by CTL*’s to describe the properties of a path. The formulae are made up
of path quantifiers and temporal operators. The path quantifiers describe the set of paths the
logical state will apply to, and the temporal operators, ’next’, ’eventually’, ’always’, ’until’,
’release’, and ’never’, describe the properties path.
Due to the computational complexity required to describe the computational tree, CTLs and
LTLs are bounded forms of CTL* which prevent the problem space that needs to be searched
from exploding by only proving certain aspects of the tree. LTLs describe events only along
a single path of the tree by placing the restriction on CTL* that path formulae may only be
preceded by atomic propositions. The time complexity of LTLs is O(|T |exp|φ|), where |T | is the
number of traces and |φ| is the number of path formulae. CTLs still make statements about
the whole tree of state transitions but restrict CTL* by demanding that temporal operator
must be immediately preceded by path quantifier. The time complexity of the CTL algorithm
is O((|N |+ |K|)|Φ|) where |N | is the number of states, |K| is the number of transitions, & |Φ|
is the number of formulae to be satisfied[14].
Research has been done into modifying LTL to model security promises of a protocol. Corin
& Saptawijaya[45] modified an LTL with term algebra, which allowed for the encapsulation
of agents in a protocol session as well as describing an adversary’s abilities. A compiled term
algebra is used to describe a session from which traces analysed using an LTL. A security prop-
erty is confirmed if a logical statement about the adversary’s knowledge is disproved by the
logic. This method allows them to test the security of protocols compromises of confidentiality,
authentication, and forward secrecy as well as DoS attacks that utilise multiple sessions of a
communication model to chock a state machine. This is the only symbolic model based formal
method that the author found that looks for attacks against availability in a protocol’s state
machine. The other security LTL in the academic literature was developed by Carbone et al.[11]
which modifies an LTL with multiset rewriting. It is the same methodology as Corin’s, but
instead of traces, a labelled transition system of the session diagram is generated and reasoned
about. This approach allows the agents to have different strengths of confidentiality by altering
the security promise of a communications channel between agents. It can also model agents
that time out eventually. This is the only symbolic model that the author found where the
properties of the communication channel were decoupled from the adversary model.
Whilst there are various model checking software packages that use these logics, such as LTSmin,
SPIN, NuSMV and TAPAs, the author is unaware of any that have been specifically developed
for the analysis of security protocols. In these model checkers the system analysed is defined in
the tool’s modelling language. These are used to define elements of the system such as variables,
and data types, as well as the promises that the system is expected to comply with.
Belief Logics
Belief logics are used to verify the belief held by an agent on the status of a sessions security
promises matches reality. They are usually used to prove that an agent’s belief in the identity
of the agent they are corresponding with (authentication) is correct. The processes that the
logics use to prove the security promise of a session is by generating a logic description of a
protocol run and then annotating the process by hand to encapsulate the actors beliefs about
each step.
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The first logic of this kind was the Burrow-Abadi-Needham (BAN) logic[32]. They developed
a set of logical connectives to describe the steps in a protocol run and the beliefs of the ac-
tors involved. The logic works by deriving an idealised form of the protocol, by removing all
information that doesn’t contribute to the security beliefs of an actor, and then stating the
assumptions that each actor will have of each step. Logical formulae are derived for each step
of the protocol, from the assumptions, and then checked against the BAN logic’s postulates
of authentication. If there is a contradiction between the formulae and postulates then the
authentication promise of the run has been undermined by the adversary. The logic was found
to have several flaws that undermined the verifications that had been made with it, such as the
idealisation process stripping out crucial details, and the lack of encapsulation of compromised
actors undermining the authentication proof[122].
Gong-Needham-Yahalom (GNY) logic[71] sought to fix and extend BAN logic, by removing the
dependence on universal assumptions onf the protocol run. The logic also encapsulates what an
actor expects in the message which allows for the separation of the implied and actual content
of messages. These extensions were achieved by increasing the range of logical formulae and
postulates of the logic, as well as removing the idealised protocol step.
Datta et al.[50] extended the concepts of belief logics with their protocol composition logic
(PCL). They created a logic that can assess the security of of protocol runs made up of a
composition of different security standards that have concurrent processes. It is achieved by
first describing the communication model with a bespoke process calculus that describes the
threads of the protocol run. Each thread can have several agents acting on it, and the agents
pass information between each other via buffer cords. Once the system has been modelled,
logical statements are made about the threads using various sets logical formulae created by
Datta et al.. The formulae make statements on the knowledge and honesty of actors, and the
temporal ordering and nature of actions. From these formulae proofs can be generated for the
security promises of the system. The security promises that can be encapsulated by the logic
are confidentiality and authentication.
Operational Semantics
Cremer’s operational semantics were developed to separate the logical description of a protocol
from it’s dynamic behaviour. It uses Backu-Naur form (BNF) grammars to describe the pro-
tocol operations, along the series and order of actions an agent using the protocol can make.
Each agent in the run is given a role specification which describes their initial knowledge and
their order of operations. The adversary is different as their specification is only their initial
knowledge of the run. The adversary’s initial can include the knowledge of agents they have
compromised. The grammars are used in labelled transition system to describe a potential trace
of a protocol run. The transition system allows for any agent to repeat an event to encapsulate
multiple protocol sessions happening between agents at the same time, but it is assumed that
the runs are independent of each other. The state of the run is described by the adversary’s
current knowledge and the remaining events of the current runs.
The semantics prove the security promises of a protocol run by having an agent test their per-
ception of the global state of the system from their local knowledge. The promises that can be
tested by an agent are, confidentiality, which is done by checking if the message is discernable
with the adversary’s current knowledge; granular forms authentication that allow the agent to
check if the agents they are communicating are deriving the correct information in the session,
and are alive in the session; and several forms of synchronisation, such as message agreement,
the protocol executes as if there is no adversary (non-injective), and that runs are resistant
against replay attacks (injective)[48].
Cremer created the Scyther tool to check protocols using this approach, which he has been
proved to prove the security promises of IKEv1 and IKEv2 protocol suites and the IEC 9798
authentication protocol. The tool implements the algorithm layed out in Creamer’s work[48],
but the user has to set up the grammar and transition system by hand before the tool can
search the problem space. This approach was further incorperated into Cremer’s more recent
tool Tamarin, which is discussed in section 2.1.3.
22
Process Calculus
Process calculi are a family of approaches used to model the evolutionary behaviour of concur-
rent systems after certain events have occurred. The two main approaches were independently
developed in the 1970s by Hoare, who developed communicating sequential processes (CSP)[79],
and Milner, who developed the calculus of communicating systems (CCS)[128]. These two dif-
ferent approaches have different philosophies of modelling, but both approaches use a set of
actions that describe how the behaviours of processes evolve, along with including an equiv-
alence relation to compare different constructions[142]. Whilst the two approaches have con-
verged over time they both began trying to solve distinct problems, and they’re still some
differences[13, 12]. The types of actions that are common across all the calculi are those related
to decisions, interactions between concurrent processes, and behaviours over infinite time scale.
The aim of theses constructions is to see if a system is equivalent to an idealised construction of
the system’s function, or meets some promise that has been described in a temporal logic. The
usual standard of equivalence that is bisimulation, which compares if the models have the same
structure and accept the same input as the idealised form. CCS builds upon systems described
by a labelled transition systems, and focuses on identifying behavioural equivalences between
constructed models. CSP is a system for modelling the language used to govern concurrent
systems. Their primary use in security research is to see if an adversary is able to gain access
to a communication channel, and if so what they can achieve in the channel given the abilities
they posses.
The CSP calculus has been developed to be able to verifying the traditional security promises
of a cryptographic protocol, confidentiality, authentication and non-repudiation[160]. The most
seminal use CSP to verify a security protocol was done by Lowe, who used a CSP based model
checker to show that the Needham-Schroeder protocol was vulnerable to a man in the middle
attack(MiTM) as well as undermining the promise of authentication[111]. Schneider has used
the CSP calculus to build upon traditional security promises. He used CSP to develop a method
of proving that a protocol’s message may appear to an agent that it could have come from any
participant in a protocol run with equal likelihood[167], and then used this result to verify
that the agents in the dining cryptographer problem are anonymous[38]. Schneider & Evans
introduce the concept of event based time in CSP to verify the authentication promises of the
wide mouth frog protocol[58]. Most of Schneider’s work was completed using Lowe’s Casper
tool. Casper requires the user to lay out a narration of the protocol they want analysed as
well as the primitives used in the protocol, the agents and their initial knowledge. The solver
presumes that the intruder is a Dolev-Yao intruder[112].
Most of the security research using process calculi is done with the CCS derivate called π-
calculus. π-calculus is an extension of CCS developed by Milneret al.[129, 130] to allow for the
encapsulation of mobility in concurrent processes, which allows for communicating automata
to proliferate, forge new links, and die in the models of concurrent systems. As π-calculus can
build models with restricted channels between processes it is straight forward to test the con-
fidentiality promises of protocols, whilst other promises are more difficult using this method.
There have been two main approaches for being able to test other promises. The first was to
create new actions for the calculus, as done in the Spi-calculus which added encryption and
decryption actions so authentication of protocols could be tested[2]. Spi-calculus has been used
to encapsulate the knowledge and expectation of agents, as well as packet fragmentation to
reduce the ambiguity of protocol narration descriptions[31]. The other approach is applied
π-calculus which allows functions to be passed between processes, this means that a wider
range of cryptographic functions can be modelled without having to develop a more complex
calculus syntax[1]. To the authour’s knowledge there has been no automated implementations
of either spi calculus, so any verification of protocols using this approaches will have to be
undertaken by hand. The applied π-calculus has been used in various security domains such as
verifying election properties, interoperability of web services, and key agreement protocols[159].
Cheval & Cortie further extended applied π-calculus by incorporating time functions into the
cryptographic functions. This allowed them to model side channel attacks in security protocol




Herzog et al. strand space methodology was developed to ensure cryptographic protocols upheld
the security promises of confidentiality and authentication in the presence of an adversary. The
strand space models a session diagram as a pair of strands between agents whose only ability
are to send or receive messages with certain cryptographic attributes. Each agent’s strand
represents their local view of the session. A security promise is proven to be upheld when
the agents’ belief of what happened in the session match, and there is no construction of
adversarial strands that give them access to the channel and maintain the agents’ beliefs. If
a bundle of strands can be constructed to show that the adversary can perform a series of
actions that produce an output that simulates an agents belief, it proves that the promise
can be undermined. In a Strand Space model the adversary is an expanded DY adversary,
who can concatenate messages or separate messages into components[60]. Strand spaces were
extended by Syverson to formally encapsulate the belief propositions that can be made using
BAN logics[185].
There has been a limited number of protocols verified using this strand spaces. Kamil & Lowe
used strand spaces to build a model to verify the security promises of TLS 1.0[85]. As far as
the author is aware there has been no automation of this approach.
Induction
Paulson’s structural induction method allows for the analysis and confirmation of security
promises of an unbounded security protocol, by considering a set of potentially infinitely large
traces of protocol runs being enacted between unbounded set of actors. The set of actors include
the adversary, who can also discern knowledge from the actors they have compromised. The
approach also encapsulates multiple sessions occurring between agents at the same time.
Three sets of types are used to describe the protocol’s communication model, agents, messages,
and events. The agents list the actors in the simulation and messages describe the cryptographic
functions that an agent can perform to, whilst events keeps track of all the traces going across
the network. Before each simulation the actors initial knowledge is defined. Each agent will
have a list of keys they have access to, and the adversary will only know the keys they have
from compromised agents. As the protocol run progresses the adversary gains access to the
messages passed across the network, as the approach presumes that the adversary is a DY
adversary. The approach uses three operators that allow the agents/adversary to interact with
the protocol run’s traces, partz, which learn messages from the traces, analz, which extracts
and decrypts mesages from the traces, and synth, which allows for the generation of fraudulent
messages. The security promises of the run are analysed from a global perspective, where if a
certain event takes place in the traces the security promise is declared undermined. For example
if the adversary learns an agents key and so is able to perform on the analz operator on a message
that is imbued with the promise of confidentiality then the session is compromised. The other
promises that the induction method is able to verify are integrity, correct key distribution,
authentication, unicity, and that the session isn’t reused.
Paulson implemented the induction formalism in his Isabella theorem solver[149], and used it
to prove the security of the Kerboros protocol and the security of some smart grid functions.
2.1.2 The Computational Model approach for Verifying Security
The next two approaches for security protocol verification are from the computational model
school of thought. In this model the adversary is trying to increase it likelihood of successfully
decrypting a message through various kinds of cryptanalytical attacks. In the computational
model the messages passed between agents as bitstrings, with the cryptographic primitives
being functions of the bitstring. In this case the adversary is modelled as a polynomial time
Turing machine, with the objective of discerning the decryption key through cryptanalysis. The
author is unaware of any specific automated of generating proofs in this domain.
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The Random Oracle and Cryptographic Game Proofs
The concept of probabilistic encryption was first put forward by Goldwasser & Micali[69] as way
preventing an adversary from discerning the either the whole or part of a cleartext message that
had been encrypted using a deterministic trapdoor function. They describe how an adversary
can attack the message if the possible message space is sparsely populated. Their solution was
the development of the unapproxable trapdoor function, that uses implied intractability, of the
quadratic residuosity problem to encrypt the individual bits of the message. To prove their new
protocol was secure they described the notion of semantic security, where if it is shown that a
passive adversary is bounded to having access to only polynomial time Turing machine cannot
discern which of two messages produced by a given cyphertext with better than probability
of 0.5 then it is secure. From this work they introduced the notion of the random oracle[70]
to further increase their notion of security. A random oracle is a black box function that if
queried with a certain input produces a seemingly random output. If a cryptographic function
can proven to appear to act in this way it is deemed secure from adversaries trying to discern
a cleartext message by repeatedly querying the protocol’s oracle.
These notions of security were developed into a method for testing and developing cryptographic
protocols. Bellare & Rogaway[21] showed that an implementation of a cryptographic protocol
could be secure if the protocol had proven to act like a random oracle. Which meant that a
random oracle could be replaced with a pseudorandom function, as true random oracles cannot
be physically implemented, and the new protocol would still be able to maintain its security.
This was disputed by Goldreich et al.[36] who proved that it is possible for a random oracle
secure protocol to not have any secure implementations as ensemble used as the source of
randomness for the protocol cannot guarantee that there is no tractable way of correlating the
encryptions input and output.
Whilst cryptographic games have been used since at least world war 2[88], their contemporary
formulations are based on Goldwasser & Micali’s semantic security. The idea is to demonstrate
that given an adversarial interaction with a protocol across multiple games that the adversary
can’t discern a defined bit of knowledge about the protocol run. The promises is usually proven
by the adversary trying to discernin which of two messages was encrypted by the protocol.
The comparison between games is either done comparing the execution of the protocol across
games[20] or the probability of an event in a shared probability space across all the games[169].
Whilst the are is an array of games that an adversary can deploy against a protocol , the two
principle ones that are tested against are chosen-plaintext attacks (CPA) and chosen-ciphertext
attacks (CCA). CPA is when the adversary is trying to discern between two messages, and is
given access to protocol a run’s encryption function, whereas CCA extends this to allow the
adversary access to both the encryption and decryption function[19].
Universally Composable (UC) Security
The UC method for analysing security protocols, developed by Canetti,[34], demonstrates that
an observer of a protocol run can’t tell the difference between an idealised form of the protocols
objective and the protocol itself. The UC method views a protocol as program that is executed
across several interacting machines, which allows for the modelling of concurrent protocols, with
an adversarial machines. There is also a machine that governs all the machines in the protocol
run called the environmental machine. This machine takes and distributes the protocols initial
inputs, and performs the final operation of the run of concatenating all the machines local inputs.
All the machine are defined by their ID, the set of machines they can communicate with, and the
program that they are operating. The communication set is series of pairs that describe if the
other machine can provide input, receive output, and, if the machine is the adversarial machine,
or a compromised machine. The first model of the protocol that is used in UC verification is the
idealised form. The idealised form is used to define the security promises that are being verified,
as the adversary can only compromise environmental variables. The UC method has been used
to prove the promises of authentication, confidentiality, and synchronisation of machines, as
well resilience against byzantine generals[99], side channel, and coercion attacks. The protocol
execution model allows the adversary to compromise any machine in the protocol. If the final
concatenated global outputs of the two different forms are the same, then the protocol is has
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met that security requirement.
A useful feature of the this methodology is that it reduces the amount of effort required to
prove a complex protocol is secure. It has been proven that a protocol that is made up of a
set of simpler interconnected protocols that have been proven to be UC-secure, then the new
protocol is also secure[35].
2.1.3 Security Analyizer Tools and Proof Solvers
There have been many different automated tools that have been used to analyse the security
promises of crytpographic protocols[48, 150, 147], this section will go over the contemporary
tools that are currently in development.
The Tamarin solver is being developed by Cremers et al.. It is based on combination of multiset
rewriting systems[37], first order logical formulae, and labelled transition systems. The labelled
transition systems keeps track of what the adversary knows, what messages have been passed
on the network, the freshness of values in the network, and the protocol’s state. The multiset
rewriting systems are used to define the agents and protocol, as well as keep track of the facts
and transitions of the labelled transition system. The first thing that needs to be defined is
the equational theory of the model. This includes cryptographic operators, as well as mathe-
matical operations that an agent can perform. Multisets are used to define the behaviours of
the agents, along with notions of value freshness and how the adversary can interact with the
labelled transition system. Finally the security properties that are being verified are laid out
in a first order logic. The Tamarin solver looks at the traces of facts as the labelled transition
system evolves. The solver looks for counter examples of the promises, which in turn could be
potential attacks in a protocol run[166].
Tamarin has be used to discover attacks 5G Authentication[18], the TLS 1.3 drafts[47], and
V2X Revocation Protocols[204].
Proverif is an applied π-calculus cryptographic protocol verifier implemented in prolog by
Blanchet[24]. The cryptographic operations used by the agents, and the adversary’s abili-
ties are described as constructor functions that describe what functions are passed along a
communications channel. The adversarial model primarily used by proverif is the DY model.
The system can model multi-session attacks as it allow for an operation to repeated limitless
times so long as the previous operation has been completed at least once. Given the potential
for these process to not terminate Blanchet developed an algorithm that reduces the π-calculus
into horn clauses. These horn clause statements are then searched to see if an inference rule
that state the adversary’s objective is true[23].
Proverif has been used to verify the security of smart grid authentication schemes[165].
2.1.4 Queuing Theory in Security research
The principle focus of queuing theory security research has been describing network level DoS
attacks. It is a suitable abstraction for this type of attack as the queuing theory abstraction
can easily be mapped onto the idea of a device with a buffer of packets to process. The queue
represents the server and the objects entering the queue are equivalent to the packets enter-
ing the server’s buffer, from this the efficiency that a server can process packets can easily
be calculated. Different probability distributions for the packet arrival and processing can be
used to model how a server can cope with different scenarios it may be faced with[76]. Despite
this natural affinity, seemingly little research has been pursued modelling other attacks against
availability of a server in queuing theory.
Most DoS attack research using queuing theory uses either a single M/M/1 queue, which will
be explained in section 3.1.1, or an open Jackson network[72], which is a network of M/M/1
queues. Relying on M/M/1 puts a boundary on what can be learned from the model, as
this type queue has no limit on its buffer. Given this underlying assumption, all that can be
discerned from these models is the degradation of a servers performance. It can’t answer the
question of when a server will cease to meet the promise of availability.
Below is a selection of the more novel queuing theory DoS models.
Wang et al.[200] built a two dimensional embedded Markov M/M/1 queue to model the num-
ber half open connections a server has caused by both regular and adversarial traffic during
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a SYN flood attack. Each packet has a different probability distribution for their arrival rate
into the server queue. For their work they develop an algorithm that has a slightly smaller
time complexity, O(N5.7) where N is the number of half open connections, than Gaussian elim-
ination algorithm usually used to solve continuous time Markov chains to find the stationary
probabilities of their queuing model. With their model they are able calculate the probability
of connection loss and buffer occupancy percentage. With their metrics they demonstrate that
reducing the holding connection time or increasing the maximum number of half open connec-
tions reduces the probability connection loss, but only reducing the arrival rate of malicious
connections reduces the percentage of buffer occupancy.
Akhlaghi et al.[4] use the exact same mathematics, experiments, and metrics as Wang to obtain
the same results. The difference between the two papers is Akhlaghi et al. is looking at DoS
attacks voice over IP proxy servers.
Wan et al. [198] developed a countermeasure to a SIP flooding attack using two M/M/1/K2
queues, where K is the size of the servers buffer. They split the traffic entering the server into
two priorities. The low priority is for packet inviting the server for a connection, and the high
priority is for all other packets. This mathematical solution to this model was generated by
Ohta [143]. This model prevents timeouts occurring in legitimate server interactions, as all new
requests are processed in a separate queue. Using this method they show that the occupancy
of high priority queue remains relative stable, and thus keeping the processing time of the le-
gitimate packet under the timeout threshold, whilst the low priority queue bears the brunt of
the DoS attack. However, their model doesn’t take into account that initialisation of legitimate
sessions may still be drowned out in a DoS attack.
Kesdogan [92] uses queuing theory to analyse the MIX anonymity method, and justify changes
to the algorithm to prevent attacks against the protocol. The MIX protocol has servers collect
a batch of packets before outputting the batch in a different order than it received them. This
process can occur several times to reduce the likelihood of successful statistical analysis, but the
process only needs to be successful once to provide some level of anonymity. One attack against
the protocol is if the adversary manages to get all but one their packets in batch to be theirs.
Kesdogan uses an M/M/1 to show that if the MIX server chooses an arbitrarily selected time
window for which it collects the batches of packets, it greatly reduces the adversary success.
Kammas et al. [86] used an open Jackson network to model the propagation of computer
viruses across a computer network. They did this to find a computationally easier abstraction
as an alternative to non-linear epidemiological models. Each node in the network represents a
computer on the network, and so the probability of transmission between nodes encapsulates
the topology of the communication network. The state space of the network represents the
number of viruses, anti-virus programs, occupying each node and the number of virus/anti-
virus annihilations that have occurred at a node. The use of open Jackson networks reduces
the complexity of the calculations required, as the open product form of the state space can be
used to generate a solution[72].
Xu et al.[212] use the birth-death process, a precursor to M/M/1 queue model, to model the
two stage low rate DoS attack proposed by Macia-Fernandez et al.[115]. The adversary in the
attack wants to defeat statistical analysis of their traffic, by injecting pulses of malicious traffic
at foretasted points. The attack happens in two stages the first stage the adversary matches
the regular traffic to occupy spaces in the servers buffer. When the buffer is full the adversary
sends a pulse of packets with an increased arrival rate of their malicious traffic which DoS’s
legitimate traffic, but looks like just a heavy load to any analysis of the traffic. Their analysis of
the attack shows that adversary has a high probability of successfully implementing the attack,
but only achieves a modest disruption of the server compared to traditional flooding attacks.
An alternative uses of queuing theory in computer security research are as follows Shintre et
al.[168] use of an open Jackson network to model optimal strategies for side channel leakage
in a packet scheduler. The legitimate and malicious packets enter the scheduler according to a
Bernoulli distribution, with the malici1ous packets being given a priority. The adversary wishes
to discern the legitimate packet arrival pattern, and does so calculating the time difference of
probe packets being sent into the scheduler. From this the adversary can develop optimal non-
adaptive strategies to maximize the leakage, using the Shannon entropy in the model.
After discovering the workfactor amplification attack, described in section 4.2, the author
wanted to explore disruption attacks further. To do this an abstraction was required to be
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able model different kinds of attacks against of availability. Given the use of queuing theory to
model DoS attacks, the author felt that with a little extension that the abstraction could be
developed other kinds of availability. In spite of the ease of adaptation to modelling packet level
availability attacks, the focus of the research was to explore the attacks at the state machine
level. Given how the abstraction was good at modelling this class of attack, a decision was made
to see if a device’s state machine could be mapped to a queuing network. With the selection of
Osorio & Bierlaire[144] queuing network abstraction, the research focus became to develop the
methodology and see what aspects of the state machine could be modelled and what kinds of
attack vectors could be encapsulated at this level of abstraction.
2.1.5 Finite state machines and Context-Free Grammars in Security
Research
Given the first attack that the author published attack, the credential intercept attack described
in section 4.1, was developed using finite state machines and context-free grammars, a brief
overview of how these techniques have been used in security research is presented here. Finite
state machines have been used to validate the general promises of communications protocols
for decades[30]; however, they have only recently been applied to security promises. Poll and
Rutiter[151] used automata, along with black box fuzzing techniques, to show that session
languages are usually poorly defined leading to vulnerabilities. Wood and Harang[206] proposed
a framework for using formal language theory to secure protocols, as it is better at defining the
data transiting between points of a network.
The use of context-free grammars has been applied to various security problems. Sassaman
et al.[163] used context-free grammars and pushdown automata to create a framework for
a language based intrusion detection systems. Liu et al.[103] used probabilistic context-free
grammar to prove that an adversary could impersonate authentication server in a Point-to-
Point Protocol over Ethernet protocol.
2.2 Smart Grid Security Research
This section presents the security features inherent in IEC61850 and IEC62351, a long with
the features in IEC60870 and DNP3, to present the reasons as to why this class of distributed
system would be a good testbed for the authors queuing network based formal method. The
section then goes on to present an overview of the various avenues of research into the security
of SG systems, as well as the security of time synchronisation protocols.
2.2.1 The Inherent security of SG protocols
This section explores the security promises and mechanisms that are presented in the various
SG SAS. This lays out the security of IEC61850 to show why it is was selected as a test bed for
the author’s method. Even though this research focuses on testing IEC61850 standard, with
the SG security ancillary IEC62351, to test the queuing network methodology, the security of
other SASs used in the SG domain are presented here to further explain IEC61850s selection.
As stated in the introduction care needs to be taken when thinking about the security of an
SAS, because the without a proper security implementation the safety QoS of the standard can
be compromised by an adversary. The standards do attempt to secure the SAS systems, but
the designers have failed to do their due diligence as they haven’t developed a threat model
that covers their domain. Along with this provide no form analysis on how to assessing their
countermeasures are with dealing with the threats.
More importantly none of the standard provides a complete set formalised communication mod-
els of the various functions of the standards. The formal model is required for those trying to
prove the security promises, and in this case the resilience, of the standards. Also by stating
the specific threats the standards are designed to prevent analysis can clearly state what is
omitted, what communication models need developing to meet the designers intentions, and
provide concrete metrics that can be tested against. Without a formal model that describes
the acceptable internal states of the devices on the network and the tolerance for unreliable
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communications channels, anyone performing an analysis is left to infer the security intentions
of the authors. The formalising of the desirable states allows people to formally prove that
their countermeasures negate threats, and can be used in the calculation of the probability that
the system ends up in an undesirable state. The system can end up in up in undesirable states
without an interaction with a malicious adversary, and without a formal model it is impossible
to assess if the overall system can extricate itself from the undesirable states in a QoS require-
ments compliant way. The communication models in all the standards makes no comment on
how the system should recover from an undesirable state. This omission increases the difficulty
of testing a systems recovery time, as it is left to the manufacturer of devices to implement their
own recovery functions (if they do at all). The recovery of state is critical to the QoS of SGs, as
these systems are designed to run for years without requiring a reboot. Consideration should
also be made in the formal models about how to prevent an adversary from exploiting conflicts
in security promises or counter measures to achieve their objectives. An example of this is due
to the interoperability requirements secured devices must still be able to work with those that
haven’t, as stated in IEC62351-8. The model would also be useful for those who are developing
intrusion detection systems for the communications network to discern the difference between
the correct and malicious behaviour.
IEC61850 was developed with the objective to replace the various general SCADA protocols
used in the SG domain with one purpose designed interoperable standard. It achieves this by
declaring how IED should communicate with each other through explicitly stating the semantics
of messages, a device’s communication interface, and the logical relations between communica-
tion functions. It also lays out very specific QoS promises for message delivery to ensure the
safe operations of the electricity distribution infrastructure. With these promises in place it
can declare how a devices in a substation will handle the data and commands it receives, in-
stead of just describing the communication channel like the generalised SCADA protocol. The
encapsulation of all the functions for transmission and distribution substations into a series of
modular logical nodes that can be combined together into a custom IED. The logical nodes
describe the protection, monitoring and control operations that can be configured in a device,
as well as how they can be automated. There are seventeen different communication models
that provide session diagrams for how the logical nodes can communicate.
The standard demands that devices in the communications network always be available and to
automatically recover after failure (which can be posited as a form of synchronisation of state),
as well as messages between devices maintain their correctness during transmission (integrity).
The standard maintains the promise of availability by specifying that there should be a “dual
port redundancy” which requires each device on the network has access to a redundant commu-
nications network, so if the primary network is unavailable to them it can still send and receive
messages. The standard sets that maximum grace time that a communication interconnect can
suffer is of the order of 10ms.These promises are to ensure the QoS requirements are met by the
nodes on the communication network so they can always be able to send and receive emergency
messages, such as tripping a circuit breaker, in 3ms in order to prevent any damage to the
transmission infrastructure. The dependability of these safety messages is calculated using
D = 1− Pmissing commands, (2.1)
with the accepted probability of a safety message failing being 10−5. To complement this the
standards’ definition of the security of the communications channel is defined as
D = 1− Punwanted commands. (2.2)
An example of an unwanted command would tripping a circuit breaker when it isn’t required.
The accepted probability of unwanted trips occurring on the communications network should be
10−8. However the designers of the are assuming that adversarial interactions can be modelled
in the same way as faults in the network. The two equations make no consideration for if an
adversary sends a sequence of messages. IEC61850 makes limited comments on the security of
the communications channel, and provides no consideration of the security of the device. The
only resilience promise the standard makes is the deployment of access control to prevent DoS
attacks. The standard states it will prevent link layer and association DoS attacks. It accom-
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plishes this by limiting access to systems using the authorisation establishment communication
model, which is described by the application association communication model in IEC61850-7-2
[120]. An attack against this communication model is demonstrated in section 4.1. From this
instance an association between entities on the network can have one of five different privileges
to describe what the accessing party can do to a device. If the the accessing party has no
privilege to access a device, the standard dictates that this doesn’t automatically mean that
the device can respond as if it is being attacked. It transitions to a presumed state of attack
after an unspecified number of no privilege attempts have been made.
It is the combination of the QoS promises, large number of communication models, and hierar-
chy of stringent real time message delivery timings that made this standard an ideal candidate
for testing the queuing network method. These promises are declared to make the system ro-
bust, not to be able to withstand many classes of adversarial interaction. However its robustness
is limited to ensuring the substation continues to operate regardless of operating conditions.
This robustness isn’t extended to the design of the communication models themselves. The
models make concrete statements about the expected timings and orders of messages, but there
is no thought given to the devices and functions are meant to recover from any disruptions. If
these considerations are left to the implementers of the devices and software there is no guar-
antee that the their solutions will integrate with each other, which will violate the promise of
interoperability of devices.
IEC61850 also declares that the implementer should prevent an “attacker(s) attempts to make
use of the SAS system in a way that the attacker is not authorised”, but provides very little
guidance on how this should be achieved.
IEC61850 can be further secured the ancillary security standard IEC62351 which extends
the security promises, and threat models, of the communication channels implemented using
IEC61850, IEC60870, or DNP3 standards. The standard is written to provide the promises of
the CIA triad and non-repudiation. It also presents an algorithm for preventing replay attacks
using the IEC61850’ GOOSE messaging service. The author describes how the replay attack
prevention can be used for packet injection based DoS attacks in section 4.4. IEC62351-1 [180]
does acknowledge that it is working in opposition to the QoS requirements of the SG standards
it compliments. It also makes clear that despite the need for security in this domain, that se-
cured devices will still have to be to communicate with unsecured ones without compromising
security. It provides no description of how these device will exist together. The standard is
written to allow for the manufacturer of devices to know what functionality their devices must
have to maintain the security of the communications network. The authors have attempted to
write the standard so that it “lists precise design details and leaves little room for interpreta-
tion”[184]. However the standards undermines this aim as it it carries on with IEC61850 focus
on the security of the communications channel, but only declares what security functionality the
devices should have[184]. Without clear guidance on how the security functionalities should
be configured or interact with each other, the standards allow for the likely possibility that
the stated promises will be undermined due to the various vendors implementing the required
technologies in incompatible ways. However, the devices will still be required to communicate
with each other due to the QoS requirement of interoperability, which would produce a network
where the lowest common denominator of security is the defacto standard across the network.
IEC62351-3[181] describes how public key cryptography will be deployed on the IEC61850 com-
munication networks. The threat model of this section is to use confidentialiy, integrity, and
message level authentication to prevent eavesdropping, MiTM attacks, replay, and spoofing
attacks. It states that only TLS 1.2 and subsequent versions should be used to encrypt the
network. It also declares which cypher suites can be used. The authors have pointed out the
deficiencies of this section in appendices A & A.1.4.
IEC62351-4 [182] describes how TLS will be used to work with the ISO9506 MMS standard that
is used by IEC61850 to send messages across the network. The section provides application
layer security to the SG infrastructure. It does explicitly allow the use of both the secure and
non-secure MMS messages to be used in conjugation with each other.
IEC62351-6 [187] is the section that specifically deals with the securing the features of the
IEC61850 standard. It reaffirms the standards defence against MITM and replay attacks, and
providing a mechanism for being able to identify tampered messages. This section achieves this
by using VLAN technologies and modifying IEC61850’s substation configuration description
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language. However, it provides no description of how these technologies will identify the de-
vices. It is important to note that this standard makes clear that “applications using GOOSE
and IEC 61850-9-2 and requiring 4msec response times, multicast configurations, and low CPU
overhead, encryption is not recommended”.
And finally there is IEC62351-7 [184] which describes which parts of the communications in-
frastructure and devices should be monitored. The section makes no remarks on how these
aspects should be monitored.
IEC60870 is a SCADA telecontrol standard which was later extended to be used for electrical
transmission. It was designed to control devices either through point to point communications
or a multidrop communications bus. This combined with the standards focus on low band-
width, meant that no two way communication could be deployed across the standard and only
the master device could initiate communication. The main advantage of this meant that mes-
sage collision detection wasn’t required for the standard. Only hierarchical network structures
are possible in this standard, which means that if a node atthe top of a branch is disabled all
subsequent tiers are also lose connectivity. The standard only defined that application level of
data transmission between devices, by defining the structure of the messages and what services
the standard incorporated. However, it is considered a precursor to IEC601850 as it also drove
for interoperability of all devices that used the standard in any domain, so it doesn’t lay out
any explicit QoS promises.
DNP3 is a communications protocol that describes the communication channel between SCADA
devices in any domain. It was originally designed for the use in power systems, but has been
deployed in other domains due to its low bandwidth requirements and reliability features. The
standard focuses on describing how it achieves its transmission goals by using its three layer
OSI model. The protocol was designed for hierarchical network structures, unlike IEC61850.
The standard describes many reliability features select before operate and spontaneous report-
ing, but it doesn’t describe the behaviour of the devices when it receives a message. Given its
deployment across various domains it has no declared QoS promises that its communications
models can be tested against.
There has been research into the security of the protocol. East et al.[53] developed a taxonomy
of attacks against DNP3. In it they discussed what different strength adversaries could achieve
by attack different layers of DNP3’s frame. They state the consequence of an adversary mod-
ifying each field of a DNP3 message. They concluded that the biggest security threats to the
network is the channel no longer being confidential, and the operator losing either situational
awareness or control of their network. To address the security concerns a secure authentication
functionality was added to the standard. This included a key distribution and an authentication
handshake communication model. Cremer et al.[46] used their Tamarin protocol analyser to
demonstrate that the function upheld their security promise, and allowed them to make further
suggestions to improve security.
2.2.2 Protocol Analysis
The focus of this research is to formally analyse the adherence of protocols to their claimed
security promises. Other than Cremer’s[46] work the author couldn’t find any cases of formal
methods being used in the SG domain. On top of that there has been limited research into
the SG domain specific threats that need to be factored into the development of SG com-
munication protocols. There are plenty of taxonomies of attacks against general smart grid
technologies[134, 202, 95, 216], but only since 2010 have there been taxonomies focusing on
specific attacks against IEC61850[152, 56, 154]. Most of the theorised attacks against smart
grids are either derivatives of computer network exploits, or an infiltration into the smart grid’s
information network via compromising the affiliated corporate network. Most taxonomies put
forward solutions for there proposed attacks based upon their computer network counter parts,
without considering if it will conflict with the QoS promises of the protocols.
Despite this, there has been some research directly focusing on attacks using IEC61850’s
GOOSE multicast messaging service. Most of the attacks using GOOSE are done with the
inclusion of, and sometimes caused by, the replay attack protection of IEC62351. Hoyos et
al.[80] demonstrated a GOOSE spoofing attack where the adversary injects malicious copies of
legitimate message, with an incremented stNum, the GOOSE variable that counts the number
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of events that have occured, to force the IED to ignore some of the future messages it will
receive. They also flip any Boolean data in the transmitted DatSet. The aim of their attack is
to get an IED to perform an undesirable action, such as ignoring a command to trip a circuit
breaker. Strobel et al.[177] qualitatively expands upon Hoyos’ attack vector by discussing that
if an adversary replayed a GOOSE message within two minutes of a stNum rollover, after 232
events the stNum counter resets, they can undermine the availability promise of an IED for
up to approximately 4.5 years, presuming no one notices. Whilst Kush et al.[98] also model an
attack against availability by using a near rollover stNum, they model two other attacks. In the
first attack the adversary floods a GOOSE subscriber with messages that have incrementally
higher stNum until they exceed the current value, and in the second attack the adversary injects
malicious messages, with a marginally higher stNum, at a slightly higher rate than the regular
messages. Whilst not developing an explicit adversary model El Hariri et al.[77] explores an
important consideration for the security of the GOOSE protocols whose QoS promises demand
that devices from different manufactures be interoperable. They demonstrate that different
commercial devices and simulation libraries respond differently when presented with the same
undesirable situations. The various implementations had differing responses with messages with
old timestamps, and out of order sTNum, and with timestamps outside the 2 minute skew of
the IEC62351 replay prevention algorithm.
There has also been some research that looks into filling the omissions in IEC62351. Tawde
et al.[186] propose a bump in the wire key management mechanism to implement IEC62351-5,
which is designed to extend the security promises of IEC60870 and DNP3. They propose con-
necting the bump in the wire devices to the remote terminal units and management terminal
units on the network topology. They claim that this would be a practical way of bringing legacy
hardware in line with the standard, but make no consideration as to whether the added latency
will violate the QoS requirements that the users of IEC60870 or DNP3 need in their implementa-
tions. Fries et al.[64] identify that MMS messages that use multiple transport layer connections
in their traversal of the network undermine the promise of integrity, as the standard assumes
that an intermediary in the chain is trusted. They propose introducing security sessions into
the MMS protocol to restore this promise. Ruland & Sassmannshausen[158] propose adding the
security promises of non-repudiation and traceability to IEC62351-4 to enhance MMS security.
They argue that the authentication of communication partner does not guarantee authentica-
tion of the origin of data transmitted. They propose encoding XML non-repudiation tokens
into the data sent between the client and the server. These tokens will contain proof of author-
ship and a timestamp. Zhao et al.[221] points out that certificate revocation is not a declared
part of IEC 62351-3, and propose using a broadcast encryption media key block to secure the
communications in a hierarchical device structure which would allow them to revoke a device’s
certificate. However, they provide no proof as to if their algorithm actually meets the security
promises of IEC62351-3. Fuloria et al.[65] discuss the various possible encryption choices, and
their implementations, given the limited computational resources the communications network
will have. They also develop a broader threat model which encryption can defend against. How-
ever, their analysis overlooks what could go wrong in key update algorithms. They conclude
that encryption may be too great a burden to implement on smart grid network.
2.2.3 Intrusion Detection Systems
There has been a substantial body of work dedicated to the creation of bespoke intrusion
detection systems (IDS) for SG communication networks.
Mitchell et al.[131] provide a broad, yet thorough, analysis of the current state of IDS for cyber-
physical systems research. They identify several gaps in the field that have been ignored by
the research community such as a greater need for bespoke performance metrics to be designed
specifically for cyber-physical systems, and not enough effort has gone into looking for domain
specific attack vectors.
There have been different ways suggested to model and detect malicious behaviour on SG
communication networks. Examples of the methods are using stochastic process modelling[6],
graph theory to specifically detect aurora type attacks[176], bloom filters[146], packet sniffing
looking for forged ARP packets[153], and semantic analysis[102] have all been considered for use
in this domain. The drawback of these approaches is the potential for mimicry attacks. Also
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these methods only look for known attack vectors as they are trained on historical malicious
events from the internet domain. Another direction is machine learning, using techniques such
as One-Class Support Vector Machines[116], hidden Markov Models, and k-nearest neighbour
algorithms[217]. In the training of these methods the implementer would have to make sure
that the training sets have no malicious activity in them or that would be allowed through the
IDS.
2.2.4 Privacy
There has been a large body of work dedicated to ensuring the privacy of the consumers of
electricity provided by an SG enabled transmission networks, as they generate a large amount
of data about the user, to increase the efficiency of the system. This has raised questions about
how this data could be used in a malicious manner, or entrench power structures. The work
below describes some efforts to either define the problem, or develop remedies.
The following papers focus on defining the problem. McDaniel & McLaughlin[124] discuss the
potential privacy issues of the customers within the context of current US legal statues. They
identify the major source of problematic privacy practises are smart metres in the customers
home’s, and how that information could be abused by a supplier. They also discuss the potential
for abuse by third parties, such as Google. Molina-Markham et al.[137] use various statistical
techniques on a smart meters data to infer a detailed plan of a households daily routine. They
also provide a zero-knowledge method for suppliers to aggregate billing data to prevent such
data leaking. Skopik[171] lays out a broad range of potential threats of to a users privacy, whilst
laying out philosophical solutions to these problems. Yang et al.[215] present technical threats
against SG user’s privacy, whilst presenting the mathematical basis for their counter measures.
The following papers propose solutions to the privacy problem. Mohsenian-Rad et al. designed
an algorithm using game theory that balances the generators schedualing of the networks loads
with the users privacy needs, whilst still incentivising users to use the system.[136]. Lu et
al.[113] developed a privacy-preserving aggregation scheme for secure SG communications that
uses homomorphic Paillier cryptosystem. They also provide proofs of their security promises,
but they do not consider the latency that this system will add to the communication of the
data. McLaughlin et al.[126] developed a procedure to reduce the amount of private information
leaked by smart metres through the addition of a battery between the customers residence and
the gird which discharges every time an appliance is turned on, so distinct load information
isn’t leaked. Marmol et al.[140] proposed a privacy-aware protocol which hides an individual’s
measurements from the electricity supplier while allowing it to access the information on the
aggregated energy use for their state estimations. Savi et al.[164] developed a mathematical
framework to assess the privacy guarantee of a specific SG’s communication architecture. Their
methodology can also be used to assess the tradoff between a users privacy and the precision of
aggregated measurements. Borges et al.[27] develop two quantum mechanics based protocols for
preserving a users privacy, whilst being resistant to quantum computational attacks. They use
quantum entanglement and quantum key distribution to uphold their security promises. They
also developed the iKUP framework which is a privacy-preserving protocol, which uses DC-
Nets and Elliptic Curve Cryptography, that covers power provisioning, consumption, billing,
and verification.
2.2.5 Blackouts
The research into the security or QoS promises of SG communication protocols, but little
thought has been given as to how the communication protocols can include communication
models that negate or help manage blackouts. Bompard et al.[26] gives an in depth analysis of
the current trends of of blackouts in electrical grids around the world. They also hypothesize
about the various challenges faced by SG technology in preventing them in the future. Mahdad
& Srairi[117] developed a pattern search algorithm to develop planning strategies during peak
consumption periods to prevent blackouts. Chen et al.[39] discuss and simulate the ways power
generation architecture run by distributed communication networks can minimise the probabil-
ity of blackouts. Yan et al.[214] study the temporal effects on the power load during a blackout,
and develop a simulation modelling it. This is in aid of trying to prevent such occurrences hap-
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pening during a malicious cyber attack. Liu et al.[105] demonstrated a cyber-physical attack
that harnessed coordinated variable structure switching could cause a blackout.
2.2.6 Encryption
Given the tension between the stringent adherence to the QoS for a SG communication’s network
and the computational overhead of required in implementing cryptographic systems, research
has been done to see if it is possible for cryptographic to be used on SG networks.
Some work has been done on developing specific encryption schemes for IEC61850. Wang et
al.[199] developed various modes of GCM encryption to protect the integrity of the different
message types within the communications protocol, and Yin[218] proposes using identity based
encryption.
Robles et al.[157] weigh up the pros and cons of asymmetric and symmetric key encryption
schemes for SCADA systems that are communicating over the internet. They also note that
the latency of sending encrypted instruction is an important factor in the decision of which
scheme the implementer should use. Zhang et al.[220] do an in depth analysis on a potentially
viable implementation of AES encryption. Tsai & Lo[191] develop a mathematical model to
show that identity based signatures and encryption can be used to produce an anonymous
key distribution scheme for SGs. He et al.[78] develop a homomorphic encryption scheme for
smart grid communications. Zhao et al.[221] analyse the use of media key broadcast encryption
scheme for the use key revocation, in spite of the limited computational resources that intel-
ligent electronic devices have. Cairns et al.[33] explore their Time-Valid One-Time-Signature
authentication protocol. They show that it is resistant to brute force attacks, and that it can go
through its verification cycle in under 10 milliseconds. It should be noted that this is still too
slow for IEC61850 QoS standards. Dan et al.[51] developed a cryptographic system that works
with a modified Diffie-Hellman scheme. They prove that the scheme guarantees confidentiality,
integrity, and forward secrecy, and that it functions on the order of 1̃0ms, which is again too
slow. Ward[201] developed a simulator to demonstrate that public key infrastructure “may be
pushed beyond known limits and must go where no PKI has gone before” within the SG security
domain.
2.2.7 False Data Injection Attacks
One domain specific attack vector that has been explored by the research community is the
injection of false data into a SG’s state estimation calculations to undermine the integrity of the
control operations, automated or human, of the network. Gul & Wolthusen present a taxonomy
of different objectives and strategies of false data injection attacks[74].
There is a significant body of work dedicate to the use of false data injection attacks against
state estimation, where the adversary manipulates a state variable measurement in such a way
as to bypass the bad measurement detection and still be able to drive the state estimation to
demand an undesirable, and potentially damaging, response. It is a concern as it currently
stands the only integrity checks that are done are to see if the data is transmitted correctly,
not to see if the data is correct. In Liu et al. research they demonstrate that an adversary can
approximate a grid’s state through power flow analysis or injection measurements, and they
also provide simulation results to demonstrate that false data injection attacks are viable attack
vector[109]. Kosut et al. classify how false data injection attacks affect the decision making
in a smart grid. The false data injection can make the state of the grid unobservable if set of
meters are compromised by the adversary. The set of target meters can be discovered by the
adversary using a polynomial time algorithm. They also discuss how to detect an adversary if
they haven’t compromised enough meters to make the state unobservable[96]. Ozay et al. sim-
ulated how an adversary can use the communication network’s topology to effect the outcome
of their attack, and showed that if the adversary only has access to a cluster of nodes they can
only effect the consensus process[145]. Yu & Chin use principal component analysis to analyse
the effectiveness of blind data injection and demonstrate that it can still cause damage to the
transmission network[219].
Research into other attacks vectors to compromise a SG’s state estimation has also been done.
Work has also been done by Gul & Wolthusen to demonstrate that an adversary doesn’t neces-
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sarily inject malicious data into the network, but can achieve the similar levels of disruption by
reordering the measurements sent by a device[73]. Baiocco et al. demonstrated that introduc-
ing delays and jitter into a state estimators communication channel can force a control system
to make undesirable decisions[15].
Another class of false data injection attacks is against the networks topology. Kim & Tong
present the criteria required to send an incorrect representation of the network topology to
the control system[93]. There has been work to look at how this kind of attack would affect
different aspect of the power grid infrastructure. Such as how the communications network has
either centralised, or distributed topology, affects the control systems when attacked[175, 174],
and the difference of adding nonlinear effects into the attack model[110].
This attack vector would also allow the adversary to instigate an attacks against the energy
market, as the state estimator is used to set the price of energy[96, 213].
2.2.8 Other Attack Vectors
Other attack vectors that are unique to the SG domain have been considered by the research
community. An adversary could use the networks bad data detection system against the in-
frastructure, by using it to label legitimate meter sources as erroneous depriving the controller
of correct information[94]. Some work has been done to see if switching attacks against the
grid can be prevented. This is where the adversary, through either physical or cyber access,
can manipulate circuit breakers on the power network to cause blackouts[61, 106, 108]. This
attack vector is usually a physical consequence of the use of the false data injection attacks.
A potential solution to the switching attack vector is using a game theory based controller
system to redistribute resources to stabilise the power system. However this proposed system
is dependent on it receiving accurate information from the communications network[62]. An-
other potential use for the false data injection attack vector is to make the system to alter
the load distribution on the power grid to allow the adversary to damage certain parts of the
network[135]. Jamming of packets in SG communication networks has unique consequences in
this space, due to the stringent latency requirements expected of transmission of data. There
has been some effort to model and mitigate such attacks. Wang et al.[114] undertook an in
depth analysis of the consequences of jamming attacks, as well a proposing a profile detection
system. Ghosh et al.[68] performed an analysis on the negative consequence of data packets
being delayed or dropped and how to mitigate them with physical mechanisms in the power
grid.
There has been some working theorising, modelling, and developing ways to mitigate DoS at-
tacks on a smart grid’s communications network. Hurst et al.[81] developed a mathematical
framework to help security practitioners evaluate the scale of damage their communication net-
work will suffer if they are attacked by various types of distributed DoS attacks. Liu et al.[107]
demonstrated that a DoS attack against load frequency controls can affect the stability of the
power grid. Li et al.[101] studied the time delay suffered by critical communication packets on
an IEC61850 communications network when either the physical or application layer is flooded
with malicious messages. One potential mitigation strategy against DoS attacks is to use flock
based behavioural transition rules to make sure the packets avoid deigning a node availabil-
ity to the network[203]. Ansilla et al.[10] developed a hardware based algorithm to deal with
SYNflooding on SG networks.
2.2.9 Attacks Against Time Synchronisation Protocols
Due to the stringent real time QoS promises every device in the SG’s communication network
must keep an extremely accurate time, so as part of this project is to explore attacks the
synchronisation of clocks between devices. This sections reviews how time synchronisation
protocols can be disrupted by a malicious adversary.
There have been various taxonomies on the security vulnerabilities of the NTP/PTP protocols
where the adversary can either manipulate or control the network[83, 67, 119, 83, 67]. Each
taxonomy has proposed countermeasures, such as introducing the CIA triad into this domain
and basing the protocol on the P2P network paradigm. Ullmann & Vögeler[194] performed an
analysis on the consequence of a delay attack against both the NTP and PTP protocols. They
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proved that a delay in a sync message would affect all the client clocks, and a delay request
message would only affect the client that sent the message. They propsed implementing SHA on
the protocol to mitigate these attacks. Tsang & Beznosov[192] created a qualitative taxonomy
of attacks against the PTP protocol. They laid out how an adversary could potentially misuse
certain messages in the protocol to drive the protocol into an undesirable state. Mizrahi[132]
developed some game theoretic strategies to prevent delay attacks against NTP. Malhotra et
al. [118] demonstrated that NTP’s “kiss-o-death” packet can be used to DoS any client on a
NTP network, and denying it the ability to synchronise. There has also been research on how
the NTP protocol can be used to generate distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks. Czyz
et al. [49] performed an analysis of DDoS on the internet that were achieved using unsecured
NTP servers, seeing substantial increases of these kinds of attacks between 2013 and 2014. The
increase was due to adversaries realising that NTP’s monlist diagnostic command could be
used as a work factor amplification attack vector.
Moussa et al.[139] produced a detailed a detailed analysis of the consequences of a delay attack




Queuing Network Based Formal
Method
This chapter describes the author’s queuing network methodology that is used to test the limits
of robustness of security protocols. The first section provides an overview of the foundational
queuing theory results which provide the base abstraction for the author’s formal method. This
section goes onto describe the specific features encapsulated in the author’s formal method.
The second section goes over the proofs of correctness for the author’s implementation of the
formal method. Before finally comparing the queuing network methodology with other formal
methods described in section 2.1.
3.1 The Queuing Network Methodology
This section provides a foundation of queuing theory, focusing on queuing networks, before
going onto describe the author’s formal method.
3.1.1 The M/M/c/K Queuing Network
Queuing theory uses stochastic process to model and analyse the nuances of objects being pro-
cessed by a queue. The abstraction of queue is defined by five exogenous variables, represented
in Kendall notation as A/B/X/Y/Z[89]. A & B are probability distribution that govern the
arrial of objects entering a queue and the rate which they are processed at. X is the is the
number of processors each queue has. Y is the maximum number of objects a queue can hold.
Z, states discipline that a queue’s processor selects the next waiting objected to be processed.
A network of queues is a set of these objects that form a graph, with packets being passed
along the vertices. The author’s formal method builds upon the M/M/c/K queueing network
developed by Osorio & Bierlaire, where M/M represent the that the arrival of objects occur
according to a Poisson process and processed according to an exponential. Due to each queue
in the network having a set truncation limit there has to be a stated blocking discipline for
network. The network used in this formal method use a blocking at service (BAS) discipline,
which means that all subsequent target queues are full, then the server of that queue are cannot
process another object until a queue is able to receive a packet. This discipline was chosen as
it allowed for the encompassing of attacks against availability, as it represents a device or node
no longer being able to accept any more packets.
This kind of queuing network is the base abstraction of the author’s probabilistic formal method
that allows for the testing of a device’s state machine or a network of devices to find the limit
of correction operation when subjected to adversaries who seek to disrupt the completion of
a session. Each queue in the network represents either an individual state in a honest agent’s
state machine, with K represent the maximum number of sessions that a device can have in
this state, or a node in the network, with K being the size of the buffer. In this abstraction the
processing and arrival rates describe the communication channel between the honest agents, or
they can be mapped onto the properties of packets. The adversary in this formal method is
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generated by stating which of these rates in the network they can manipulate.
The assumptions of the formal method are:
1. Each queue obeys the first-in-first-out (FIFO) discipline for processing packets (its Z).
2. That the transition between states is memoryless.
3. The network is in the steady state.
Given assumptions 2 & 3 continuous time Markov chains (CTMC) is used to calculate the
probability that the queuing network will be in a particular state. This is done by solving the
state spaces’ global balance equation. The formal method further assumes that the network
is in the steady state, an approximation where the network’s traffic doesn’t change over time,
which requires the state transitions to be:
• Independent of time.
• Independent of the initial state vector.
If the CTMC is ergodic then an unique steady state probability vector, π, exists that is inde-
pendent of any initial probability vector, which means the global balance for each state space






where πj is the probability of being in a state, qij is the rate of transmission between state i and
j, and I is the state space. From the steady state assumptions equation 3.1 can be rearranged
into the matrix form,
,0 = πQ (3.2)
where Q is the transition matrix that encapsulates the probability flux for each state. Every
transition rate between any pair of states flowing out of a state is stored in the non-diagonal
elements, and the sum of all the transitions flowing into a state are stored in the diagonal
elements. The steady state vector is found by solving the systems of linear equations described
in 3.2 using the boundary condition ∑
i∈S
πi = 1. (3.3)
Once the steady state vector is calculated the marginal probabilities of the state space can be
discerned. These give the probability of a state having a certain configuration of packets, which
is dependent on the state space selected. The various configuration developed for the author’s
formal method are:
• The number of packets (agnostic of packet type) in every queue in the network.
• The number of packets of each type that are currently being processed, blocked from
transmitting, or waiting to be processed, either in an individual queue or every queue in
the network.
• The order of the packets of each type in either an individual queue or every queue in the
network.
These state spaces are defined in section 3.2. The marginal probability is calculated by summing
the probabilities of all the states that have a specific value packets in an element in the state
space from the initial state vector.
3.1.2 Using the M/M/c/K Queuing Network
To test a specific state space or network of nodes, a queuing network representing these must be
defined. Each queue in the network either represents a state in a honest agent’s state machine
for a particular protocol session, or a node in a network of devices communicating via specific
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protocol. Each queue is a vertex in the network, and the edges between each queue are declared
in the set of matrices pτi,j . Where i & j represent queue indices, and τ is the index for the
specific packet type. Each element in the matrix gives the likelihood of a queue transferring a
packet to another queue, and so for the unitarity of the transfer probabilities to be kept
ΣτΣjp
τ
i,j = 1. (3.4)
In this formal method it is possible for several different packet types can be passed through
the network in a simulation, unlike other queuing theory models developed in security. The
level of encapsulation the formal method was designed for is to differentiate between expected
packets and malicious ones, and not specific message semantics or content. Whilst it is possible
to create a new packet type for each kind of message this would drastically a computations
state space, and thus run time.
Each queue in the network has set of declared exogenous variables, that describe how efficiently
it would process packets if it were not in a network. These are the variables manipulated by
the adversary over many iterations of a specific queuing network to find their limit of correct
operation. The exogenous variables are shown in table 3.1
Exogenous variable Symbol Interval
Truncation Limit Ki Z+
Number of Processors Ci Z+
External Arrival Rate γτi R ≥ 0
Processing rate µτi R ≥ 0
Table 3.1: Exogenous variables that must be declared for each queue in the network.
A queue may have multiple packet types passing through it, so for each type a specific γ &
µ will need to be defined. From defining the exogenous variable seven endogenous variables
must be calculated to discern how a queue functions within the network given the potential
for queues to become blocked. These variables are calculated by solving a system of non-linear
equations. The endogenous variables are shown in table 3.1.2.
Exogenous variable Symbol Interval
Probability Queue is Full P (Ni = Ki) 1 ≥ R ≥ 0
Probability Queue is Blocked Pi 1 ≥ R ≥ 0
Arrival Rate λτi R ≥ 0
Effective Arrival Rate λeff τi R ≥ 0
Common Acceptance rate ¯µa τi R ≥ 0
Effective service rate µeff τi R ≥ 0
Traffic Intensity ρi 1 > R > 0
Table 3.2: Endogenous variables that are solved for for each queue in the network.
The traffic intensity for all the queues will be less than 1 to keep it in steady state regime. In
the author’s implementation the probability of a queue being full or being blocked only have
one form, whereas the last five are dependant on which probability distributions selected for a
queue’s arrival and processing rate. The first two equations are calculated using







p̄ijP (Nj = Kj) (3.6)
where the mean probability of transmission matrix p̄ij = Στp
τ
ij The three different probability
distributions used in the author’s implementation are exponential, Poisson, and uniform. These
are included so the user of the formal method can model different kinds of packet traffic entering
a node/state machine. These inclusion of various probability distributions for the arrival and
processing rates was implemented to further push the limits of the range of modelling queuing
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theory could do in the security domain. Other probability distributions could be added to the
methodology to model different packet and adversary behaviour. The forms of the next four
variables for each distribution are shown the three tables below.
Variable Poisson








Effective service rate µeff τi = µ
τ
i + Pi ¯µa τi











Table 3.3: Equations for the endogenous variables using the Poisson distribution.
Variable Exponential
Arrival Rate λi =
¯
λeffi (1− P (Ni = Ki))



















Table 3.4: Equations for the endogenous variables using the exponential distribution.
Variable Uniform










Effective service rate µeff τi =
a+b
2 − Pi ¯µ
a τ
i











Table 3.5: Equations for the endogenous variables using the uniform distribution. Where a &
b are the uniform distribution parameters.
The mean acceptance rate is an approximation used by Osorio & Bierlaire[144] to reduce the
computational complexity of the methodology, which the author carried over to their formal
method. The true value would require the calculation for a queue to account for all the subse-
quent queues that its packets passed through.
The equation for the final variable, traffic intensity of a queue, is dependant on the probability
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distributions selected for a queues’ arrival an processing rates. The traffic intensity is a unitless
quantity so restricts the combinations of probability distributions can be selected for a queue.
If a queues’ λ obeys the Poisson distribution,that has the unit s, then it’s µ must either be
exponential or uniform, which have the units s−1. With the current selection of distributions















with the first case being the queue’s arrival rate is specified as an exponential distribution and
the processing rate is either a uniform or Poisson distribution, and the second case being the
reversed.
3.1.3 Queuing Network Performance Measures
Queuing theory provides a selection of performance measures that are calculated using the
marginal probabilities of the state space being used to study the network3.1.3. All are written
in the context of the state space that shows the agnostic number of packets in each queue, but
some metrics can be rewritten in the context of the other views[25, 72].
Performance Metric Equation








Total Throughput λ =
∑N
i=1 λ0i
Mean Number of Packets k̄i =
∑k
k=1 kπi(k)




Mean Response Time T̄i =
k̄i
λi
Mean Wait Time W̄i = T̄i − 1µeffi
Mean Number of visits ei =
λi
λ
Relative Utilisation xi =
ei
µeffi
Table 3.6: Probabalistic performance measures of queuing theory
Since these measures are agnostic to the types of packets that pass through a queue, not all of
them can be applied to each of the state space configurations used by the methodology. The
table below shows how each of the performance measures are applied to the five state space
configurations that are described in section 3.2.
Performance Metric GK IO GIO IS GIS
Traffic Intensity ρi X X X X X
Throughput λi X
Total Throughput λ X
Mean Number of Packets k̄i X X X X X
Mean Queue Length q̄i X
Mean Response Time T̄i X
Mean Wait Time W̄i X
Mean Number of visits ei X
Relative Utilisation xi X
Traffic intensity and mean number of packets were the only metrics applied to internal order and
internal states state spaces as they provided further insight into the behaviours of the specific
aspects of the queue. Traffic intensity shows the likelihood of a particular type of packet being
in a queue position or being blocked, whilst mean number of packets shows the number of the
types of packets. The other performance metrics are designed to give the user an insight into
the internal state of the queue without having generating the state space, so applying them to
the internal states and orders doesn’t provide any further insight.
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3.1.4 Algorithms used in the author’s implementation
The author’s implementation of the queuing network methodology is structured into four main
parts. The first part are initial calculations that only need to be done once for a run of the
implementation. These are
• Making a list of all the exogenous variables that the user has selected for the adversary
to manipulate.
• Making lists of the queues a queue can transfer each type of packet to.
• Making a list of which packets pass through each queue.
The next part of the implementation is solving the set of non-linear equations for the endoge-
nous variables of the queues in the network. This involves setting up the matrix where each
row is a stores an iteration of the queuing network that has had an exogenous variable altered
by the adversary. Each row has an element for each exo- & endogenous variable for every queue
in the network. The creation of the matrix is dependent on whether the user wants one set of
exogenous variable variations done one after other or recursively nested within each other. An-
other factor in the generation of the matrix is whether the queues all share the same probability
distributions for their arrival & processing rates (if there is queues with a different probability
distribution the implementation uses the central limit theorem for the calculation). Once this
is done the indexing variables for each non-linear equation is deduced, before using Matlab’s
fsolve function, which uses the Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm[138], t solve them all.
The next stage of the code is the generation of the state spaces and creation of state transition
matrix. The state space is recycled for each Q generation, unless a queuing network variation
alters a parameter that affects the state space. These parameters are discussed in section 3.2.
The generation of each transition matrix requires inserting the variations of endogenous vari-
ables into them. From each Q a steady state vector is calculated. This is using MATLAB’s eig
function[8] to solve the eigenvalue problem described by equation 3.2.
The final part is the calculation of each state spaces marginal probability from those the per-
formance measures.
The correctness of the creation of the topological matrix and the state space are proven in
section 3.2.
3.1.5 The calculation and use of conditional probability
Conditional probability is used in the author’s implementation to allow for the adversary to
infer information across the queuing network. A compromised queue or tapped network edge
can be used by an adversary who has access conditional probability abilities to infer what has
passed through other queues or edges that they are not directly connected to. They conditional
probability calculations use the endogenous variables and marginal probabilities of other queues
around the compromised aspect of the network to provide the adversary this information. These
probabilistic inferences can be used to alter the adversaries behaviour on the network. There are
two parts of the author’s implementation where conditional probability is used. The first point
where conditional probability can be used is during the calculation of the non-linear simultane-
ous equations, described in section 3.1.4. During the calculation of the endogenous variables for
each variation the implementation can calculate the probability of a selected variables across
all their variations so far. The variables can be any of the exogenous and endogenous variables
in the network. If the probability crosses a set limit there is an option for the implementation
to alter the exogenous variables and generate a new set of experiments. This can be used to
demonstrate an adversary’s ability to infer aspects of an agents state machine, or infer what
packets are passing along communication channel that they don’t have a tap on. This switching
mechanism can only be activated once per run of the implementation, to prevent the code being
stuck in recursive state without any exit.
The second point where conditional probability can be calculated occurs after the computation
of the selected performance metrics. This conditional probability calculation occurs across the
entire set of network experiments (including those if a conditional probability switch). It is
just a one off conditional probability calculation of selected variables. The variables can be
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selected from any of the network’s exogenous or endogenous variables, as well as any marginals
calculated, and selected performance metrics.
3.2 Proofs of Correctness of the Queuing Network Method-
ology
This section presents proofs that the author’s implementation of the queuing network formal
method provides the correct results for solving the non-linear equation system of endogenous
variables in the network, and creating and solving the state space of a given network. Whilst the
algorithms used, and thus their proofs, used in the formal method are agnostic of a particular
procedural programming language, they are shaped the data structures used. The author
used Matlab for their implementation which primarily stores data in vectors and arrays. The
complexity of the methodology could be improved by implementing it using different data
structures, which would change the proofs in this section. The intent of this work was to
present a proof of concept of the formal method to demonstrate that the robustness of security
protocols can be modelled and tested.
The first section goes over the proofs of the creation of the matrix that stores all the experiments
over selected exogenous variables of a given network, (described by a set of pi,j). The definitional
axioms of a given network are laid out, before proving that the loop invariant used in the creation
the matrix is correct and complete. Finally the equations used to link the variables in the system
of non-linear equations are demonstrated to be correct.
The subsequent three sections lay out the proofs for the generation of each kind of network
state space, as well as the solution of their state transition matrix Q. The first section presents
the configuration of just the number of packets in a queue. The next section presents the
proofs of the ordering of packets in a queue, as well as all queues across the network. And
the final section lays out the proofs that were completed during the course of this research for
the packet in various queue states for a queue, as well as all the queues in the network. This
section also lays out some conjectures on how the remaining proofs for this configuration could
be demonstrated. The layout of these sections, and the proofs themselves, follow a similar
structure. The first step is define what is encapsulated by the state space and the rules for
transitioning between states, so that the rules can be shown to be sound. Next is the proof
showing how the state space is constructed. Each of these construction proofs is different as the
each state space configuration uses different exogenous variables in their definition. Next the
various features of the transition matrix Q are proven, before showing the construction of the
grouping rules, that are based on the algorithm of state space generation. These rules reduce
the complexity of creating Q and calculating the marginal probability. The final proof of each
section shows that the algorithm for creating the Q terminates.
Within this section the author will lay out the complexity of their own implementation of the
queuing network formal method.
3.2.1 Proofs of Correctness for a Network’s Exogenous Variations Ma-
trix
This section goes through the proofs of the generation exogenous variable problem space of a
given network. The base axioms of any network modelled in the formal methods are:
Definition 3.2.1.1. The network must not be a disconnected graph, as the method can only
represent one network at a time.
Definition 3.2.1.2. The set of packet transfer probabilities matrices should meet the condition
Pi =
∑
j p̄ijP (Nj = Kj), previously stated in equation 3.7.
Definition 3.2.1.3. The number of processors of a queue must be, and always remain, less
than or equal than the truncation limit of a queue, Ci ≤ Ki∀i.
In addition to the above definitions the author’s implementation of the formal method
includes these additional conditions to ensure code termination.
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• If a run of the implementation runs across a set of the exogenous variable variations, that
the parameters in the set must be reachable using the provided step size provided.
• The initial parameter of an exogenous variable must be greater than its final parameter
for a given set parameters that will be computed over in a run.
• All pτi,j must be immutable over the course of a run.
These axioms are checked for at the beginning of each run of the implementation. If any of
the axioms are violated the code terminate with an error. Given the above axioms required for
termination, it is now possible to define the loop invariants required for the generation of the
matrix, and then use them to prove the correctness of the problem space. A loop invariant is
a property of a programmatic loop that remains true for each iteration of a loop[66].
To generate the problem space for each variation of a queuing network a list of any of the
exogenous variables that have been given a set of parameters to compute across must be created.
The network’s problem space is the set of each set of exogenous variable variations. There
are two ways of generating this problem space. The first is to go through each variable set
sequentially and create an iteration of the network for each. The second way is to generate the
problem space recursively, where each variable set is nested within the subsequent set.
The loop invariant for the creation of the problem space is the cardinality of the set of exogenous
and endogenous variables for a given queuing network. Each row of the matrix must have this
many elements in it.
Theorem 3.2.1.1. The set of queuing network variables is correct.
Proof. For the set of non-linear equations to be solved each exogenous variable of each queue
must have an value for as defined in table 3.1. An external arrival rate and initial processing
rate for a queue must be declared for all packet types that pass through the network, even if a
specific packet type don’t pass through a particular queue (in this case the value is set to zero).
There must also be a column for each endogenous variable for the queues on the network. For
the six variables that are packet type dependent, each one has an extra column for the mean
of that variable across the types. This means the matrix must have
NCol = Nqueue(5 + 6(Nτ + 1)) (3.8)
columns for each iteration of the network.
In the author’s construction the first Nqueue(3 + 4(Nτ + 1)) columns are zero columns to hold
the endogenous variable’s values. The other 2Nqueue(2 +Nτ ) store the exogenous variables for
each iteration.
Theorem 3.2.1.2. The set of queuing network variables is complete.
Proof. There are two methods for constructing the complete set of network variations. The first
is the sequential order of all the exogenous variables that have been parameterised. This is done
by looping through all the exogenous variables and seeing if any of the queues are parmeterised
in that variable, for external arrival and processing rate there is a sub loop for each packet type.
Once the list is constructed then the set containing all the possible variations of the variable is
inserted into the matrix, with every other exogenous variable of the network remaining at its
initial value.
The other construction of the complete set of queue iterations is recursively. This is when
a set of a variable’s parameter are embedded within another set of parameters, and so on.
Instead of looping through the list of variables and inserting the sets into the matrix, the set
of parametrised variables of the last member of the list is inserted between each member of the
set of the penultimate variable, and so on until the the first variable in the list.
Before the non-linear equation system can be solved the column indices of each variable
required for a specific endogenous equation must be linked to the specific column of that en-
dogenous variable. The linking algorithm loops through each queue index, and then subloops
through each packet type. For this loop system the invariant is equations used to calculate
the linked variables in the equation. For each type of equation, presented in tables ?? − 3.1.2,
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there is an individual correctness proof, but they all share the same completeness proof. All
the proofs for the endogenous variables, except for the common acceptance rate, are the same
regardless of what probability distribution is used, as each equation uses the same variables
regardless of distribution.
Proposition 3.2.1.3. The linking equations used in the calculation of the probability of a queue
being full,P (Ni = Ki), is correct.
Proof. The calculation of the probability of a queue being full requires a queue’s traffic intensity,
ρi, and their truncation limit, Ki. Given the construction of the invariant given in the proof of
theorem 3.2.1.1, the queue’s traffic intensity index is Nqueue(2 + 4(τ + 1)) columns away from
the P (Ni = Ki)’s index, and the truncation limit is Nqueue(3 + 6(Nτ + 1)) away.
Proposition 3.2.1.4. The linking equations used in the calculation of the arrival rate for a
specified packet type, λτi is correct.
Proof. The calculation of the arrival rate requires a queue’s probability of a queue being
full,P (Ni = Ki) and their effective arrival rate for the packet type in question, λ
eff τ
i . Given
the construction of the invariant given in the proof of theorem 3.2.1.1, the queue’s probability
of being full index is −Nqueue(1 + 4(τ −1)) columns away from the λτi ’s index, and the effective
arrival rate is 2Nqueue away.
Proposition 3.2.1.5. The linking equations used in the calculation of the effective service rate
for a specified packet type, µeff τi is correct.
Proof. The calculation of the effective service rate for a packet type requires a queue’s service
rate,µτi , the common acceptance for the packet type, ¯µ
a τ
i, and their probability of being
blocked,Pi . Given the construction of the invariant given in the proof of theorem 3.2.1.1, the
queue’s service rate index is Nqueue(5Nτ − 3τ + 9) columns away from the µeff τi ’s index, the
common acceptance is 2Nqueue indexes away, and the probability of being full is Nqueue(4(Nτ −
τ) + 7).
Proposition 3.2.1.6. The linking equations used in the calculation of the effective arrival rate
for a specified packet type, λeff τi is correct.
Proof. The calculation of the effective arrival rate for a packet type requires the queue’s prob-
ability of a queue being full,P (Ni = Ki) and their initial arrival rate for the packet type, γ
τ
i .
The calculation also requires the effective lambda value of any queue that feeds that packets
type into the queue. Given the construction of the invariant given in the proof of theorem
3.2.1.1, the queue’s probability of being full index is −Nqueue(3 + 4(τ − 1)) columns away from
the λeff τi ’s index, and the initial arrival rate is Nqueue(4Nτ − 3τ + 7) away. The difference in
indices of effective lambda values is given by j− i where j is the index of the feeding queue.
Proposition 3.2.1.7. The linking equations used in the calculation of the mean acceptance
rate for a specified packet type, ¯µa τ i is correct.
Proof. There are two cases in the calculation of the common acceptance rate, depending on
which probability distribution is used. In both cases the calculation requires the queue’s effective
arrival rate, λeff τi and the mean arrival rate,
¯λeff τ j , mean processing rate, ¯µeff τ j , and the
number of processors, Cj , of the queues that the queue of interest feeds into. Given the
construction of the invariant given in the proof of theorem 3.2.1.1, the queue’s effective arrival
rate index is −Nqueue columns away from the ¯µa τ i’s index, and subject queue’s mean arrival
rate is Nqueue(4 ∗ (Nτ + 1 − τ) − 1) − (j − i) away. Also the subject queue’s mean processing
rate is Nqueue(4(Nτ + 1 − τ) − 2) − (j − i) away, and finally the number of processors is
Nqueue(6Nτ − 4τ + 10) away.
Additionally, when either the uniform or Poisson distributions are used, the calculation requires
the queue’s probability of being blocked, which is Nqueue(4(Nτ − τ) + 5) columns away, and
the subject queue’s probability of being full, which is −4Nqueueτ + (j − i) away.
Proposition 3.2.1.8. The linking equations used in the calculation of the probability of a queue
being blocked, Pi, is correct.
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Proof. The calculation of the queue’s probability of a queue being blocked,Pi, and the queue’s
effective arrival rate for the packet type, λeff τi . Given the construction of the invariant given in
the proof of theorem 3.2.1.1, the queue’s probability of being full index is −Nqueue(1+4(τ −1))
columns away from the Pi’s index, and the effective arrival rate is 2Nqueue away.
Proposition 3.2.1.9. The linking equations used in the calculation of traffic intensity, ρi, is
correct.
Proof. The calculation of the traffic intensity requires the queue’s mean effective arrival rate, ¯λeff i
and the mean effective processing rate, ¯µeff i, and the number of processors the queue has, Ci.
Given the construction of the invariant given in the proof of theorem 3.2.1.1, the queue’s mean
effective arrival rate index is −3Nqueue columns away from the ρi’s index, the mean effective
processing rate is −4Nqueue indexes away, and the number of processor is 2Nqueue(Nτ + 1).
Where in the above proofs τ ∈ [1, Nτ + 1] to include the mean value of the variable. Before
proving the completeness of for the above set of invariants, a discussion for including the central
limit theorem when calculating the effective arrival and processing rates must be discussed. If
all the queues in the network are using the same probability distributions for their lambda and
mu calculations then the central limit theorem isn’t required, but if a single queue is using
a different distribution then it will be. If is used then two rows are inserted between each
parameterised set of variables.
Theorem 3.2.1.10. The linking equations described in the proofs to proposition 3.1.2.3 to
3.1.2.9 produce a complete set of equations
Proof. There are two cases of completion. The first is if the central limit theorem isn’t used. In
this case the complete set of all the linked equations above is just all the rows in the matrix. If
the central limit theorem is used then the indices of the pairs of rows is inserted for calculation
of the central limit theorem are withdrawn from the list of all matrix’s rows.
3.2.2 Proofs for the Global K State Space
This section lays out the theorems used in the generation of and use of the state space that
shows the agnostic number of packets in every queue in the network (that shall from here be
referred to as the global K state space). The axioms of this state space are:
Definition 3.2.2.1. The states space SGK for the global K is defined as
SGK = {n1, ..., nN |0 ≤ ni ≤ Ki} (3.9)
where Ki is the truncation limit of a queue, defined in table 3.1.
There are three types of state transition in this state space. Transmission into the network,
Ii, transmissions out of the network, Oi, and transmissions between queues Ti. These transitions
are described below.
Definition 3.2.2.2. The transition rules of the global K state space are:
Label State Transitions Rate Conditions
Ii (ni, ...)→ (ni + 1, ...) −λi γi 6= 0 & ni ≤ Ki − 1
Oi (..., ni)→ (..., ni − 1) −µeffi pi,∀j = 0 & ni ≥ 1
Ti,j (..., ni, ..., nj , ...)→ (..., ni − 1, ..., nj + 1, ...) −µeffi pi,j 6= 0 & ni ≥ 1 & nj ≤ Kj − 1
where are all the rates and conditions are described from the perspective of transitions flowing
out of state i.
In the author’s implementation the first step is to generate the chosen state space for the
network’s exogenous variables.
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Proposition 3.2.2.1. The algorithm that creates the state space for a given queuing network,
as defined in section 3.2.1, only generates feasible and reachable states by the transition rules
given in definition 3.2.2.2 and a given set of truncation limits K and a mean probability of
transmission matrix ¯pi,j.
Proof. For the state space SGK to contain every feasible state is every possible state of a queue
in the a given network must be permuted with every possible state of every other queue in the
network. If a queue receives packet exogenously (from here on referred to as a source queue) or
there is a path from a source queue to a non-source queue through ¯pi,j then the queue’s state
will be within the interval ni ∈ [0,Ki], otherwise its state space is ni ∈ {0} so long as it doesn’t
violate definition 3.2.1.1. The set of a queue’s possible states is defined as Ni.
To generate evert feasible state for SGK each queue’s Ni undergoes two duplication operations.
The first operation duplicates each member of Ni, becoming N ′i , so each state can be matched
with every state in the subsequent queues state space. To equal the cardinality of the subsequent
queue’s state space a duplication factor must,DFi, is calculated for every queue in the network.
This factor is given by the equation,
DFi = Π
NN
j=i+1(Kj + 1) (3.10)
where DFN = 1 as it has no subsequent sets to be duplicated against.
The second operation duplicates the set N ′i , so that it matches the number of states in the
proceeding queue. As the proceeding queue will also have been duplicated, and recursively
on until the first queue, the number of times that a N ′i is repeated is given by SRi. SRi is
calculated using the total number of states, |SGK |, which is equivalent to the number of states





These two duplication processes provides every feasible state in a given queuing network with
a defined set of queue truncation limits K.
The state space contains every reachable state as the queuing network can’t be a disconnected
graph, as stated by definition 3.2.1.1. This means it is possible for packets to pass through
every queue in the network given the transition rule Ti,j stated in definition 3.2.2.2. Packets
will only pass through the network if a source queue is present which utilises rule Ii. If there
isn’t a source queue, or there are queues upstream from a source, then their individual state
spaces Ni = {0} as defined at the beginning of this proof.
Corollary 3.2.2.2. The number of states in a global K state space is,
|SGK | = ΠNqueuesi=1 (ni + 1), (3.12)
where ni ∈ [0,Ki]∨ 0, depending on whether packets are passing through the queue i. As stated
in proposition 3.2.2.1 every reachable and feasible state is every state of a queue being permuted
with every state of every other queue. This calculation uses this statement with multiplication
principle of sets to give the result.
For the transition matrix Q to be correct the transition rules it is generated from must be
sound. Below are the proofs for the transition rules stated in definition 3.2.2.2.
Proposition 3.2.2.3. The transition rules of the global K state space, as given in definition
3.2.2.2, will not lead to any state collision.
Proof. Let A = {Ii, Oi, Ti,j} be the set of transition rule. If all three transition operations were
applied to the same state, the concluding state for each operation would be different because
the modification that each transition rule applies to a state is different.
Proposition 3.2.2.4. The transition rules of the global K state space, as given in definition
3.2.2.2, do not contain any contradictions.
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Proof. The transition rules cannot be applied to the same state, as each rule has a different
activation condition. Also the rules wont lead to a gap in their domain, given that the state space
is generated using a deterministic algorithm, described in the proof to proposition 3.2.2.1.
Generating the transition matrix Q from a set of transition rules and state space with a
deterministic structure, lead to the matrix having certain set of properties.
Theorem 3.2.2.5. That the transition matrix Q is invariant for a given state space as defined
in prop 3.2.2.1
Proof. If K is fixed then the state space |SGK | is invariant which leads to the dimensions of Q
remaining constant, as |SGK | × |SGK |. Each index (i, j) in Q remains either zero or non-zero
for a given state space. This is dependant on if there is a transition between states. A state will
transition if a queue in the state meets the conditions of either being a source or sink queue,
or there is connection within pi,j that allows for a transmission of a packet to another queue.
The initial and concluding state of any transition will remain invariant because the position
of all the states in the state space is determined by the deterministic algorithm that generates
the state space, which is described in proposition 3.2.2.1. So any transition between states,
regardless of the values of the exogenous variables, will have the same (i, j) so long as the state
space isn’t altered, by changing a queue’s Ki. This doesn’t mean that the rate of a transition
can’t also be zero.
Theorem 3.2.2.6. For a given state space, as defined in prop 3.2.2.1, and set of arrival rates
γ and processing rates µ there is a unique transition matrix Q
Proof. As stated in proof 3.2.2.5 for specified set K and a pi,j there is a specific layout of a Q
where the values of the rate for each transition have continuous values. The layout, and thus
the solution, becomes unique for a given set of values of λ & µe{{ across all the queues in the
network, because each transition rate can then be calculated.
To decrease the computational complexity of generating Q grouped forms of the transition
rules were used, instead of searching the state space to find the concluding state of a transition.
Theorem 3.2.2.7. That grouping form of the transition rules will generate the correct transi-
tion matrix Q for a given state space and exogenous variables as defined in theorem 3.2.2.6.
Proof. The grouped form of the transition rules are based upon the deterministic structure
of S generated using the algorithm described in proof 3.2.2.1. The grouped rules are used to
calculate the indexes of a set of concluding states that all share a set of initial states when one
transition operation is applied to them. As stated in the proof 3.2.2.1 the number of times a
specific state in a queue is repeated is given by DFi and the number of times a whole block of
states is repeated is given by SRi. The starting index of any N ′i block in the state space can
be found using
SIBIi = 1 + (BI − 1)DFi(Ki + 1)); (3.13)
where BI is the number of N ′i repetitions. Each transition operation is applied to these BI
blocks (In the case of the Ti,j transition it is the BI block of the transmitting queue). The
start of any specific state repetition can be found using
SS = SIBIi +DFini (3.14)
where ni is the state index. The grouping form of the transition rules are used for calculating
which group of specific ni indexes pair with each other. For the Ii & Oi transitions a block
consists of every state of a certain value. The block is paired off with a the block with either
the subsequent or proceeding state. To find the start position of the concluding block of an









For a Ti,j state transition the block of states involved in a particular starts off by containing all
the states on the lower index queue, regardless of if it is the transmitting or receiving queue, in
the set ID. Then subsets of indexes that match up with the states in the higher index queue
that can’t be involved with the transmission are removed from the set, as there will be several
BIhigher index blocks for one of the lower index’s. This will be the states 0th states if higher
index queue is transmitting or the Kth states if it is receiving. The number of subsets that are




The calculation between the starting index the initial and concluding blocks is
T conci,j = T
start
i,j +DFj −DFi (3.18)
as it is as an Ij and Oi operation are done one after the other.
The grouped form of the rules cover all reachable states in a specified state space as they have
the same conditions of use as the rules in definition 3.2.2.2. For Ii & Oi it is simply when they
used, whereas with Ti,j the rules are used to generate the initial set grouped states.
The complexity for the generation of Q is dependent on the operation theorem 3.2.2.7 being
applied to each queue. So the complexity for each queue is O((Ki + 1)SRi).
Theorem 3.2.2.8. That the generation of the transition matrix Q terminates.
Proof. As described in this state space configuration’s complexity argument the generation of
Q is completed using three loops. The nested loops loop over the set of queues in the network,
Ki+1 for each queue, and the SRi factor described in proof 3.2.2.1. These monotonic variables
are all calculated before the loops are initiated, and are not altered within the loop. Therefore
the loops generating Q will terminate.
The method of the calculation of the marginal probabilities is given in section 3.1.4.
Corollary 3.2.2.9. The logic and proof for calculating the marginal probabilities is the same
as proof of theorem 3.2.2.7.
3.2.3 Proofs for the Internal Order & Global Internal Order State
Spaces
This section lays out the theorems used in the generation of and use of the state spaces that
show the ordering of packets in a single queue and every queue in the network. The structure
of the proofs are similar to those described in section 3.2.2. The axioms of the state space for
the ordering in a single queue are:
Definition 3.2.3.1. The states space SIO for internal order is defined as
SIO = {n1, ..., nK |ni ∈ τqueue} (3.19)
where τqueue is the set of packet types passing through the individual queue under inspection
as well as ∅ for empty spaces in the queue. An additional rule of the state space is that there
can’t be an empty space between two packets.
There are two types of state transition for this state space. Transmission into the queue,
Iqueue, and transmissions out of the queue, Oqueue.
Definition 3.2.3.2. The transition rules of the internal order state space are:
Label State Transitions Rate Conditions
Iqueue (..., ni,Ø, ...)→ (...ni, ni+1, ...) −λτqueue nK = Ø
Oqueue (..., na..., ni)→ (na+1, ..., ni,Ø) −µeff τqueue ni 6= Ø | a ∈ [1, Cqueue]
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where are all the rates and conditions are declared from the perspective of transitioning out of
a state.
The first step generate the state space of all possible orderings of packets for an individual
queue.
Proposition 3.2.3.1. The algorithm that creates the state space of all possibles orderings in
queue, only generates states that are feasible and reachable by the transition rules given in
definition 3.2.3.2 for a queue with a truncation limits Kqueue.
Proof. If the queue receives no packets, the only feasible state in the state space is all positions
in the queue are empty. The feasible state space of non-empty queues are built using a recursive
process. A queue with Kqueue = 1 is a column vector of the packet types passing through it
and the ∅. Queues’ Kqueue > 1 are a union of the Kqueue = 1 column vector, with each state
extended with Kqueue − 1 ∅, and Kqueue = 1, with each state duplicated, combined with with
the non-empty state space of a Kqueue − 1 queue. So the complete feasible state space that
includes every packet ordering of a queue is the union of the empty queue set, which is just 0’s
in all positions of the queue, and the recursive structure of non-empty packet orderings.
For the state space SIO to be generated as described two operations must be performed. The
first is a recursive set generation operation, followed by an repetition operations. The recursive
set operation happens for each position in the queue. The first state is the ∅ state where all the
positions empty. The generation of the non-empty states begins with the first position in the
queue. The set of packet types that pass through the queue, τ+, has its members duplicated
|τ+|a−1 times, where a ∈ [1,Kqueue]. The first position consists of concatenation of these dupli-
cated sets. For each subsequent position in the queue the τ+ member duplication operation is
interwoven with a recursion operation. After the members of set are duplicated, it is repeated
|τ+|pos−1, where pos is the column position in the queue, before being concatenated. The du-
plication operation happens one less times than the previous position in the queue because the
new position are starting concatenation point Σpos|τ+|pos−1 to include the generation of the
empty queue spaces.
These two process, as well as the addition of the empty queue state, gives you every packet
order state of a queue described in definition 3.2.3.1.
In the generation of the queue’s internal packet ordering every feasible state is equal to every
reachable state as the state space only contains the packet ordering of an individual queue.
Corollary 3.2.3.2. The number of states in the state space is,
|SIO| =
{
Ki + 1, |τi| = 1
|τqueue|Ki+1−1
|τi|−1 , |τi| > 1
(3.20)
For the transition matrix Q to be correct the transition rules it is generated from must be
sound. Below are the proofs for the transition rules stated in definition 3.2.3.2.
Proposition 3.2.3.3. The transition rules of the state space, as given in definition 3.2.3.2,
will not lead to any state collision.
Proof. Let A = {Ii, Oi} be the set of transition rule. If the two transition operations were
applied to the same state, the concluding state for each operation would be different because
the modification that each transition rule applies to a state is different.
Proposition 3.2.3.4. The transition rules of the state space, as given in definition 3.2.3.2, do
not contain any contradictions.
Proof. The transition rules cannot be applied to the same state, as each rule has a different
activation condition. Also the rules wont lead to a gap in their domain, given that the state
space is generated in a deterministic way leading.
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Generating the transition matrix Q from a set of transition rules and state space with a
deterministic structure, lead to the matrix having certain set of properties.
Theorem 3.2.3.5. That the transition matrix Q is invariant for a given state space as defined
in prop 3.2.3.1.
Proof. A given state space |SIO| with a fixed K and τi will have an invariant dimensions
|SIO| × |SIO|. Each index (i, j) in Q remains either zero or non-zero for a given state space,
which is dependant on if there is a transition between states. A state will transition if a position
in a queue meets the conditions for receiving a packet or processing a packet. The initial and
concluding state of any transition will remain invariant because the position of all the states
in the state space is determined by the deterministic algorithm that generates the state space,
which is described in proposition 3.2.3.1. So any transition between states, regardless of the
values of the exogenous variables, will have the same (i, j) so long as the state space isn’t
altered, by changing a queue’s Ki or τi. This doesn’t mean that the rate of a transition can’t
also be zero.
Theorem 3.2.3.6. For a given state space, as defined in prop 3.2.3.1, and the queue’s arrival
λi and processing µ
eff
i rates there is a unique transition matrix Q
Proof. As stated in proof 3.2.3.5 for specified Ki and a set τi there is a specific layout of a Q
where the values of the rate for each transition have continuous values. The layout, and thus
the solution, becomes unique for the set of λτi & µ
eff τ
i of the packet types that pass through
a queue, because each transition rate can then be calculated.
To decrease the computational complexity of generating Q grouped forms of the transition
rules were used, instead of searching the state space to find the concluding state of a transition.
Theorem 3.2.3.7. That grouping form of the transition rules will generate the correct transi-
tion matrix Q for a given state space and exogenous variables as defined in theorem 3.2.3.6.
Proof. The grouped form of the transition rules are based upon the deterministic structure
of SIO generated using the algorithm described in proof 3.2.3.1. The grouped rules are used
to calculate the indexes of the concluding states of a specific transition that is applied to set
of initial states. Each queue position is divided into sets of repeated τ+ whose members are
repeated |τ+|a−1 times, as described in the proof of proposition 3.2.3.1. The starting index of
each of these blocks is given by,
SIa = SIa + |τ+|a (3.21)
where SI0 = 1.
The Iqueue transition grouping is based on the repeated τ
+ sets. Bar from the last repeated
block of the first position, every other state in every other repeated block can receive packet of
any type that passes through the queue. So to find the block of indices at the end of a Iqueue
transitions the position of the packet type in the unaltered set τ+ is required. With its position
in the initial τ+ block the starting index of the concluding block with
Iconcqueue = I
init
queue + (|τ+| − t)|τ+|a−1 + t|τ+|a (3.22)
where t is the position of the packet type in the initial τ+ set, and a is the duplication number
of the initial group. Iinitqueue is given by,
Iinitqueue = SIa + (t− 1)|τ+|a−1. (3.23)
With this position a block of states with all the members of τ+ are concatenated to this state.
Oqueue transitions happen for all states in the queue except for the empty queue state. Each
queue has a stated number of processors Cqueue positions that can be the starting point of
an Oqueue transition. The way to calculate the initial and concluding groups is done a single
repeated block at a time. The calculation for the starting index of concluding block is given by,
Oconcqueue = O
init
queue − |τ+|a−2 (3.24)
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For each state in the initial group they transmit to a different position in the concluding state
for each Cqueue position. The indices of concluding group are divided by |τ+|Clayer−1 and then
repeated |τ+| times.
The complexity for this state space configuration is O(τiCi)
Theorem 3.2.3.8. That the generation of the transition matrix Q terminates
Proof. As described in this state space configuration’s complexity argument the generation of Q
is completed using two loops. The nested loops loop over each packet type that passes through
the queue and the number of processors C that the queue has. These are monotonic variables
are all calculated before the loops are initiated, and are not altered within the loop. Therefore
the loops generating Q will terminate.
The method of the calculation of the marginal probability is given in section 3.1.4.
Corollary 3.2.3.9. The logic and proof for calculating the marginal probability is the same as
the recursive structure described in the proof of proposition 3.2.3.1.
The proofs and definitions packet ordering state space for a single queues can be built upon
to define the state space that looks at packet ordering all the queues in the network. The
axioms of this state space are:
Definition 3.2.3.3. The states space SGIO for the global internal order is defined as
SGIO = {n1,1, ..., n1,K1, ..., nN,1, ..., nN,KN |ni,j ∈ [Ø, Nτ ]} (3.25)
where ni,j can only be the packet type that pass through the specific queue, ni,j ∈ τi.An
additional rule of the state space is that there can’t be an empty space between any two
packets in a specific queue
Definition 3.2.3.4. The transition rules of the global internal order state space are:
Label State Transitions Rate Conditions
Ii (..., ni,a,Ø, ...)→ (..., ni,a, ni,a+1, ...) −λτi ni,a = Ø
Oi (..., ni,a..., ni,b, ...)→ (..., ni,a+1..., ni,b,Ø, ...) −µeff τi ni 6= Ø | a ∈ [1, Ci]
Ti,j (..., ni,a..., ni,b, ..., nj,a,Ø, ...) −µeff τi ni 6= Ø | a ∈ [1, Cqueue]
→ (..., ni,a+1..., ni,b,Ø, ..., nj,a, nj,a+1, ...)
where are all the rates and conditions are declared from the perspective of flowing out of a
state.
The algorithm that generates the global internal order state spaces incorporates the algo-
rithm required to generate an individual queue’s ordering.
Proposition 3.2.3.10. The algorithm that creates the state space only generates states that
are feasible and reachable by the transition rules given in definition 3.2.3.4 for a given set of
truncation limits K, and the set of pτi,j∀τ .
Proof. The generation of the global internal order space is based on using the algorithm de-
scribed in the proof of proposition 3.2.3.1 to generate the state space for each individual queue.
Each of the individual queue’s state space is then duplicated using the two duplication opera-
tions described in the proof of proposition 3.2.2.1.
In the generation of the queue’s internal packet ordering every feasible state is equal to every
reachable state as the state space only contains the packet ordering of an individual queue.
The state space contains every reachable state as the queuing network can’t be a disconnected
graph, as stated in definition 3.2.1.1. This means it is possible for packets to pass through every
queue in the network given the Ti,j,k,l transition rule given in definition 3.2.3.4. Packets will
only pass through the network if a source queue is present which can utilise the rule Ii,j . If
there isn’t a source queue, or there are queues upstream from a source, then their individual
state spaces Ni = {0} as defined at the beginning of proof 3.2.3.1.
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Corollary 3.2.3.11. The number of states in the global internal order state space is,
|SGIO| = ΠNi=1|SIOi | (3.26)
as the total number of reachable and feasible states is the permutation of every internal order
state in a queue permuted with every state of every other queue, as described in the construction
of the state space algorithm in proof 3.2.3.10.
Proposition 3.2.3.12. The transition rules of the state space, as given in definition 3.2.3.4,
will not lead to any state collision.
Proof. Let A = {Ii,j , Oi,j , Ti,j,k,l} be the set of transition rule. If all three transition operations
were applied to the same state, the concluding state for each operation would be different the
modification that each transition rule applies to a state is different.
Proposition 3.2.3.13. The transition rules of the state space, as given in definition 3.2.3.4,
do not contain any contradictions.
Proof. The transition rules cannot be applied to the same state, as each rule has a different
activation condition. Also the rules wont lead to a gap in their domain, given that the state
space is generated in a deterministic way leading.
The generation of transition matrix Q using the set of transition rules and utilising the
deterministic state space structure described in 3.2.3.10 give the matrix a specific set of prop-
erties.
Theorem 3.2.3.14. That the transition matrix Q is invariant for a given state space as defined
in prop 3.2.3.10.
Proof. A given state space |SGIO| with a fixed K & the set of pτi,j will have an invariant
dimensions |SGIO| × |SGIO|. Each index (i, j) in Q remains either zero or non-zero for a
given state space, which is dependant on if there is a transition between states. A state will
transition if a position in a queue within the network meets the conditions for receiving a packet
or processing a packet from outside of the network, or transferring a packet between queues.
The initial and concluding state of any transition will remain invariant because the position
of all the states in the state space is determined by the deterministic algorithm that generates
the state space, which is described in proposition 3.2.3.10. So any transition between states,
regardless of the values of the exogenous variables, will have the same (i, j) so long as the state
space isn’t altered, by changing a queue’s Ki. This doesn’t mean that the rate of a transition
can’t also be zero.
Theorem 3.2.3.15. For a given state space, as defined in prop 3.2.3.10, and set of arrival
rates λ and effective processing rates µeff there is a unique transition matrix Q
Proof. As stated in proof 3.2.3.14 for specified set K and a pτi,j there is a specific layout of a Q
where the values of the rate for each transition have continuous values. The layout, and thus
the solution, becomes unique for a given set of values of λ & µe{{ across all the queues in the
network, because each transition rate can then be calculated.
To decrease the computational complexity of generating Q grouped forms of the transition
rules have been used, instead of resorting to a search of the state space to find the concluding
state.
Theorem 3.2.3.16. That grouping form of the transition rules will generate the correct tran-
sition matrix Q for a given state space and exogenous variables as defined in theorem 3.2.3.15.
Proof. The grouping rules are merger of those described in proof 3.2.3.7 that are then duplicated
by the block jumping operation described in proof 3.2.2.7.
The complexity for each queue’s state transition conclusion is O(τiCiSRi), so this calculation
would need to be done for each queue.
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Theorem 3.2.3.17. That the generation of the transition matrix Q terminates
Proof. As described in this state space configuration’s complexity argument the generation of Q
is completed using four loops. The nested loops loop over each packet type that passes through
each queue that, the number of processors that the queue has C,and the SRi factor described
in proof 3.2.3.10. These are monotonic variables are all calculated before the loops are initiated,
and are not altered within the loop. Therefore the loops generating Q will terminate.
The method of the calculation of the marginal probability is given in section 3.1.4.
Corollary 3.2.3.18. The logic and proof for calculating the marginal probability is the same
as the recursive structure described in the proof of proposition 3.2.3.10.
3.2.4 Proofs for the Internal State & Global Internal State State
Spaces
This section goes over the proofs for the generation of the state spaces of internal state of an
individual queue and internal state of every queue in the network. The author was unable to
devise a complete set of proofs for these state spaces, so this section will go over the completed
proofs before laying out proof strategies for the missing proofs. It will also lay out complexity
arguments for the current implementation of these proofs. The axioms of the internal state
state space are:
Definition 3.2.4.1. The states space SIS for internal state is defined as
SIS = {a1, b1, w1, ..., aτ , bτ , wτ |ai, bi, wi ∈ [0,Kqueue]} (3.27)
where the number of ai, bi, wi represent the number of packets being processed, blocked, or
waiting in a queue, and i is the index of a packet type that passes through queue.
Definition 3.2.4.2. The transition rules of the internal state state space are:
Label state transition Rate Conditions
SPi (..., ai, bi, wi, ...)→ −λqueue,i ai + bi + wi = 0
(..., ai + 1, bi, wi, ...) & a+ b < Cqueue
Wi (..., ai, bi, wi, ...)→ −λqueue,i wi < Kqueue − Cqueue
(..., ai, bi, wi + 1, ...) a+ b = Cqueue
PC1i (..., ai, bi, wi, ...)→ −aiµqueue,i(1− Pqueue) ai ≥ 1
(..., ai − 1, bi, wi, ...) & wi = 0
PC2i (..., ai, bi, wi, ...)→ −aiµqueue,i(1− Pqueue) ai ≥ 1
(..., ai − 1, bi, wi, ..., aT + 1, bT , wT − 1, ...) & wi = 0
T = {i|wi 6= 0}
NP 1i (..., ai, bi, wi, ...)→ −aiµqueue,i(1− Pqueue) ai ≥ 1
(..., ai, bi, wi − 1, ...) wi ≥ 1
NP 2i (..., ai, bi, wi, ...)→ −aiµqueue,i(1− Pqueue) ai ≥ 1
(..., ai − 1, bi, wi, ..., aT + 1, bT , wT − 1, ...) wi ≥ 1
T = {i|wi 6= 0}
PBi (..., ai, bi, wi, ...)→ −aiµqueue,iPqueue ai ≥ 1
(..., ai − 1, bi + 1, wi, ...)
BC1i (..., ai, bi, wi, ...)→ −µai bi ≥ 1
(..., ai, bi − 1, wi, ...) wi = 0
BC2i (..., ai, bi, wi, ...)→ −µai bi ≥ 1
(..., ai, bi − 1, wi, ..., aT + 1, bT , wT − 1, ...) wi = 0
T = {i|wi 6= 0}
BP 1i (..., ai, bi, wi, ...)→ −µai bi ≥ 1
(..., ai + 1, bi − 1, wi − 1, ...) wi ≥ 1
BP 2i (..., ai, bi, wi, ...)→ −µai bi ≥ 1
(..., ai, bi − 1, wi, ..., aT + 1, bT , wT − 1, ...) wi ≥ 1
T = {i|wi 6= 0}
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where the rates and conditions are declared from the perspective of flowing out of a state.



















Proof. The number of reachable and feasible states of the internal state state space maps onto
the stars and bars problem[63], which is used to calculate the number of possible ways that n
objects can be distribute across k bins. The solution of the stars and bars problem is given by
P =
(




The number of feasible states can be split into two stars and bars problems. The first problem
is how the packets are distributed across the processors, Ci, of a queue, and the second is if
the queue’s processors are full what are the permutations of ways packets can be waiting to be
processed. Each of these problems maps to the terms in equation 3.28.
Each processor can either be processing a packet or blocked, so for every packet type that passes
through a queue there are two bins to represent a & b for each type. This means k in equation
3.29 becomes 2|Ti|. n packets are distributed across the bins, so the n in equation 3.29 remains
unchanged. To include the number of packets waiting to be processed a third bin needs to
be added for each packet type. For all possible values of c < Ci there no packets queuing, as
packets go straight to a processor, so the waiting bins remain empty. The number of feasible








When c = Ci the packets begin queuing. This means that the third bins of each packet type
start filling. The number of packets can be calculated using equation 3.30 and setting the the
starting and terminating conditions of the sum to Ci. How many ways packets of different
types waiting can be permuted by the same process as calculated the number of permutations
of packets being processed and blocked. For the waiting permutations the number of bins is








So the total number of full processing states with all the potential waiting states is the sum
of equation 3.31 and equation 3.30 when it is set up to only calculate c = Ci. This gives the
second term of equation 3.28.
In the generation of the queue’s internal packet ordering every feasible state is equal to every
reachable state as the state space only contains the packet ordering of an individual queue.
Below is the proof that the current algorithm that creates the state space only generates
a complete state space. However the current algorithm doesn’t create a grouped state space
that allows for the development of combinatorial rules that allow for the calculation of a set of
concluding transitions indexes.
Proposition 3.2.4.2. The algorithm that creates the state space only generates states that are
feasible and reachable by the transition rules given in definition 3.2.4.2 for a queue’s truncation
limits Ki and number of processors Ci.
Proof. The algorithm that generates the state space follows a similar procedure as described
in the proof of proposition 3.2.4. The algorithm to create all the permutations of a stars and
bars problem proceeds by moving a value across the bin space. It starts with the all n objects
in the initial bin, i = 1. Each subsequent state moves one value into the bin i = 2 until all
n are in the i = 2 bin. The next state moves one value into the i = 3 bin and the remaining
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n− 1 objects in the i = 1 bin. This shifting operating is repeated across all the bins until all n
objects are in the i = k.
For each c < Ci the above stars and bars algorithm is applied to generate their c-block space.
Once all the blocks are generated a column of zeros is inserted after every two columns of the
state space, to represent the empty waiting states. Then a c-block for c = Ci generated. The
k-space is generated in the same way as the c < Ci. Once the k-space is generated each state
in the c = Ci block is duplicated to the number of states in the k-space. Each duplicated state
of c = Ci has a column of the k-space inserted after every two of the c = Ci columns.
An algorithm designed to produce grouped states so to ease the calculation transitions
indexes, as in the previous sections, two elements of the proof of proposition 3.2.4.2 would have
to be changed. The first would the stars and bars generation would have to become generate
all the states in the range of [0, n]. This could be done with a similar shifting operation that
has already been described, but it the initial state ascends from 0 before moving an object to
the next column. The second modification would be the weaving together of the c-blocks and
k-blocks. A method for doing this is still being researched.
Proposition 3.2.4.3. The transition rules of the state space, as given in definition 3.2.4.2,
will not lead to any state collision.
Proof. Let A = {SPi,Wi, PC1i , PC2i , NP 1i , NP 2i , PBi, BC1i , BC2i , BP 1i , BP 2i } be the set of
transition rule. If all eleven transition operations were applied to the same state, the concluding
state for each operation would be different as the transition operations for each member of set
A is different.
Proposition 3.2.4.4. The transition rules of the state space, as given in definition 3.2.4.2, do
not contain any contradictions.
Proof. The transition rules cannot be applied to the same state, as each rule has a different
activation condition. Also the rules wont lead to a gap in their domain, given that the state
space is generated in a deterministic way leading.
Theorem 3.2.4.5. That the transition matrix Q is invariant for a given state space as defined
in prop 3.2.3.1.
Proof. A given state space |SIS | with a fixed Ki, Ci and τi will have an invariant dimensions
|SIS | × |SIS |. Each index (i, j) in Q remains either zero or non-zero for a given state space,
which is dependant on if there is a transition between states. A state will transition if a position
in a queue meets the conditions in the rules defined in axiom 3.2.4.2. The initial and concluding
state of any transition will remain invariant because the position of all the states in the state
space is determined by the deterministic algorithm that generates the state space, which is
described in proposition 3.2.4.2. So any transition between states, regardless of the values of
the exogenous variables, will have the same (i, j) so long as the state space isn’t altered, by
changing a queue’s Ki, Ci, or τi. This doesn’t mean that the rate of a transition can’t also be
zero.
Theorem 3.2.4.6. For a given state space, as defined in prop 3.2.4.2, and the queue’s arrival
λi and processing rate µ
eff
i rates there is a unique transition matrix Q
Proof. As stated in proof 3.2.4.5 for specified Ki, Ci and a set τi there is a specific layout of a
Q where the values of the rate for each transition have continuous values. The layout, and thus
the solution, becomes unique for the set of λτi & µ
eff τ
i of the packet types that pass through
a queue, because each transition rate can then be calculated.
Without the derivation of rules of the structure of state space the generation of Q is com-
pleted by searching the state space rather than navigating it. Also the current method for
calculating the marginal probability for this state space configuration is done by a search. The
complexity of this configuration is currently O(|SGIS |2), as the state space isn’t structured into
a grouped form that can easily be navigated across. Each state’s transitions leads to a search
of the state space until the concluding state is found.
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Theorem 3.2.4.7. That the generation of the transition matrix Q terminates
Proof. As described in this state space configuration’s complexity argument the generation of
Q is completed using two loops. The nested loops loop over each state and then loops over
them again whilst searching for the concluding state. As the number of states is calculated
before the loops are initiated in the proof 3.2.4, and isn’t altered within the loop, then the
loops generating Q will terminate.
Having defined the internal state space for an individual queue, the internal state space of
all the queues in the network can be derived. The axioms for this state space are:
Definition 3.2.4.3. The states space SGIS for global internal state state space is defined as
SGIS = {a1,1, b1,1, w1,1, ..., a1,τ , b1,τ , w1,τ , ..., aN,1, bN,1, wN,1, ..., aN,τ , bN,τ , wN,τ |ai, bi, wi ∈ [0,Kqueue]}
(3.32)
where the number of ai,τ , bi,τ , wi,τ represent the number of packets being processed, blocked,
or waiting in queue i of type τ . Note that the set of τ ’s for each queue only contain the packet
types that pass through the queue.
Definition 3.2.4.4. The transition rules of the global internal state state space are:
Label state transition Rate Conditions
PBi,τ , (..., ai,τ , bi,τ , wi,τ , ...)→ −ai,τµi,τPi ai,τ ≥ 1
(..., ai,τ − 1, bi,τ + 1, wi,τ , ...)
ESPi,τ (..., ai,τ , bi,τ , wi,τ , ...)→ −λi,τ ai,τ + bi,τ
(..., ai,τ + 1, bi,τ , wi,τ , ...) +wi,τ = 0
ai + bi < C
EWi,τ (..., ai,τ , bi,τ , wi,τ , ...)→ −λi,τ ai + bi < C
(..., ai,τ , bi,τ , wi,τ + 1, ...) wi < Ki − Ci
EPC1i,τ (..., ai,τ , bi,τ , wi,τ , ...)→ −aτµi,τ (1− Pi) ai,τ ≥ 1
(..., ai,τ − 1, bi,τ , wi,τ , ...) wi,τ = 0
wi = 0
EPC2i,τ (..., ai,τ , bi,τ , wi,τ , ...)→ −aτµi,τ (1− Pi) ai,τ ≥ 1
(..., ai,τ − 1, bi,τ , wi,τ , ... wi,τ = 0
ai,T + 1, bi,T , wi,T − 1, ...) wi > 0
T = {τ |wi,τ 6= 0}
EBC1i,τ (..., ai,τ , bi,τ , wi,τ , ...)→ −µai,τ bi,τ ≥ 1
(..., ai,τ , bi,τ − 1, wi,τ , ...) wi,τ = 0
wi = 0
EBC2i,τ (..., ai,τ , bi,τ , wi,τ , ...)→ −µai,τ bi,τ ≥ 1
(..., ai,τ , bi,τ − 1, wi,τ , ... wi,τ = 0
ai,T + 1, bi,T , wi,T − 1, ...) wi > 0
T = {τ |wi,τ 6= 0}
ENP 1i,τ (..., ai,τ , bi,τ , wi,τ , ...)→ −aτµi,τ (1− Pi) ai,τ ≥ 1
(..., ai,τ , bi,τ , wi,τ − 1, ...) wi,τ > 0
ENP 2i,τ (..., ai,τ , bi,τ , wi,τ , ..., ai,T , bi,T , wi,T , ...)→ −aτµi,τ (1− Pi) ai,τ ≥ 1
(..., ai,τ − 1, bi,τ , wi,τ , ...ai,T + 1, bi,T , wi,T − 1, ...) wi,τ > 0
T = {τ |wi,τ 6= 0}
EBP 1i,τ (..., ai,τ , bi,τ , wi,τ , ...)→ −µai,τ bi,τ ≥ 1
(..., ai,τ + 1, bi,τ − 1, wi,τ − 1, ...) wi,τ > 0
EBP 2i,τ (..., ai,τ , bi,τ , wi,τ , ..., ai,T , bi,T , wi,T , ...)→ −µai,τ bi,τ ≥ 1
(..., ai,τ , bi,τ − 1, wi,τ , ...ai,T + 1, bi,T , wi,T − 1, ...) wi,τ > 0
T = {τ |wi,τ 6= 0}
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PC1i,τ − SPj,τ (..., ai,τ , bi,τ , wi,τ , ..., aj,τ , bj,τ , wj,τ , ...) −aτµi,τ (1− Pi) ai,τ ≥ 1
→ wi,τ = 0
(..., ai,τ − 1, bi,τ , wi,τ , ..., aj,τ + 1, bj,τ , wj,τ , ...) wi = 0
aj,τ + bj,τ0
+wj,τ = 0
aj + bj < C
PC2i,τ − SPj,τ (..., ai,τ , bi,τ , wi,τ , ..., aj,τ , bj,τ , wj,τ , ...) −aτµi,τ (1− Pi) ai,τ ≥ 1
→ wi,τ = 0
(..., ai,τ − 1, bi,τ , wi,τ , ..., ai,T + 1, bi,T , wi,T − 1 wi > 0
..., aj,τ + 1, bj,τ , wj,τ , ...) aj,τ + bj,τ
T = {τ |wi,τ 6= 0} +wj,τ = 0
aj + bj < C
BC1i,τ − SPj,τ (..., ai,τ , bi,τ , wi,τ , ..., aj,τ , bj,τ , wj,τ , ...) −µai,τ bi,τ ≥ 1
→ wi,τ = 0
(..., ai,τ , bi,τ − 1, wi,τ , ..., aj,τ + 1, bj,τ , wj,τ , ...) wi = 0
aj,τ + bj,τ
+wj,τ = 0
aj + bj < C
BC2i,τ − SPj,τ (..., ai,τ , bi,τ , wi,τ , ..., aj,τ , bj,τ , wj,τ , ...) −µai,τ bi,τ ≥ 1
→ wi,τ = 0
(..., ai,τ , bi,τ − 1, wi,τ , ...ai,T + 1, bi,T , wi,T − 1 wi > 0
..., aj,τ + 1, bj,τ , wj,τ , ...) aj,τ + bj,τ
T = {τ |wi,τ 6= 0} +wj,τ = 0
aj + bj < C
NP 1i,τ − SPj,τ (..., ai,τ , bi,τ , wi,τ , ..., aj,τ , bj,τ , wj,τ , ...) −aτµi,τ (1− Pi) ai,τ ≥ 1
→ wi,τ > 0
(..., ai,τ , bi,τ , wi,τ − 1, ..., aj,τ + 1, bj,τ , wj,τ , ...) aj + bj < C
aj,τ + bj,τ
+wj,τ = 0
NP 2i,τ − SPj,τ (..., ai,τ , bi,τ , wi,τ , ..., aj,τ , bj,τ , wj,τ , ...) −aτµi,τ (1− Pi) ai,τ ≥ 1
→ wi,τ > 0
(..., ai,τ − 1, bi,τ , wi,τ , ..., ai,T + 1, bi,T , wi,T − 1, aj + bj < C
..., aj,τ + 1, bj,τ , wj,τ , ...)
T = {τ |wi,τ 6= 0}
aj,τ + bj,τ
+wj,τ = 0
BP 1i,τ − SPj,τ (..., ai,τ , bi,τ , wi,τ , ..., aj,τ , bj,τ , wj,τ , ...) −µai,τ bi,τ ≥ 1
→ wi,τ > 0
(..., ai,τ + 1, bi,τ − 1, wi,τ − 1, ..., aj,τ + 1, bj,τ , wj,τ , ...) aj + bj < C
aj,τ + bj,τ
+wj,τ = 0
BP 2i,τ − SPj,τ (..., ai,τ , bi,τ , wi,τ , ..., aj,τ , bj,τ , wj,τ , ...) −µai,τ bi,τ ≥ 1
→ wi,τ > 0
(..., ai,τ , bi,τ − 1, wi,τ , ..., ai,T + 1, bi,T , wi,T − 1 aj + bj < C
..., aj,τ + 1, bj,τ , wj,τ , ...) aj,τ + bj,τ
T = {τ |wi,τ 6= 0} +wj,τ = 0
PC1i,τ −Wj,τ (..., ai,τ , bi,τ , wi,τ , ..., aj,τ , bj,τ , wj,τ , ...) −aτµi,τ (1− Pi) ai,τ ≥ 1
→ wi,τ = 0
(..., ai,τ − 1, bi,τ , wi,τ , ..., aj,τ , bj,τ , wj,τ + 1, ...) wi = 0
aj + bj < C
wj < Kj − Cj
PC2i,τ −Wj,τ (..., ai,τ , bi,τ , wi,τ , ..., aj,τ , bj,τ , wj,τ , ...) −aτµi,τ (1− Pi) ai,τ ≥ 1
→ wi,τ = 0
(..., ai,τ − 1, bi,τ , wi,τ , ..., ai,T + 1, bi,T , wi,T − 1 wi > 0
..., aj,τ , bj,τ , wj,τ + 1, ...) aj + bj < C
T = {τ |wi,τ 6= 0} wj < Kj − Cj
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BC1i,τ −Wj,τ (..., ai,τ , bi,τ , wi,τ , ..., aj,τ , bj,τ , wj,τ , ...) −µai,τ bi,τ ≥ 1
→ wi,τ = 0
(..., ai,τ , bi,τ − 1, wi,τ , ..., aj,τ , bj,τ , wj,τ + 1, ...) wi = 0
aj + bj < C
wj < Kj − Cj
BC2i,τ −Wj,τ (..., ai,τ , bi,τ , wi,τ , ..., aj,τ , bj,τ , wj,τ , ...) −µai,τ bi,τ ≥ 1
→ wi,τ = 0
(..., ai,τ , bi,τ − 1, wi,τ , ...ai,T + 1, bi,T , wi,T − 1 wi > 0
..., aj,τ , bj,τ , wj,τ + 1, ...) aj + bj < C
T = {τ |wi,τ 6= 0} wj < Kj − Cj
NP 1i,τ −Wj,τ (..., ai,τ , bi,τ , wi,τ , ..., aj,τ , bj,τ , wj,τ , ...) −aτµi,τ (1− Pi) ai,τ ≥ 1
→ wi,τ > 0
(..., ai,τ , bi,τ , wi,τ − 1, ..., aj,τ , bj,τ , wj,τ + 1, ...) aj + bj < C
wj < Kj − Cj
NP 2i,τ −Wj,τ (..., ai,τ , bi,τ , wi,τ , ..., aj,τ , bj,τ , wj,τ , ...) −aτµi,τ (1− Pi) ai,τ ≥ 1
→ wi,τ > 0
(..., ai,τ − 1, bi,τ , wi,τ , ..., ai,T + 1, bi,T , wi,T − 1, aj + bj < C
..., aj,τ , bj,τ , wj,τ + 1, ...) wj < Kj − Cj
T = {τ |wi,τ 6= 0}
BP 1i,τ −Wj,τ (..., ai,τ , bi,τ , wi,τ , ..., aj,τ , bj,τ , wj,τ , ...) −µai,τ bi,τ ≥ 1
→ wi,τ > 0
(..., ai,τ + 1, bi,τ − 1, wi,τ − 1, ..., aj,τ , bj,τ , wj,τ + 1, ...) aj + bj < C
wj < Kj − Cj
BP 2i,τ −Wj,τ (..., ai,τ , bi,τ , wi,τ , ..., aj,τ , bj,τ , wj,τ , ...) −µai,τ bi,τ ≥ 1
→ wi,τ > 0
(..., ai,τ , bi,τ − 1, wi,τ , ..., ai,T + 1, bi,T , wi,T − 1 aj + bj < C
..., aj,τ , bj,τ , wj,τ + 1, ...) wj < Kj − Cj
T = {τ |wi,τ 6= 0}
where xi = Στxi,τ and all the rates and conditions are declared from the perspective of flowing
out of a state.
Corollary 3.2.4.8. The number of states in the state space is,
|SGIS | = ΠNi=1|SISi | (3.33)
as the total number of reachable and feasible states is the permutation of every internal state
of a queue with the internal state of every other queue in the network.
Proposition 3.2.4.9. The algorithm that creates the state space only generates states that are
feasible and reachable by the transition rules given in definition 3.2.4.4 for network with a given
set of truncation limits K, set of number of processors C, and the set of pτi,j∀τ .
Proof. The generation of the global internal state space is based on the algorithm described in
the proof of proposition 3.2.4.2. This algorithm is used to generate the state space for each
individual queue. Each of the individual queue’s state space is then duplicated using the two
duplication operations described in the proof of proposition 3.2.2.1.
In the generation of the queue’s internal state every feasible state is equal to every reachable
state as the state space only contains the packet ordering of an individual queue. The state
space contains every reachable state as the queuing network can’t be a disconnected graph, as
stated in definition 3.2.1.1. This means it is possible for packets to pass through every queue in
the network given the set of transition rules rule given in definition 3.2.4.4. Packets will only
pass through the network if a source queue is present which can utilise the rules ESP or EW .
If there isn’t a source queue, or there are queues upstream from a source of a particular packet
type, then that hypothetical ai, bi, wi isn’t included in the state space.
Proposition 3.2.4.10. The transition rules of the state space, as given in definition 3.2.3.4,
will not lead to any state collision.
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Proof. Let A be the set of the 27 transition rule given in 3.2.4.4. If all twenty seven transition
operations were applied to the same state, the concluding state for each operation would be
different as the transition operations for each member of set A is different.
Proposition 3.2.4.11. The transition rules of the state space, as given in definition 3.2.4.4,
do not contain any contradictions.
Proof. The transition rules cannot be applied to the same state, as each rule has a different
activation condition. Also the rules wont lead to a gap in their domain, given that the state
space is generated in a deterministic way leading.
Theorem 3.2.4.12. That the transition matrix Q is invariant for a given state space as defined
in prop 3.2.4.9.
Proof. A given state space |SGIs| with a fixed K, C, & the set of pτi,j will have an invariant
dimensions |SGIS | × |SGIS |. Each index (i, j) in Q remains either zero or non-zero for a given
state space, which is dependant on if there is a transition between states. A state will transition
if a position in a queue within the network meets one the conditions for receiving a packet or
processing a packet from outside of the network, or transferring a packet between queues given
in definition 3.2.4.4. The initial and concluding state of any transition will remain invariant
because the position of all the states in the state space is determined by the deterministic
algorithm that generates the state space, which is described in proposition 3.2.4.9. So any
transition between states, regardless of the values of the exogenous variables, will have the
same (i, j) so long as the state space isn’t altered, by changing a queue’s Ki or Ci. This doesn’t
mean that the rate of a transition can’t also be zero.
Theorem 3.2.4.13. For a given state space, as defined in prop 3.2.4.9, and set of arrival rates
λ, processing rates µ, mean processing rates µa and probabilities of being full P there is a unique
transition matrix Q
Proof. As stated in proof 3.2.4.12 for specified set K, C, and a pτi,j there is a specific layout of a
Q where the values of the rate for each transition have continuous values. The layout, and thus
the solution, becomes unique for a given set of values of λ, µ µa, & P across all the queues in
the network are defined, so each transition rate can then be calculated.
As proposition 3.2.4.2 doesn’t produce a grouped structure, the state space for the global
internal state space also doesn’t have a grouped structure due to its dependence laid out in
proposition 3.2.4.9. This means that the concluding states of any transition in the global internal
state space are also searched for instead of computed. The complexity of this configuration
is then O(|SGIS |2) as each state’s transitions leads to a search of the state space until the
concluding state is found.
Theorem 3.2.4.14. That the generation of the transition matrix Q terminates
Proof. As described in this state space configuration’s complexity argument the generation of
Q is completed using two loops. The nested loops loop over each state and then loops over
them again whilst searching for the concluding state. As the number of states is calculated
before the loops are initiated in the proof 3.2.4.8, and isn’t altered within the loop, then the
loops generating Q will terminate.
The method of the calculation of the marginal is given in section 3.1.4.
3.3 Comparison to Other Formal Methods
This section compares the author’s queuing network formal method with the other formal
methods described in chapter 2. It will compare what each method can encapsulate, before
looking at what different adversaries can be generated. The final aspect of comparison is the
performance of the different methods.
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3.3.1 Methodology Comparison
To model a security protocol’s robustness a class of security promises that are orthogonal
to those that are traditionally tested against must be encapsulated. In the case of the formal
method presented in this research the author was able to encapsulate the promises of availability
and synchronisation of state. The method is able to test these promises because the description
of the communication channel that the honest agents are using is not abstracted away into the
adversary model, which is what is traditionally done in the symbolic adversary model. This
formal method allows the user to declare which parts of the a session diagram they are allowed
access to, and in what ways the malicious interference can happen. This granularity manifests
itself in the generation of iterations of a given queuing network with variations in the exogenous
variables of specified queues in the network, such as arrival rate, processing rate, truncation
limit.
Symbolic methods are traditionally formulated to encapsulate and augment the narrative of
a protocol run. They achieve this by analysing a bounded set of potential traces of run(s)
within the state space of all potential runs. These traces are generated from the potential paths
through an honest agent’s state machine. They are searching these traces to find a trace where,
through illicit manipulation, the adversary is able to discern the secret being passed between
the honest agents. If the search of the state space produces a trace where the adversary learns
the secret message the security promises is proven to be broken. In these formal methods the
notion of time is the order of messages passed between the set of agents a long a particular
traces. Symbolic methods create these narrative with variables to define a message’s content, the
cryptographic primitives, etc, along with functions for how agents interact with the variables.
From these feature a model of a protocol session can be created so set a trace can be searched
for violations.
The computational adversary model finds promise violations by seeing if an adversary can
compute the content of an encrypted message through deductions directed through queries of
protocol instances. If the adversary can deduce the message with a greater than fifty percent
chance in polynomial time it is said to have found a violation. The computational model’s
notion of ordering describes how the adversary accrues knowledge over time. Each query to the
honest agent is another step in the ordering. In this model the honest agent is encapsulated
as a reactive oracle that has no state machine of their own. The only notion of timing this
approach has is that of the time complexity of the algorithm the adversary uses to decrypt the
message. However, this approach does have a notion of internal state for the adversary, as their
knowledge develops over time with the responses from the oracle. This gradual acquiring of
knowledge allows their internal algorithm to break the honest agents cypher.
Unlike both the computational and symbolic methods the goal of the author’s queuing network
formal method is not to extract a message from a channel, but to see how much effort is
required to disrupt a secure channel. The method’s set up is similar to the symbolic method as
it encapsulates the narrative of a protocol run and shares the same base assumption of perfect
cryptography. However, due to the orthogonal goals to most symbolic methodology how the
queuing network method is similar to the computational model. Instead of providing the user
with a counter example that undermines the security promise, like the symbolic methods, the
method calculates the probability that a range of exogenous variables will stop the completion
of a protocol run. Instead of looking for counter example traces the queueing network method
searches the problem space to across a range of queue exogenous variables. From these sets of
exogenous variables the method is able to calculate the most likely state of the network, which
may be in violation of the security promises. This allows for the user of a protocol to monitor
the device’s for when they are approaching abnormal behaviour. This reduction in strength of
proof has precedent as computational method uses probabilistic arguments to demonstrate the
likelihood of an adversarial Turing machine using a polynomial time algorithm to deduce an
encrypted message.
The other major difference between the author’s methodology and the other symbolic formal
methods is the separation of the structure of the communication channel between honest agents
and the adversary. In all symbolic formal methods they use some form of the DY adversary, who
has complete control over the channel that a protocol session is running across. This regime
of modelling provides little resolution for the minimum power an adversary needs to stop a
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session from being completed, because it is trivial for the DY adversary to drop every packet.
To solve this the author has separated the channel from the adversary, and it is up to the user
of the method to decide what the adversary has access to. In the author’s implementation the
adversary has access to a queue’s exogenous variables. By manipulating these variables across
a range of values the method can discern what the mimimum access and knowledge they need
to disrupt the session, and at what value of exogenous variable the protocol session is no longer
available.
Unlike the other symbolic methods the queuing network isn’t designed to be able distinguish
between each kind of the messages in a protocol run. All the packets passed between the states
of an agent, other than those manipulated by the adversary, are presumed to be correct and
expected. The method could be set up to model to encapsulate message content by having a
packet type for each kind message passed in the state machine, but that would detract from
modelling the performance of the agent’s state machine. The encapsulation of an honest agent’s
knowledge is only to the level of calculating the likelihood of state machine passing a packet
along a certain edge. This lower resolution of protocol run encapsulation is what allow for the
modelling of the timing and size of packets to analyse how these features effect the quality of
service requirements of the protocol run. The probabilistic model also allows for this method to
overcome one of the common problems faced by symbolic methods. As stated in section 2.1.1
boundaries need to be set for the modelling of a protocol otherwise the decision of which trace
to analyses become undecidable. These restrictions are either in the form of an algorithm or
human decision. This decision problem is circumnavigated by the queuing network methodology
as it is not looking at specific traces, but the overall state of an agent’s state machine.
The only symbolic method that the author knows of with the ability to find attacks against
availability is the security LTL developed by Corin & Saptawijaya[45]. Temporal logics are used
to test the robustness of protocols, by seeing if it is possible for the devices state machine can
logically reach an undesirable state, but they aren’t designed to provide these guarantees in the
presence of an adversary. Given that they usually don’t encapsulate adversarial interactions,
LTL’s don’t have a way of encapsulating the rate or size of messages being passed through a
state machine, just that they will be passed. These are the principle advantages of the queuing
networks when compared to temporal logics. An adversary can manipulate the state machine
to increase the likelihood of the state machine reaching the undesirable state.
3.3.2 Adversary Comparison
Adversary modelling is another critical aspect of protocol modelling. The features of a formal
method dictate what abilities and knowledge an adversary can have.
The traditional symbolic adversary has the objective of violating the confidentiality and au-
thentication of a protocol session to extract a secret message from the honest agents. In the
existing symbolic methodologies the DY adversary is omnipresence and omnipotent over the
communication channel, which allows them to read any message they have the key for, edit
messages, and replay them. The research into this kind of adversary, as described in section
2.1.1, aims to make the DY adversary as strong as possible. This is achieved by enhancing either
the adversary’s abilities or knowledge capacity. The goal of strengthening an adversary is to
demonstrate how difficult it is for an adversary to extract a message from a security protocol.
These enhanced DY adversaries could easily implement an attack against availability by sever-
ing the channel between honest agents, or inject a message that can cause a de-synchronisation
of state. Given this it is clear that these adversaries are too powerful to define the limits of
correct operation of a security protocol against disruption attacks with any useful sensitivity.
This kind adversary also has some further presumptions baked in that restrict it from mod-
elling disruption attacks. The assumption of the adversary controlling the network between
the communicating parties is often reduced to the channel being modelled as as a single edge
between the parties. This simplification means that the model doesn’t encapsulate the time it
would take for the adversary to synchronise the knowledge it gathers from different intercepts
on the network. This lack of timing further reduces the nuance of any models of attacks against
availability developed using this adversary as it can’t encapsulate race conditions or the rate at
which packets are processed or packet ordering.
The computational adversary tries to discern enough information about the cryptographic sys-
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tem so that it can decrypt a message in its polynomial time. It does this by making queries
against multiple instances of the protocol to try gather information it can use in its decryption
algorithm. It is objective is achieved when the probability of decrypting a message is better
than a coin flip.
The queuing network method is primarily derived from the symbolic adversary, but the queuing
network allows for the development of weaker adversaries which allows for more nuanced models
of a protocol’s robustness to be developed. This is done to provide a protocol implementer with
the most granular statement of a protocol’s sensitivity to disruption. The ability within the
methodology to select the individual queues in the network that the adversary can manipulate
weakens them in two ways. The first is by only having access to select exogenous variables
means they may not be able to cease all traces through a honest agent’s state machine. The
adversary can manipulate a packet’s arrival and processing rates which can be mapped over
to models where they are adding or removing content from a message, or trying to simulate
a large number of instances like in the computational model. This means that the adversary
can be modelled with as little knowledge as required for the attack, to the point of violating
principle[91]. Expected but incorrect packets can be modelled by generating a new packet type.
The second is it limits the concrete knowledge the adversary has about the network. If the ad-
versary only has taps on certain edges of the network or can only tell if a device has reached a
specific state but not others, then they have to develop attack strategies based solely on infer-
ences. These inferences are represented through the implementation’s conditional probability
functionality.These inferences can be set up the model an adversary reacting to if a packet goes
down a certain edge of the network, or if a certain amount of packets are reached.
The methodology’s adversary can also can be used to demonstrate some of the timing modelling
that the other symbolic methods can’t, by being able to model the order of packets arriving
into a state and calculating the probability that a specific sequence of malicious packets arrives
in the order that the adversary desires.
3.3.3 Performance Comparison
The complexity of the queuing network formal method is dependent on which state space is
selected to analyse a given network. The worst complexity in methodology is the one for the
global internal space configurations as it is performing a search of the state space for each
state, which has a complexity O(|SGIS |2), to generate the transition matrix. The other state
space configurations have more manageable complexity because the generation of the transition
matrix utilises the deterministic structure of the state space to calculate groups of transitions in
one go. The grouped nature of states meant blocks of concluding state of the transitions could
easily be calculated, which led to a reduction in the number of operations that were needed
to be performed. Despite this, the complexity for all the state space configurations are below
the upper bound of proving confidentiality in DEXPTIME by remaining in the polynomial
time complexity class. This complexity could still be improved upon by researching alternative
algorithms and data structures, but optimising the method wasn’t the focus of the project.
Most symbolic methods require quite a lot human intervention to operate. Each methodology
requires the user to formalise the protocol’s rules and the agents initial knowledge and abilities
before they can compute the proof for a single trace of the protocol. Each potential trace
is tightly coupled with the adversaries knowledge and abilities, so the adversary has o be
carefully edited for each run. The induction, applied π-calculus, and operational semantics
have ben developed into forms that have a degree of automation to them. Each have associated
algorithms that generate a set of traces, for a specified adversary knowledge and ability set, that
searches the state space by going through permutations of an adversary’s order of operations.
Instead of formalising the rules of the run, along with an how an agent interacts with the
run, all that user needs to do to create a model in the queue network method is to select the
queues in the network the adversary is allowed to interact with, and then decided what range
of values the adversary is allowed to input into the exogenous variables. This reduction in
effort required for the user to build a model comes from the methods orthogonal objective than
the other symbolic methods. The method is only trying to define a protocol’s sensitivity to
specific disruption instead of searching an entire state space to find a counter example. The
turn around time for testing a different adversarial is a lot lower as the user doesn’t need to
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Attack Vectors Discovered in the
IEC61850 SAS
This chapter lays out the the attacks developed by the author. Most sections present novel
attacks discovered in the IEC61850 SAS. The first two attacks in this chapter did not use the
author’s formal method in their development. The first attack is a credential intercept attack
discovered in the IEC61850 association communication model, and the second attack present an
example of IEC61850’s generic substation event class model can be used to created a workfactor
amplification attack. It was during the course of the second attack’s development that the au-
thor wanted to a more rigorous abstraction for proving that aspects of the protocol undermined
it’s own promises during disruption attacks. With a formal method proof security omission and
defects could be shown to inherent in all implementations of the standard, regardless of the
technical specifications of the devices used. From this requirement the queuing network formal
method described in chapter 3 was developed. All the subsequent attacks in the chapter were
discovered using the author’s formal method. The only attack not directly related to IEC61850
security is the generalised packet injection model presented in section 4.5. This model is an
expansion of the model used for the GOOSE packet injection attack presented in section 4.4,
which allowed for exploration of the dynamics of packet injection attacks.
4.1 IEC61850: Credential Intercept Attack
This section discusses a credential interception attack against IEC61850’s association model[120],
which allows an adversary to hijack a session during an initial association between an IED and
a control server. The consequence of this attack is the adversary denies access to a legitimate
device, and can act in any way they please within the privilege of the legitimate device. This
undermines the standard’s promises of access control, and possibly synchronisation of state if
the adversary chooses to not respond to control commands. The feasibility of this attack is
proven using a context free grammar.
An adversary, who has no login credentials on the network, is able to hijack the login credentials
of a legitimate user whilst they are logging into a logical node for the first time, or who hasn’t
already been given a predetermined authentication parameter. This scenario is predicated on
the adversary doing some passive surveillance of the communications channel, as the two party
association model is only instigated when a new entity is connected to the network. Once
this precondition is fulfilled the attacker is able to proceed with the attack. This attack only
works against networks that haven’t deployed the IEC62351 security standard as it encrypts
the message in this communication model. There are examples of IEC61850 implementations
being deployed without IEC62351 being attacked. In December 2016 and 2017 Ukraine’s power
system network, which was running IEC61850 devices, was attacked by foreign adversary[82].
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Client LN server view
Figure 4.1: The logical nodes affirmative response
Client LN server view
Figure 4.2: The logical nodes negative response
4.1.1 The Two Party Association Model
The two party association model describes how a client program can connect and transfer
packets with a logical node. The standard procedure for the model is that the client sends an
access request, Acc−Req(SA/AP ), message to a virtual view on the logical node server, LN .
Included within the request are the client’s login credentials, which includes an authentication
parameter, AP , and the server access point reference, SA.
Once the server has received this request, it then decides how to proceed. If the client’s login
credentials are correct then the server will reply to the client with an affirmative message,
Acc−R+(AID/Re), that will include an authentication ID, AID, and the result of the attempt,
Re. However, if the client’s login credentials are invalid then the server will reply in the negative,
Acc−R−(Err), with an error message, Err.
Figures 4.1 & 4.2 depict the two possible session diagrams of the two party association
model.
4.1.2 The Adversary Model
The adversary for this attack is a weakened form of the DY model[52]. The rules governing the
adversary for this attack are:
• The adversary can see all packets passing between the client and the LN server, as the
channel isn’t encrypted.
• The adversary cannot send any message that they have not already seen.
• The adversary has no buffer of messages they have seen. They have to send the mes-
sage directly after seeing it. Whilst unrealistic this limitation on the adversary is to
demonstrate the ease with which the objective can be achieved.
• The adversary can forward and intercept packets.
4.1.3 The Credential Intercept Attack
The attack happens by combining the two potential responses of the server, depicted in figures
4.1 & 4.2, into one session. It begins with the client sending a legitimate login request to the
LN server. The adversary sees the client’s packet go through their intercept, and then sends
a invalid login attempt to the LN. When the LN responds in the affirmative with the AID to
the client, the adversary intercepts this packet. When the LN replies in the negative to the
adversary, the adversary forwards the packet with the error message to the client. After this
the client cannot use their login credentials. The session diagram for the attack is shown in
figure 4.3.
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Figure 4.4: The automaton depicting one client logging into a logical node server.
4.1.4 The Automata
Figure 4.4 depicts an automaton that models the process of one client logging in, whilst figure
4.5 shows the union of two one client automatons to show the state machine for two users
logging in simultaneously. The two user automaton allows the depiction of the attack described
in section 4.1.3. In the two person automaton S represents the standby state, C represents the
check state, and A represents the awaiting state.
4.1.5 The Context Free Grammar
The rules that describe a legitimate message that passes through the two person automaton
are:-
• A login attempt for one access view must be completed before a second login can be
attempted.
• There can only be two successful attempts per run of the automaton.
• An infinite number of failed attempts can be made before the first successful message and
between the first and final successful message.
The following rules describe the form of the message that can pass through the two person
automaton that leads to an undesired result:
• The adversary can only duplicate a message that has passed their intercept.
• The adversary’s duplicate message can only be sent immediately after seeing it. They
have no buffer.
• The adversary’s ‘Acc−Req()’ must come before the client’s ‘AP/SA’ is processed by their
login view.
• The adversary can only send invalid SA/AP credentials. This is to make sure it ends up























































































































Figure 4.5: The automaton depicting two clients logging into a logical node server simultane-
ously.
• The legitimate user cannot login after the attacker has intercepted their credentials.
The objective of the adversary is to make sure that the automaton is driven through the C1C2
state. This collision state represents the adversary’s intercept where they hijack the authenti-
cation ID and forward their error message.
The context free grammar that represent the above rules are:
S → TATV |TWTW |TV |TW
R→ Acc−Req()
V → Invalid SA/AP Acc−R−(Err)
W → SA/AP Acc−R+(AID/Re)
T → RU
U → V T |ε
A→W |RVW |RWV
4.1.6 Mapping to IEC61850-7-2
The above grammar maps to the two party association model by:
• Rule S: Presents the four different message types. From left to right.
1. Is the comprised attack form. If the attack is not attempted this leads to n = 0...
failed attempts, followed by a successful login and then another n = 0... failed logins.
However if rule inserts either ‘rV W ’ or ‘RWV ’ instead of ‘W ’, then the undesired
form of the message begins. This leads to two ‘Acc−Req()’ messages in a row. They
can both be seen as undesired as the attacker controls all messages passing through
its intercept.
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2. A word with two successful logins with n = 0... failed messages before the first and
between the subsequent successful logins.
3. n = 0... failed logins.
4. n = 0... failed logins followed by one successful message.
• Rule R: Maps to the request message parameter.
• Rule V : Maps to the incorrect form of 8.3.2.2.2.1, the server access point reference, and
8.3.2.2.2.2, the authentication parameter. Followed by 8.3.2.2.5, response showing the
failed attempt error, which “shall indicate that the service request failed”.
• Rule W : Maps to the correct form of 8.3.2.2.2.1, the server access point reference, “which
shall identify the server, with which the application association shall be established”, and
8.3.2.2.2.2, the authentication parameter, “for this application association to be opened”.
Followed by 8.3.2.2.3, response showing the successful login returning the authentication
ID, which “may be used to differentiate the application associations”, and request message,
which indicates ”if the establishment of the application association was successful or not”.
• Rule T : Is the rule that facilitates the n = 0... repeats of the failed login, or it provides
an ‘Acc−Req()’ packet before terminating the loop.
• Rule U : Provides the terminals to facilitate rule ‘T ’.
• Rule A: Is the production rule for the attack. From left to right.
1. Facilitates the normal success message stuck between to infinite failed attempts.
2. Two ‘Acc − Req()’ packets followed by a failed login attempt and then a successful
login.
3. Like 2, but the error and success messages are reversed.
2 and 3 are the undesired message forms
The above analysis has shown that the security promise of access control does not hold through-
out the IEC61850 standard. The credential intercept attack has been developed and proved
using context-free grammar against the two party association model. This scenario would allow
them to cause physical damage to the SG, for example they could trip circuit breakers and
cause undue stress on the distribution network.
4.2 IEC61850: Workfactor Amplification Attack
This section looks at an attack against the promise availability of the IEC61850 standard. Dur-
ing the investigation it was found that an attack using the generic substation event class model,
as described in IEC61850-7-2 section 15[120], could be used to create a DoS attack.
The aim of the adversary of this attack is to degrade the performance of packet transfer between
points in the SG communication network to below the acceptable QoS standard. The adversary
achieves this by sending messages that connects additional subscribers or topological branches
to a LN’s generic substation event subscriber list. This leads to the routers and IEDs on the
network having to process extra messages from other devices that they do not expect to be
within their broadcast network. The analysis that follows only focuses the calculation of the
number of extra bits processed by devices. However, the analysis doesn’t cover the additional
latency because that would be dependant on the hardware components of the grid which are
beyond the scope of the standard.
This analysis is a proof of concept of this class of attack. It is modelled that the generic
substation event communication model has been implemented deployed on a protocol indepen-
dent multicast (PIM) multicast framework that has been applied to a network substrate that
supports it.
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4.2.1 The Generic Substation Event Class Model
The generic substation event class model describes the way an IED can broadcast data regarding
its current, or changing, status to other devices within the substation that subscribe to its
announcements. It is based on a producer/subscriber multicast model, and is implemented as
an unidirectional process. There are two types of message in this model. Firstly, the GOOSE
message, that is used to broadcast the IED’s data, and the second is the GSSE message, which
broadcasts any changes in state. When an IED is connected to the network it sends a GOOSE
message that announces to devices its current status.
An IED on a generic substation event network will only check to see if the message it has
received is a duplicate of a previous message, or if parts of it are missing. The method used
to check for this is, again, beyond the scope of IEC61850. In this analysis it is assumed that
the IED does not have access to the complete address space of the network and the packets
received aren’t cryptographically signed.
4.2.2 PIM multicast
The PIM framework is a collection of protocols that describe how devices can multicast packets
across an IP network[179]. Depending on the bandwidth and subscriber update constraints
of the implementers network topology, PIM offers different protocols for modifying a devices
subscriber list. The two protocols that this analysis focuses on are PIM sparse mode and PIM
dense mode, where the .
In the PIM sparse mode the subscriber list is updated whenever a device joins the network.
The process begins when a new subscriber to the network issues a join request to be added to
a publisher’s subscriber list, a reverse path forwarding (RPF) check is triggered. A PIM-join
message is sent toward rendezvous point (RP), as demonstrated in figure 4.6. The join message
is multicast hop by hop upstream to the all the PIM routers until it reaches the RP. The RP
router receives the PIM-join message and adds it to the outgoing interface list. The same
process is done for when a router wishes to leave the network, but instead sends a PIM-prune
message. When a source is added, it multicasts a PIM-register message and sends them by
means of unicast to the RP router.
In PIM dense mode, an example is shown in figure 4.7, the principle way a subscriber list is
generated is when the publisher periodically sends out a PIM-flood message across the network.
This registers all devices on the publisher’s subscriber network. If a subscriber no longer wishes
to be on the list, it sends a PIM-prune message upstream to the source, which then removes
it from the list. If a new receiver wishes to join before the next PIM-flood, they can send a
PIM-graft message to the source to be added. However, if these are the main forms of list
maintenance then PIM sparse mode is recommended.
4.2.3 The Adversary Model
The adversary model is similar strength to the one described in section 4.1.2. The only mod-
ification is this adversary has a buffer so they are not required to send messages they have
discerned straight away.
4.2.4 The Attack premise
The attack is predicated on the adversary performing some passive surveillance on a devices’
subscriber network. Through their observation they decide which branch or IED they wish to
attach to the IED’s subscriber list, and which type of PIM network it is. They also discern the
IED’s specific application ID, which is required for subscribers to receive the GOOSE messages.
The adversary sends either a PIM-flood or PIM-graft, for dense PIM networks, or PIM-join or
PIM-register for sparse PIM networks. The next time the publisher IED sends out a generic
substation event message to the network the IED(s) that have been maliciously subscribed to
the network will receive messages they weren’t expecting. As they have no access to the address
space they cannot tell whether they were meant to receive the message.
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Figure 4.7: An dense topology PIM multicast system topology[179].
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4.2.5 The Workfactor Amplification Ratio
The workfactor amplification ratio calculates how many bits of messages are produced to the
amount of bits the adversary sent to initiate the attack.
Amplification factor =
Message produced as a consequence of the attack
Messages sent by the adversary
(4.1)
The amplification factor for a GOOSE message is,
Amplification factorGOOSE =
A+ length of data set + data set
B + C
, (4.2)
where is A = 187, B = 65, and C = 4or32 depending on whether the adversary chooses to edit
the PIM message type, or create a new PIM message.
For a GSSE,
Amplification factorGSSE =
D + (2 ∗ length of data set)
B + C
, (4.3)
where D = 170
4.2.6 Examples
This section provides example workfactor amplification ratios for subscriber networks attacked
using the generic substation event models of IEC61850. These examples are generated using
the PIM topologies laid out in figures 4.6 & 4.7. All of the below examples takes the average
number of status logical node variables, which is three, as the length of the data set. As the
status variables are usually a boolean variable type, it is assumed for these calculations that
they are boolean. For the purpose of these examples the adversary will create a whole new PIM
message for their attack.
AFGOOSE AFGSSE
Case 1 3.96 3.63
Case 2 23.75 22.14
Case 3 11.87 11.07
Case 1 is set in the depicted dense PIM network. In this case the adversary has chosen to connect
router I to the publisher’s subscriber list, so to send malicious messages to subscriber 3. Case
2 is when the adversary connects a new publisher to the network.
Case 3 is the attack scenario applied to the sparse PIM network example. In this instance the
adversary connects publisher 2 to the network to send malicious messages to both subscriber 1
and subscriber 2. In the case of adding another publisher to the network, the amplification
factor would be the same as case 1.
These examples show that an adversary can cause maliciously generate more bits than they use
to create the malicious additions to the subscriber list. If an IED is subscribed to too many lists
maliciously this could lead to it violating the QoS times to process and act upon emergency
messages. This delay in processing would lead to damage to the electrical distribution network
and potentially blackouts.
4.3 IEC61850 Control Communication De-synchronisation
Attack
This was the first attack discovered using the author’s queuing theory method. The attack shows
that an adversary can cause the client and server state machines in the IEC61850 control com-
munication model to become de-synchronised during a session. The attack is only valid in the
Select Before Operate (SBO) version of the communication model. The adversary achieves this
by either increasing or decreasing the rate at which the server receives the oper− req[TestOK]
in the SBO control model, described in section 19.2.2 of IEC 61850-7-2 (shown in a truncated
form in figure 4.8). The adversary can cause this disruption of state because the standard
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Receive Oper − req
Send Oper − resp+
Send Oper − resp−
Figure 4.8: A truncated version of the server side of the SBO version of the control communi-
cation protocol run described in section 19.2.2 of IEC61850-7-2.
can be interpreted as not requiring the server to send out a timeout message to the client if
it believes the session has ended before completion. Whilst this is happening the client still
thinks the run is following the operation request branch of the protocol run, and will expect an
update that will never arrive. This is a legitimate interpretation of the standard that devices
will have to be prepared for, due to the QoS promise of interoperability of all devices regardless
of manufacturer. This attack vector provides the adversary the ability to create doubt over
the state of any logical node that has “data object instances of a Controllable common data
class and whose ctlModel DataAttribute that is not set to “status-only””[120]. This includes
safety equipment, such as circuit breakers, whose response to an emergency situation have to
be completed within 5ms[121]. If the disruption caused by the de-synchronisation of states
causes a control command to violate the QoS requirements, the adversary can cause physical
damage to the distribution network.
The adversary in this result is the same the symbolic one described by DY[52]. The adversary
in this model is an omnipotent and omnipresent party on the communications network who
“can intercept messages before they reach their intended destination, it can modify and reroute
them, possibly with invalid sender fields”.
Figure 4.9 shows that adversary can increase the mean response time of the protocol run
receiving the oper − req[TestOK] message by several orders magnitude by altering the pro-
cessing rate of queue accepting those packets. The dramatic increase in the response time to
receiving the packets increases the probability that the protocol run will take the timeout path,
which would cause the de-synchronisation. In this analysis no other variables were altered. The
analysis also used the truncated form of the protocol run depicted in figure 4.8.
4.4 IEC61850: GOOSE Packet Injection
The GOOSE messaging service is one of the two models within IEC61850 to enable multicast
messaging between devices in a substation. It is designed as a fast and reliable messaging sys-
tem to distribute time critical data and commands to the relevant IEDs, such as commands to
activate a substation’s protection equipment. Due to the hard real time constraints (3− 4ms)
and high level of reliability of all the messages the GOOSE messaging service is designed to be
non-routeable, an entire message sent in a single packet, and received without acknowledgement.
The GOOSE message is multicast across the communication’s network using a publish-subscribe
model, so different subscribers can be reached for different calibrated events[97].






















































































are availability and integrity from transmission error. The standard does add that the GOOSE
subscribers must be able to detect and dispose of duplicate messages. IEC62351 does inte-
grate traditional security promises into the IEC61850 standard, but it explicitly does not add
them to GOOSE as the latency from encryption technologies could violate the message QoS
promises[148]. The only security feature that IEC62351 adds to GOOSE messaging service
is a replay protection algorithm[?]. The IEC61850 and IEC62351 make no considerations for
the other specific security problems faced by multicast protocols, which have been discussed
by Judge & Ammar [84]. These are access control or group address obfuscation mechanisms.
Having a policy on this would hinder an adversary’s attempt to used the GOOSE service as an
attack vector with which they could map and manipulate the communications network.
The combination of the lack of acknowledgement of message receipt and limited security protec-
tion makes the GOOSE service an ideal attack vector against an SG communications network.
For this reason GOOSE has been one of the few communications models within IEC61850 that
has been probed by the research community for vulnerabilities (an analysis of the various at-
tacks was given in section 2.2). The main focus of GOOSE attack research has been attacks
against availability of devices to prevent critical messages from being received. However, there
seems to have been no consideration about whether the service is susceptible to injection class
attacks.
This section describes the minimum necessary conditions that an adversary must meet for their
injection attack to be successful, and remain undetected, given the stringent QoS time con-
straints of the GOOSE service. The objective of the adversary in this analysis is that they wish
to achieve their disruption with as few messages as possible. It then goes on to demonstrate
the effectiveness of this attack vector and considers various counter measures.
4.4.1 Message Injection Attack
This work builds off Strobel et al.’s[177] DoS attack to calculate the likelihood that the adver-
sary’s packet injection will be completed within the window of opportunity before the stNum
of a device’s GOOSE messages rolls over. Whilst they give the upper timing bound of the in-
jection within two minutes of the rollover to pass IEC62351’s replay detection algorithm, they
provide no consideration to the rate of injection needed for the attack to deny any messages
after the rollover has happened. This analysis picks up from here.
Using this starting point an adversary model can be developed for when they wish to com-
plete their objective using only one message. For this attack to work the adversary will be
required to have performed some passive surveillance of the target subscriber IED. This is so
they can discover what the current stNum is, and the rate at which they change. Whilst it
is not necessary for the adversary to obey Kerckhoffs’ principles[91], they must at least know
that the GOOSE stNum rollover occurs when it reaches 232, and that they have to complete
their injection within two minutes of the rollover happening. Finally, they must be able to
manipulate the rate of transmission of individual messages passing along the communication
between devices. First to delay their arrival, before accelerating it so it can be injected at the
desired time.
If it is assumed that the subscriber’s channel has no buffer of messages it receives, then the
chances of adversary’s malicious message being the first message increases exponentially with
the rate of injection. This is shown in figure 4.10, which shows that the adversary needs to be
of order hundred times faster than the normal injection rate to guarantee their success.
4.4.2 Countermeasures: Message Buffer and Rate Limiting
Introducing even a small buffer of messages, to slightly delays the GOOSE message being
received by the IED, reduces the probability of the malicious message being the first packet to
below 12 . Adjusting the adversary model to allow for message duplicates to be injected, does
not increase their probability of success greatly if they wish to maintain the objective of not
DoSing the buffer with their malicious messages. Another method of limiting the success of
the adversary is by limiting the range of injection rates that will be accepted by the subscriber,
this means devices can only send messages to the IED with a certain frequency. These two
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. There is a message buffer, of 5, and an injection rate limit of only ten times
faster than regular traffic.
methodologies are demonstrated in figure 4.11, where the buffer is only five messages long, and
the threshold of detection is two or more.
4.4.3 Countermeasure: Evasion of buffers & rate limitation and Im-
plementing Inflexible QoS
In the above analysis it is presumed that the malicious message is the same size as the regular
traffic. However, if an adversary gains the ability to edit and increase the number of data sets
in the GOOSE message it can be shown that they may be able to circumvent the above the
countermeasures. In this attack the adversary model is expanded so that they can intercept
and edit a GOOSE message. The further knowledge that they require is thee upper limit of
size of the DatSet that a GOOSE message can carry without tripping the integrity check. As
shown in figure 4.12, contrary to the previous section, the optimal rate of injection to evade the
discussed countermeasures with the enlarged message is slower than the regular rate of injection.
This means for the evasion to be successful the adversary would also be required to change the
goal of their passive surveillance. Whilst this attack vector doesn’t increase the adversary’s
odds of remaining undetected, it does increase the chance of their injected message being first.
A counter measure to the above attack vector would to have more stringent enforcement on
the QoS transmission standard. Currently IEC61850 standard still allows for messages that
arrive late to be processed. If the standard tightened this QoS promise, there would be no
guarantee that publishers message could get through. An adversary would manipulate this
counter measure, using the previously stated adversary model, to invalidate a single GOOSE
event in a sequence of GOOSE events. That is to say that a stNum is changed without any
time for retransmission between the change. An example of this would be in the issuance of tap
changer commands[170]. The commands to adjust come in a succession of GOOSE messages,
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, given a message buffer, when the malicious message is two orders of magnitude







Figure 4.13: The layout of the attack against a tap changer, when QoS is strictly enforced.
Where T0 & T1 are different QoS time requirements defined in IEC61850-5[121]. An ’event’ is
a new event that causes the GOOSE publisher to start a new stNum.
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Figure 4.14: A demonstration of the increased processing time when enlarging a malicious







as shown in figure 4.13,and if the tap does not end in the correct position it is likely to damage
the physical equipment. Figure 4.14 shows that a less than one order of magnitude increase
in the size of the GOOSE message can create a greater delay in the expected processing time
of messages. All the variables in figure 4.14 are set to the same, and only µmal is increased
in relation to µnorm. This delay would make subsequent messages miss their QoS permitted
window.
This look at the stricter enforcement of QoS presumes that there is no change in the order of
magnitude between the translation of a change in the size of the message and the time it takes
to process a message. The change in size is demonstrated in the queueing theory model as an
increase in time of processing of the malicious message, which has now been uncoupled from
the processing rate of regular traffic.
A counter measure that would help prevent the adversary’s subversion of the rate limiter, would
be to bind the ConfRev variable with the DatSet. If the number of data sets changes but
doesn’t have a corresponding event then the IED disposes of it in the integrity check. This
would undermine the adversary being able to increase the size of the GOOSE message.
4.5 Packet Injection Model
This section presents a generalised model of packet injection attacks that that allows for the
quantitative analysis of a device’s properties to discern the likelihood of an adversary success-
fully injecting their malicious payload. This model builds upon the GOOSE injection model
described in section 4.4. The model makes it possible to study how altering parameter affects
the adversary’s likelihood of success, along with providing a testbed for developing counter-
measures. Having a testbed allows the user to see if the countermeasures hinder the adversary
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Figure 4.15: A queue representing an IED with a message buffer (K) of 6, with 5 messages in
the buffer. It has both regular and malicious traffic coming into it, but they are both processed
at the same rate.
whilst still remaining compliant with device’s chosen communication protocol.
Further exploration of packet injection attacks was pursued, despite them not necessarily being
considered an attack vector for disruption attacks, because the adversary is trying to achieve
their goal without creating a noticeable difference to the expected distribution of packets.
Creating a model of the weakest possible adversary’s injection attack allows for sensitivity to
disruption of a standard’s QoS to be gauged.
4.5.1 Injection Attack: The Adversary Model
The adversary using a packet injection attack vector wants to their message placed in a server’s
communication channel with the minimum number of packets. This is so they can minimize the
disruption to the expected distribution of messages to avoid detection by the server’s IDS. In
the model presented the adversary wishes to complete their objective using only one message.
The adversary is allowed to do some passive surveillance on the communication channel to
discover the rate of packet arriving into the device. The adversary doesn’t need the power to
generate new packet, just be able to manipulate packet that passes through their intercept.
They will be able to change the increasing the packets size (altering their µ) and change their
rate of transmission (altering their γorλ).
4.5.2 Injection attack: Altering the Rate of Packet Arrival
The adversary’s objective is not to DoS the queue but to inject their malicious message into the
device without triggering its IDS. The focus of the model is to show that a malicious packet can
be injected, not the consequences of the injection. As stated in section 3.1.1 the content of the
packet isn’t encapsulated in the queuing network methodology, and the explicit consequences of
the injection is dependent on the communication model being attacked. The adversary achieves
their goal by injecting their malicious packet into the front of the device’s buffer before any
regular packets enter the queue. This attack is modelled using one M/M/1/K queue, as shown
in figure 4.15. Figure 4.10 shows that if there is no device buffer that if the adversary is able
achieve an arrival rate two orders of magnitude faster than the regular packet’s arrival rate,
then there is a near certainty that their injection attack will be successful. However, if device
incorporates a message buffer then the maximum certainty of a successful injection drops with
each successive increase in buffer size, as shown in figure 4.16. Continuing to expand the message
buffer indefinitely could be a countermeasure to injection attacks, but it comes at the cost of
adding a latency to processing packets in device. This latency is shown in figure 4.17. This
added latency may be acceptable for some distributed protocols, but it is not acceptable in the
SAS like IEC61850 due to hard real time requirements of the standard. Another countermeasure
would be to limit the arrival rate of packets into the device to try and maintain the expected
distribution of packet arrival.
4.5.3 Injection attack: Altering the Size of the Malicious Packet
Attempting to DoS a device by flooding it with packets will likely trigger its IDS, leading to the
channel being cut, and is also computationally inefficient for the adversary. A more efficient
method of DoSing would be for the adversary to inject a packet that takes a lot longer than
expected for the device to process, consuming the available space of the buffer for as long as
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Figure 4.16: The size of the buffer, K, plotted against the maximum injection probability
achieved by the adversary.
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Figure 4.17: The size of the buffer, K, plotted against the added latency of processing of
packets.
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Figure 4.18: A queue representing an IED with a message buffer (K) of 6, with 5 messages in
the buffer. It has both regular and malicious traffic coming into it. The malicious packet take
longer to process as it takes up 4 spaces to process in the buffer.
possible, which leads to a disruption of the normal distribution of packets. They could do this
by increasing the size of the packet. This attack is modelled using two M/M/1/K queues in
tandem. The adversary achieves their objective by making sure the first queue can no longer
transmit packets, as shown in figure 4.18. Figure 4.19 shows the exponential distribution of
this class of attack when K = 2. At two orders of magnitude larger than the regular traffic, the
node can no longer receive regular traffic.
The same exponential distribution occurs across packet processing rates for larger buffers;
countermeasure for this attack would include limiting the maximum size of packets accepted by
a device. It should be noted, however, that a queuing network model could also be used to find
the correct balance of malicious packet arrival rate and regular packet size to circumvent this.
The calibration of a device’s IDS would have to have a high sensitivity of correctly identifying
malicious packets to reduce the probability of success of this kind of attack.
4.6 IEC61850: Timing De-synchronisation Attack
This section describes a de-synchronisation attack aimed at making the IED’s in an SG commu-
nication network synchronise with a master server that has the wrong time accuracy for their
functionality. An adversary would want to disrupt the time reference of an IED because reli-
able common time reference for sensors, actuators, and control logic is required for the safe and
efficient operation of SGs. The common time reference is required for the monitoring systems
to determine causality, for monitoring a network or power system’s quality, and to co-ordinate
control actions as well as to operate safety mechanisms correctly. Moreover, such synchronisa-
tion is also critical for the detection of incidents and attacks in the reconstruction of events.
However, these functions require different levels of precision and accuracy.
Both the IEC 61850 [189] and IEC 60870-5-104 [188] standards explicitly make reference to
the IETF NTP [123], whose security has been reviewed in section 2.2.9. Whilst the IETF has
made efforts to secure NTP with RFC7384 [133], most implementations of the NTP standard
remain unsecured. There have been various different attacks that have been theorised for both
NTP and PTP. A compromise of the time synchronisation can easily affect the functionality
and security of the entire power network as it allows for both attacks and obfuscation of attacks.
This section goes over what both standards say about their time synchronisation communi-
cation models, to demonstrate their lack of robustness, before presenting how an adversary
could force a desynchronisation in the author’s queuing network methodology.
4.6.1 Time synchronisation in IEC61850 & IEC60870-5
Both of the IEC 60870-5 and IEC 61850 standards defines the accuracy of the time source re-
quired for an IED to perform its function, and how they should synchronise with the clocks to
get the correct time data. Below is a brief description of the time synchronisation communica-
tion models in each standard, where the deficiencies are pointed out. Before finally describing
the potential subset of implementations that these omissions are likely to be vulnerable to
exploitation.
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Figure 4.19: The ratio of regular and malicious packet processing rates plotted against the
probability that will be blocked from receiving any further packets.
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IEC 60870-5
While IEC60870-5 (-101) can rely on implicit time synchronisation based on synchronous com-
munication, its adaptation to wide-area Internet Protocol communication architecture means
that IEDs must be able to connect to dedicated time source. The IEC 60870-5-104 standard
provides two different time synchronisation models. The first is the synchronisation process
between a control server and its client server, and the second is synchronisation based on a
calculation and dissemination of the transmission delay between servers. The first process is a
simple call-response protocol, with the client device’s clock updating when the control server
receives an affirmative reply from it. The standard requires clients to be able to reply to the
control server for the operation to be valid but does not state a preferred time source for the
control server to reference. The only integrity check client performs is if the synchronisation
process is completed later than the client expects. If this occurs, it flags any operation it per-
forms after completion as potentially inaccurate until its clock is updates again. The standard
neglects to state what happens to the flagged messages.
The time delay synchronisation method is another call and response process. During the





where td is the time delay, rdt is the round trip time, sdt is the time that the client synchronizes
to, and tr is the time it takes for the client to reply. Once the control server has completed this
operation, it forwards the delay to the client it has synchronised with.
IEC 61850
The time synchronisation communication model described in the IEC61850 standard is minimal
in its description. It gives an overview of how time synchronisation occurs between a dedicated
time server and a substation and requires a multicast protocol to tell the client IEDs what
the new time is, but does not specify how an authoritative time is sourced from a wide-area
communication network. The standard defers to either GNSS or the simplified NTP protocol
as possible time sources, but it does not elaborate on how they interface with the network or
how the correct precision is achieved. The only information explicitly called for is that the time
server needs to update at a set time interval, specified level of accuracy, and to not exceed a
time limit before the next update. Although not explicitly declared, the elapsed time is used to
calculate the transmission delay between the time server and its clients. The time server can
use multicast to complete the synchronisation operation with its client IEDs.
Exploitable Omissions in the Standards
A single local reference may suffice in trivial cases of deployment, but for larger expanses and
distributed systems, multiple time references are going to be required. Here, GNSS receivers are
widely used, potentially in conjunction with terrestrial support systems to enhance accuracy.
Such systems, however, are not feasible to be deployed indiscriminately for individual IEDs
and components since e.g. placement of antennae and line of sight to sufficient constellations
are not always optimal. Moreover, it is anticipated that future SG deployment may include
heterogeneous systems not on a single time reference. These considerations have not been
factored into the development of either time synchronisation communication models. Neither
model address what an IED should in the case of delayed or missing timing data, or if they
receive data with the incorrect accuracy. This leaves it up to the manufacture of IED’s to decide
what the appropriate course of action should be, which could lead to either solutions interfering
with each other, undermining the interoperability of devices, or a manufacture presuming no
solution is required. This omission in could be exploited by an adversary and allow them
to instigate events that damage the transmission infrastructure. This could happen through
the manipulation of the state estimation of a transmission network, which could lead to the
misapplication of protective action [9]; moreover, it should also be noted that such actions also







Figure 4.20: An example of network topography used in this class of attack. The NTP servers
are on different time accuracy strata, and the adversary manipulates the arrival rate of the pack-
ets from the them to ensure that control/master server is synchronised with the inappropriate
strata.
events cannot be relied upon.
4.6.2 Adversary Model
The adversary for the attack is a weaker form of DY[52] symbolic model. In the model the
adversary can only manipulate the processing rate of packets of different NTP synchronisation
server’s queues, but can’t modify the communication or endpoints. This maps to them being
able change the rate of packets travelling across a communication channel. This attack can be
carried out even with RFC7384[133] implemented across the network, as they don’t manipulate
the content of the packet. The adversary doesn’t attack the servers themselves. The channels
are represented as arrows in figure 4.20. It should be noted that the adversary needs to be able
to internally synchronise information and commands between the adversary’s taps on various
edges of the network that make up communication channel; in this work it is assumed that this
is the case, like all implementations of the DY adversary, and do not model this explicitly.
4.6.3 Accuracy Synchronisation Attack
IEC 60870-5-104 and IEC 61850 IEDs require different levels of time accuracy for the different
functions that they perform. From power measurements (∼ 1µs) to logging (∼ 100ms)[156],
IED and SCADA systems require a time source with the appropriate accuracy for their func-
tions. If the IED is either solely dependant on an NTP network, or is unable to connect to
another time source (GNSS satellite, PTP, etc), then it must be able to select a NTP stratum
with an appropriate accuracy [127]. We assume that a given power network holds more than one
strata of NTP server for reliability reasons. Neither of the state machines in IEC 60870-5-5 or
IEC 61850-7-2 check if the accuracy of the time source they are connecting to is appropriate the
function required, nor do they have any correction procedure if an inadequate level of accuracy
is chosen. This oversight provides an adversary with an attack vector that can undermine the
functionality of IEDs on the network. This attack vector exists because, as stated in section
4.6.1, neither standards incorporate sub-protocols on how to handle NTP state transitions that
will cause the control/master server to violate the QoS requirements. The standards presume
that all time sources will always provide the current time with the correct accuracy.
The premise of this attack is that the adversary manipulates the rate of packets arriving from
the NTP server from the stratum with correct accuracy (e.g. by interfering with legitimate
communication), stratum 1, to increase the probability that the control/master server will
synchronise to an NTP server with an inappropriate accuracy, stratum 2. The adversary ma-
nipulates the traffic of the communication channels serving the control/master server, which
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Figure 4.21: Maximum probability of the control server queue being full of malicious packets
given the adversary’s manipulation of the ratio of arrival rates of packets from the different
NTP servers from different strata.
may e.g. be achieved by a MiTM or man on the side attack but which are not elaborated here.
The simplified network topology used to demonstrate this attack is shown in figure 4.20. In
this model, malicious packets are defined as packets with inappropriate time accuracy. Using
the exogenous equations described in section 3.1.1 the effective arrival rate in each queue/NTP
server is,
λeffstratum 1,2 = γstratum 1,2(1− P (Nstratum 1,2=Kstratum 1,2)) (4.5)
λeffcontrol = γstratum 1(1− P (Nstratum 1=Kstratum 1)) + γstratum 2(1− P (Nstratum 2=Kstratum 2))
(4.6)
eff control is the sum of the previous two λ
eff as all of there packets can only go into the
control server. The probability of the queues being blocked are
Pstratum 1,2 = P (Ncontrol = Kcontrol) (4.7)
Pcontrol = 0 (4.8)








µ̃acontrol = 0 (4.10)
From the above equations the endogenous equations can then be derived. We have conducted
a simulation of the attack outlined; this simulation attack shows that adversary only needs to
create a ratio of 20 times the difference in processing rates of the two servers for the probability
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of the success of the attack to approach certainty. The author could not find any second
order affects in the simulation. It was hypothesised that with a sufficiently large difference in
processing rate, the probability of the stratum 1 being blocked would increase, but no correlation
was seen. The author would like to stress that this work attacks a different part of the time-
keeping system than the work of Barreto et al. [17]. Their attack focuses on disrupting the use
of the communication channel between the IED control/master server and the IED slave servers
within the distribution network, which are defined in the standards. The work presented here,
however, focuses on attacks against the communication channel between the IED control/master





This research project demonstrated that the alternative security promises of availability and
synchronisation of state could be modelled and tested using a symbolic formal method, expand-
ing upon the set of promises that are traditionally tested (CIA and non-repudiation). The work
presents these promises as the distinctly new class of attacks as it is argued that the promises
needed to be tested against the weakest possible adversary, with the minimum set of abilities
and knowledge, whose objective is the disruption of a session, in contrast to other promises that
are implemented to repel stronger symbolic attackers whose objectives are to learn the content
of messages passed between agents. The weaker adversary is required for these promises to find
the sensitivity a protocol session has to adversarial disruption. These arguments culminated
in the development of a probabilistic formal method based on queueing networks developed by
the author, which used a network of M/M/c/K queues to model packets travelling through
an honest agent’s state machine or between a network of agents using a specific protocol. The
methodology separates the properties of the communication channel, such as their ability to see
the entire network topology, from the adversary model, which differentiates itself from the tra-
ditional DY adversary. This facilitated the development of weaker symbolic adversaries which
made it possible to discern the limits of protocol sessions to be identified. The separation of
channel and adversary meant that the adversary’s ability to manipulate packets and the knowl-
edge of the environment and distribution of packets could be limited to being only being able
to be placed on certain paths of the network, so they are only allowed to survey a subset of
packets being passed between honest agents, to limit their knowledge acquisition to the level
of inference. It also meant for that more nuanced adversary powers, such as the ability to ma-
nipulate the size, arrival rate, and probabilistic distribution of packets received by the honest
agent could be modelled. The author’s methodology builds on Osorio & Bierlaire’s M/M/c/K
queuing network. Additional state space configurations were added to their approach, which
have been verified with a set of completeness and correctness proofs. The new state spaces allow
for the inspection of the number of packets in a queue and the order of packets in the queue,
along with Osorio & Bierlaire’s packet queue status state space. These varied state spaces were
required to be able to put limits on the symbolic adversary.
The author chose the SG domain because it was clear from the literature that the introduc-
tion of the TCP/IP technologies into the domain of electrical transmission and distribution
had created a tension within its standards between the safety and security requirements of the
cyber-physical systems that had remained unresolved. Traditionally the electrical distribution
systems had depended upon the airgap of their communications networks and a lack of broad
implementation of SCADA technologies to keep the attack surface relatively small. However,
implementing the SG technologies onto with traditional internet technologies to increase the
amount of system automation and enable two way communication has also increased the number
of attack vectors. The development of new SG standard’s haven’t grappled this new problem
space into their design philosophy leaving these critical pieces of infrastructure open to mali-
cious interference. On top of this the absolute rigidity of the SG standard’s safety mechanisms
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leaves little functional space within the domain to implement traditional security technologies.
Beyond designing a new class of network communications protocol that are flexible enough
to accommodate both safety and security promises[42], it is likely that SG technologies will
have security problems for the foreseeable future. The lack of traditional security technologies
means that the slack has to be picked up elsewhere within the ecosystem such as monitoring
and standard development.
IEC61850 SAS, and its ancillary security standard IEC62351, were chosen from amongst the
other SG communications protocols because they had explicitly declared rigid real time stan-
dards for data transmission, and a set of QoS promises to ensure the safe operation of the
cyber-physical systems that deploy them. Mapping of IEC61850’s promises into robustness
models allowed for the generation of arguments that adversarial interference of a communica-
tion session could drive them to exceed those real time requirements and violate the promises
across every implementation of the standard, whereas other standards agnosticism towards
defining acceptable limits of operation meant that attacks could only be discovered on an im-
plementation by implementation basis.
Throughout the course of this research project several attacks were discovered within the com-
munication models of IEC61850. The first two attacks were not discovered using the queuing
network methodology, but were developed to test the theory that there were attacks within
IEC61850 that would manifest in every implementation of the standard. The first of these was
a credential intercept attack in the standard’s association model was proved using context-free
grammar. An adversary could steal legitimate agents credentials due to the standard not en-
forcing the encryption of this session’s communications channel. Without the encryption of the
channel it is possible to merge the state machines of two clients to show that there is a race
condition that an adversary can exploit to steal legitimate credentials without being detected.
The second attack was a demonstration that the lack of restrictions on the multicast communi-
cations models, meant that an adversary could create a workfactor amplification attack, which
could lead to the violation of availability. The attack was demonstrated on a PIM network
topology implementation. These attacks were presented at CRITIS 2016[209].
With the queuing network methodology the author was able to develop the following attacks
within the IEC61850 standard:
• Showed that an adversary can de-synchronise a control server from a client node, because
the client state machine has no notion that the server has a timeout state. This attack
was presented at critis 2017
• Based on the the literature around how the GOOSE anti-replay mechanism would cause
more insecurity than it solve, a model of packet injection attacks was developed in the
queuing network methodology. With this model the likelihood of these proposed attacks
disrupting the QoS promises of IEC61850 were calculated. The model also allowed for
various protocol level countermeasures to be tested. This work was presented at ISGT
Europe 2018. The packet injection model was further developed into a generalised form.
• Demonstrated that a IEC61850 system can easily be de-synchronized from the layer of
the time-synchronisation network that has correct accuracy, due its time synchronisation
state machine having no states for handling exceptions. This work was presented at ISGT
North America 2019.
5.2 Future Work
This section lays out what work could be done to further build on the author’s methodology,
and then present possible research that could be done with the methodology.
5.2.1 Improvements of the Methodology
If this project were too be continued there are several additions that could be made to the
queuing network formal method. As this is a proof of concept of the approach, the focus hasn’t
been on developing an implementation with the best computational complexity. To improve the
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complexity of this approach, research into other data structures, and thus algorithms for their
creation and navigation of a network should be done. To ensure that these new implementations
are correct the proofs laid out in chapter 3 would have to be redone. Other additions to the
methodology could be made, such as:
• The inclusion of other probability distributions for the arrival and processing rates, to
model alternative traffic flows.
• Further state transition types, such as packet being dropped, queues dumping their pack-
ets, and blocks of queues being either sent at once or broadcast.
• The expansion of the conditional probability functionality switching of arrival and pro-
cessing rates and the inclusion of priority queues.
5.2.2 Projects Using the Methodology
A project that the queuing network methodology could be used for is developing a formal
taxonomy of weaker adversary powers and disruption attacks that can be demonstrated using
the queuing network methodology could be created. The first step of this project would be to
explore how the adversary’s placement on the communication channel affects what they can
learn and do on the network. This could be achieved by modelling the adversary and the honest
agents at the network level. This avenue would start with the traditional MiTM shown with
the DY adversary, before moving on to man on the side, collusion between an honest agent and
the adversary, and an honest agent unknowingly communicating directly with an adversary.
With the adversary positions modelled the next step would be to model the different ways the
DY adversary can be weakened in the queuing network approach. Creating weaker adversaries
is important as most of the work on symbolic adversaries has been done to develop stronger to
demonstrate a protocols resilience. These are useful when the adversary is trying to obtain a
message, but it isn’t useful when modelling a protocol’s robustness. In robustness models the
adversary is trying to stop the completion of a protocol session. Altering the adversary’s learning
and inference as well as developing a series of capability and timings rules would provide the
ground work for the taxonomy. The inference and knowledge models could then be combined
with the positioning models to begin to develop a series of attacks. With a taxonomy of attacks
a user can input their standard’s QoS and be given the likelihood of it being susceptible to that
attack. To further develop the adversary in a more theoretical direction, the internal state of
the adversary itself could be modelled to show how they respond to certain counter measures.
This would move away from the traditional DY adversary that can’t react to events made in
the protocol sessions. The adversary deploys an ability from their set in order to achieve a goal.






This appendix looks at security promises made by IEC62351-3[181] standard, which is describes
how the data packets being sent across a communications network that uses one of IEC60870,
IEC61850, or DNP3 SAS will be encrypted using transport layer security TLS 1.2. In addition
the security promises made by the standard IEC62351-3 incorporates confidentiality, integrity,
and message level authentication to the protocols. The standard does present a list of message
types that implementers should omit from encrypting. Those are those that need a real time
response, such as SV in IEC61850. IEC62351-6 further elaborabates on the list of types that
should be omitted by stating that “applications using GOOSE and IEC 61850-9-2 and requir-
ing 4ms response times, multicast configurations, and low CPU overhead, encryption is not
recommended.”[183]. IEC62351-3 claims that it will counter MiTM and replay attacks, along
with negating eavesdropping. The focus of this appendix is to show that these promises are
not be upheld if certain policy omission regarding the certificate authority (CA) trust networks
required by the TLS’s public key infrastructure aren’t rectified.
The violations of the security promises are shown through interrogating IEC62351-3’s approach
of just declaring the use TLS, message authentication codes(MAC), and CAs whilst it neglect-
ing to comment on CA implementation, certificate validation and revocation policies. As well
undermining its security promises, it is shown that these omissions come into clash with the
IEC61850-5 quality of service requirement of interoperability of devices[121], because without
consistent policy decelerations each vendor can make their own implementations decisions which
may clash with each other.
IEC62351-3 overlooks certain key areas that would fulfil its promises. The assumptions made
by the specification are that either a CRL or an OCSP algorithms will be deployed alongside
the communications network, but both IEC62351-3 and TLS abdicate responsibility on stan-
dardising the best practise for the operation of a CA. To uphold its promises IEC62351-3 must
specify proper administrative policy on how the CAs are deployed to prevent an attacker being
able circumvent the protections provided by TLS.
A.1 Omission in the Public Key Infrastructure Implemen-
tation
Shown below are the possible problems that can arise with the major implementations of public
key trust architecture, CRL, OCSP, and OCSP stapling. Potential solutions to these problems
are suggested. After that, the overview turns to the specific considerations that need to be
taken into account for SG public key infrastructure.
A.1.1 Attack vectors of CRL’s
Below are potential attack vectors of CRL based trust architecture:
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• Public key infrastructure is only as robust as the topology of its trust architecture[193].
The correct choice of trust topology can provide a greater guarantee that a device on the
network can authenticate the certificates it receives in a TLS handshake. For example
if the trust topology implemented is a hierarchical one then an attacker could mount a
denial of service against the promise of authentication, as it would deny a targeted device
access to the CA’s available on its branch.
• Owners of trust infrastructure need some way of checking that a CA on their network
is legitimate, and should have the authority to issue certificates. If the CA cannot be
trusted to act honestly when confirming the veracity of a party’s certificate, and for them
to maintain an accurate CRL, then the promises of both authentication and integrity
cannot be upheld.[57]
Although there haven’t been any reported cases where a CA has acted in an intentionally
dishonest manner, we can deduce the consequences of not validating their honesty by
looking at examples of CA error from recent history[7]. In 2013 Türktrust accidentally
marked two customer certificates as CA certificates. Someone then used one these on
a network gateway, which allowed them to intercept and decrypt traffic leaving it. In
2012 TrustWave issued an intermediate CA certificate to a customer that then used it
to generate end-user certificates, that allowed them to decrypt traffic. In 2011 both Co-
modo and DigiNotar CAs networks were compromised. In the first instance the attackers
issued themselves nine certificates for popular domains, however only one of them was
seen deployed in the wild. In the latter incident, the malicious certificates were used to
implement a MiTM attack, an attack which IEC62351-3 says it prevents, against Iranian
users of Gmail.
The above cases show that if the CA cannot be trusted to perform its signing function
honestly, then it compromises the global trust architecture.
• Certificates used in a trust network should only be accepted at the beginning of a session
if it can be shown that it has come from a trusted CA. If a client is unaware of how a CA
acts when it receives a certificate signing request, then they are uncertain of the level of
trust they can place in any certificates it receives. If anyone can get a certificate for their
device without any check that the person has permission to make a certificate signing
request, then the promise of authentication cannot be upheld. If there is no validation by
the CA of a requester, then an impersonation attack[22] can take place. This is further
complicated when the party requesting the CA to sign a certificate is a device rather than
an individual. This means that there is no guarantee that a device on the network is
sending its data to a legitimate party.
• CRL requests are sent unencrypted across the communications network. This problem
could allow an attacker to violate the promises of confidentiality, integrity, and authenti-
cation by manipulating or intercepting packets, via a MiTM attack. Due to this weakness
in the CRL algorithm, it is possible for an attacker to mount DoS attack against a de-
vice. As the CRL response has no boundary on its length[44], an attacker could reply to
device’s request for an updated CRL with a packet that far exceeds the overhead it can
dedicate to the task of processing.
Client Attacker CA Server
Figure A.1: The attacker sends an array of garbage data for the device to process. Where x
and y are the number of bits in the array, and y  x
A.1.2 Attack vectors within the OCSP Algorithm
The OCSP algorithm addresses the problem of CRL requests having no limit on packet length,
which was stated in section A.1.1. OCSP’s have a fixed message complexity, which is indicated
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by the responses content-length header[162], so an attacker can no longer send a reply that
would exceed a devices overhead. However, the OCSP documentation makes no comment on
the optimal latency a CA should keep to when replying to a request. Without a policy for
what a device should do if it receives no or an invalid certificate a it could be made to accept a
revoked or expired certificate by an attacker, which would undermine the promises of integrity
and authentication. As the OCSP response is not transmitted over an encrypted channel, like
CRL, an attacker can modify the response data packets. If the attacker changes the response to
”tryLater” the client doesn’t require a signed response, and, depending on the implementation,
the algorithm may ’soft fail’ and accept the certificate[55].
Client Attacker CA Server
Figure A.2: A session diagram of the ’tryLater’ attack.
A.1.3 Attack Vectors within the OCSP Stapling Algorithm
OCSP stapling is designed to allow CA’s to reduce the amount of overhead they dedicate to
the requests they receive. This is achieved by allowing the certificate holder to query the
CA’s database itself to get a signed timestamped validation response. The requirement for this
process to work is that the binding of the certificate and the CA’s validation signature must
be immutable, otherwise it then leaves verification in the hands of a potential attacker. This
would undermine any promise of authentication. Possible ways of achieving this binding are
described in section A.1.4.
Another problem with this validation method is there needs to be a redundancy in the trust
architecture if the server is unable to get their certificate signed and timestamp by a CA. If an
attacker can prevent the server from making an OCSP request then they have undermined the
IEC61850-5 promise of device availability, as no other device should connect with them due to
not being able to authenticate their identity.
A.1.4 Potential Solutions and Considerations
To secure the trust architecture of any communications network using IEC62351-3, the pro-
tocol would need to go beyond what is written in the referenced public key infrastructure
specifications. To improve the security of the CA, the standard would have to declare the
best practices expected of any entity issuing certificates on the communication network before
allowing access[178].
To prevent the ’soft fail’ scenario of the ’tryLater’ attack in OCSP, IEC6235-3 would have
to make it clear that if a device receives a ’tryLater’, revoked, or even no response that it should
not continue the session with the other party, as there is no guarantee of authentication.
To make sure that the binding of a certificate and the CA’s validation is unalterable in an OCSP
stapling trust system, there are two possible was of deploying it. The first method would be
to create a dedicated private CA for the grid’s communications network. This way an IED can
reduce the overhead needed to check that the CA is a valid entity, as if it wasn’t the private CA
it would just end the session. For this approach to work the private CA would have to develop
stringent policies on how it manages its private key(s), as if those are lost then the networks
entire trust model would be compromised[90]. It should also be noted that most commercial
CA lists used in web browsers are cultivated to be used in as many territories as possible, some
of which may decide to use its trust infrastructure to perform MiTM attacks against its own
citizens. If one of these states CA’s is used on the smart grid trust network, it could be used
for similar purposes[173]. The other method is to bind the DNSsec[54] of the communications
network with the trust topology. By making a specific tier of the grid’s DNS architecture the
only CA for the tier immediately below it, a chain of trust can be built between tiers.
It must be noted that only one of the two previous suggestions should be implemented at a
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time. Using them in combination would allow the private CA to undermine the DNSsec chain
of trust as it would allow CA’s from any tier be accepted.
A.1.5 Considerations for SG Trust Architecture
There are two challenges faced by any public key infrastructure that is implemented on a SG’s
communication network. The first is how frequently an IED should receive a copy of the latest
CRL[195]. A device is vulnerable to communicating with an adversary when it has a presented
an invalid certificate before it receives the new CRL. Most web CAs send out an updated
CRL every seven days. This leaves a web browser potentially vulnerable for six days between
updates. It is conceivable that the CRL wont be sent until it has reached a significant number
of revocations. Having a definitive policy on the time between CRL updates would remove any
uncertainty as to when a device will receive the latest CRL, which would reduce the chance
that it will accept an invalid certificate.
The second problem that needs to be considered is the overhead an IED can suffer when
processing a CRL request. The device must validate the CA’s signature, perform databasing
tasks every time it receives a CRL, and parse the database to check if the certificate it has
received in a handshake is still valid. The device has limited processing power and storage to
perform these tasks, and no consideration is made for the latency requirements of the task.
Without any QoS requirement imposed on processing a CRL request, the device could be
susceptible to an attacker using revoked certificates until the CRL has been processed and
parsed. However, IEC62351-3 does make some consideration on the storage of CRL’s. It
suggests that a CRL stored on an IED should be no larger than 8192 octets. Unfortunately it
provides no suggested recourse if a CRL is larger than this. There would be no way of remedying
an attack implemented along these vector, without external interference, as the protocol does
not allow a checking or inability to access a CRL to end an established session[181].
A.1.6 Downgrade attack
Due to the QoS promise of interoperability of devices taking precedent over security require-
ments in IEC61850-5, IEC6235-3 cannot guarantee the complete confidentiality of data sent
over its network. The specification makes no comment on what happens if there is no agree-
ment on cypher suite during a TLS handshake or CRL response signature algorithm a pair
of devices will use in a session. The danger of having no policy for this means that manu-
facturers could make the judgement for their device to use on no encryption in this instance,
which attacker could exploit in an attack. A potential justification for a manufacturer making
this decision is it reduces the overhead on the IED’s processor, which would make it easier to
be compliant with IEC62351. An example of a downgrade type attack was developed against
TLS 1.2, as it was shown that a lot of distributions were being implemented with the export
grade Diffie-Hellman 512 bit primes as a possible cipher suite. These could be precomputed[3],
therefore allowing messages to be compromised in transit. It should be noted that IEC62351-3
wouldn’t be susceptible to this attack as 1024 bit key length is the minimum requirement for
key exchange.
IEC62351-3 should make explicitly clear what happens to a session if there is no agreement
between parties on TLS protocol version or CA response. Whilst this comes into direct clash
with the requirements of IEC61850-5, it would guarantee the integrity and confidentiality of
the data being transmitted over the SG network. It should also be noted that the standard
provides backwards compatibility up to TLS 1.0. It would also strengthen IEC62351-3 security
promises to remove this requirement, as these have been shown to be insecure[16].
Client Server CA
Figure A.3: An example of a session downgrade after the CA server uses an undesirable signing
algorithm in its OCSP response.
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Appendix B
Threat Modelling Omissions in
IEC62351
The following analysis builds upon the work presented in appendix A to further explore the
security promises made by IEC61850 SAS standard, and its complementary security standard
IEC62351. The analysis shows that the principal focus of the standards is the security of the ab-
stract communications channel, whilst ignoring the rest of the communications infrastructure.
The standards declare that the security promises that the messages must maintain throughout
their transmission are confidentiality, integrity, message level authentication, availability, and
non-repudiation. The key contribution of this appendix is to show that these promises are
not upheld if the standards do not comment on the security of the rest of the communication
infrastructure. It also points out that the standards fail to provide complete formal model with
which any systems operations can be checked against the claimed promises. These omissions
arise due to the standard assuming that its threat model is complete, and that the attacks can
only occur in isolation. The designers of the standards have used traditional security measures,
whilst neglecting to consider the domain specific requirements and the added complexity of dis-
tributed systems. The analysis demonstrates that the infrastructure is susceptible to Byzantine
faults, a model that describes the resilience of a distributed system when members of the net-
work are compromised, as the standards make no declaration of a lower bound on the number
of nodes operating in undesirable states that a network should be able to tolerate. It also looks
at attacks against the time synchronisation infrastructure, and communications paths. The
analysis includes descriptions of possible solutions to these raised issues.
The authors have chosen to focus on these SAS standards because of their stringent QoS require-
ments which lends themselves as being a fertile development ground for discovering bespoke
threats that only arise in networks with distributed communication topologies. Any solutions
to these problems must also meet the QoS standards to ensure the safe operation of the SG
cyber-physical system.
B.0.1 Malicious devices on the communication network
As discussed in section 2 one potential attack vector is the injection of false data into the
state estimation calculations of an SG systems. Whilst the section presented various models
for detecting malicious data, the research usually doesn’t comment on how the injected data
infiltrates the communications network. One possibility is the adversary compromises a device
on the network, or connects their own an unauthorised device. Whilst this threat doesn’t
undermine the security of a communications channel, it does mean the communications network
cannot guarantee that proper authentication and non-repudiation of messages is maintained.
Due to the large geographical area that SG communications network will cover, it will be
exceeding difficult to visually inspect the network’s topology to make sure that there are no
unauthorised devices connected. To protect against this threat the only practical solution must
come from the communication infrastructure itself.
This attack vector has some similarities to the problems addressed in the research of Byzantine
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fault tolerance. Research in this field looks at how a distributed communication networks can
continue operating effectively when nodes within the system are operating in a misconfigured
or malicious manner. These undesirable states do not have to be brought about by malicious
interactions, they can happen if a device becomes unsure of its internal state, or desynchronised
from the rest of the network. In the SG domain it is important for the communications network
be able to resolve these errors promptly, or the undesirable states could lead to damage of
the distribution and transmission networks. Byzantine fault tolerance is based on solving the
allegorical Byzantine general problem which describes a situation where a group of generals are
seiging a city and must come to a consensus about what action to take. It is assumed that
a general sends the same message to all other generals, but the process is compromised if a
general betrays the group and sends conflicting messages to the others. It has been shown that
the group can continue operating so long as two thirds or more of the general are loyal to the
groups objective [99]. This model is useful in the SG domain because network operators need
a consensus from the nodes so a state estimation of the distribution network can be calculated.
There are various algorithms to make sure the distributed networks continue to function in
spite of a Byzantine fault. The two common approaches to resolving these kinds of faults are
increasing the accountability of nodes on the communications network, or building redundant
system for when a node is compromised. The accountability option requires the implementer
to keep a database of all the actions made by the nodes on the network. For this method to
succeed there would have to be considerations made as to how to make sure the entries in the
database weren’t modified or deleted, to prevent it becoming another attack vector. An example
of this method is the PeerReview system developed by Haeberlen et al.[75]. The drawback is
the system adds a O(N2), where N is the number of nodes in the system, to the computational
overhead of the network, which may violate the QoS requirements of IEC61850. Attempts have
been made to add the promise of accountability to advance metering infrastructure within SG’s
[104], but there doesn’t appear to be any attempts to adapt this system for the rest of SG
communications infrastructure.
The other option is building redundant nodes that act as duplicates of nodes in the network
topology[196]. When the governing algorithm identifies a faulty node, the network switches
to the redundant node to ensure the reliable and accurate operation of the network continue.
There doesn’t appear to be any attempts to use this method within the SG space.
B.0.2 Clock Synchronisation Attacks
SG’s IEDs must have the correct time to ensure reliable operation of their cyber-physical system.
Reliable synchronisation of devices and sensors across the network is required so that safety
operations can occur in the correct order. IEC61850-7-2 describes how a client server can alert
other severs that their time is inaccurate, but doesn’t provide an algorithm for how they deduce
that. The time synchronisation communication model defers to the SNTP time synchronisation
protocol [120] for this functionality. SNTP is a derivative of the NTP protocol, that removes
the algorithms that monitor the accuracy of the time servers. This means a network that uses
SNTP can only depend on one master clock or collision conditions will be created. However,
attacks that have been developed against NTP can also be used against SNTP, alongside unique
SNTP vulnerabilities.
Without an accurate time reference the IEDs that monitor and control the distribution network
will not function reliably and within the QoS of the standard. An adversary exploiting this
attack vector would be able to affect the integrity of any future messages sent from a device
and potentially allow them to cause damage to the distribution network. The research into the
various attacks against NTP and other time synchronisation standards are described in section
2.2.9.
B.0.3 Communication Path Security
In spite of IEC62351 being written with the manufactures of devices in mind, it makes little
comment on the security of the devices themselves. If the physical infrastructure is insecure,
then regardless of the channel’s security, the QoS and security promises of the standard may
not be upheld.
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Considerations need to be made for routers, because if an adversary can take control of a router
they can manipulate the distances travelled, or delay, or drop messages packets that are sent
across the communications network[197]. If an adversary can compromise a router they will
be able to undermine the promises of availability, and non-repudiation. The adversary doesn’t
necessarily need to compromise a router, they may be able to attach their own unauthorised
router to the network given the vast geographical area that communications network will have to
cover. With a compromised router they could provide false information about potential routes,
distance between routers, or create false destinations. These threats could lead to violations of
the QoS, as the standards make no comment on how the network should cope with changes in
the communications network’s topology. There are various different countermeasures against
this. Any countermeasure deployed would have to be protocol based, due to the geographical
challenges mentioned in section B.0.1. Wan et al.[197] propose a reputation based algorithm.
The routers check each others messages against a central authority. If a node is sending out
disingenuous then its reputation is lowered, until the router is just ignored. This algorithm
does rely on having secure communications with an uncorrupted central authority and they
don’t consider colluding nodes. However, it does have an advantage over similar monitoring
algorithms, such as WATCHERS[29], as it looks at the declared settings of a router rather
than just its actions. This approach prevents the adversary from trying to get other routers
blacklisted so the infrastructure comes to depend on them. An expansion of the reputation
method is distribute the job of the central authority amongst the routers on the network[100].
The routers keep a record of the contacts it has made and then distributes them amongst
’witness’ routers. These routers compare the properties of those claimed contact with what
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